Cause and Probable Results of the Civil War in America. Facts for the People of Great Britain. By WILLIAM TAYLOR, of California, author of 'Seven Years' Street Preaching in San Francisco," etc. 12mo., pp. 30. London: Simpkin, Marshall, & Co. 1862.

This pamphlet by Mr. Taylor marshals a large mass of facts, presented in a forcible way, showing the true nature of the slaveholders' rebellion. England too earnestly desires our national dismemberment to regard the argument. Otherwise it would be as effective as it is unanswerable. For how can any friend of freedom and righteousness, any enemy of human bondage, especially since the President's proclamation and his message of 1862, pretend to doubt that the true foe with which our free North struggles is the fell power of American slavery?

We said nearly a year ago that the only basis of permanent peace is a Northernization of the South. Short of this we are two nations, and no documentary unions can make us ONE. Our worst enemies are, and ever have been, the compromisers. There is no safe intermediate between the complete abolishment of the old and creation of a new South, homogeneous with the North, or an inauguration of two independent nationalities. That renovation of the South may consist of the entire destruction of slavery, and the occupancy of the vacant lands of the South by a hardy, industrious, free yeomanry. Then, not until then, we may hope to be not a mere Union but a Unit.

Late, yet sure in the accomplishment of this view, comes the President's Proclamation of Emancipation. We trust that before our readers trace our words its consummation will be a fact of history. No great convulsion, no disintegration of southern society will ensue. But a blow will be given, quiet, without a shock, by which the legal bond will be forever broken, and southern society will be compelled to readjust itself to the new order of things. The slave will become a hired laborer. The late slaveholders will be the most decided opponents of the phantasy of general colonization. The system of free labor being inaugurated, and the power of the oligarchy broken, confiscation, immigration, and renovation will be the desirable results. How completely and how rapidly this programme is to be fulfilled time will decide.

Christian Predestination; or, the Predetermined Providential Appointment of them that love God to suffer with Jesus, that with Him they may be Glorified. Being an Exposition of Romans viii, 29, 30, deduced critically from the text. By the Rev. JOHN S. EVANS. 18mo., pp. 48. Quebec. 1862.

This is a very acute piece of biblical argument. Its aim is to furnish a true and natural exposition of a standing proof-text appropriated

by Calvinism. The critic would rescue the terms "called," "justified," and "glorified" from the technical sense which a system has fastened to them, and which inveterately spring up as soon as the words are heard. His exposition is that the foreknown are "the called" to suffer the "afflictions" of the previous context; "in hope" that in those "afflictions" they are "justified," and "glorified" by a sustaining, defending, honoring God.

The Great Specific against Despair of Pardon; or, Christ's Propitiation and Advocacy extending alike to every Sinner without exception. A Discourse before the Genesee Conference of Ministers of the Methodist Episcopal Church at its session in Albion, and published at its order and expense. By Rev. I. CHAMBERLAYNE. 12mo., pp. 32. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1862.

Dr. Chamberlayne has a mind that delights to grapple with the grand doctrines and hard problems of old theology. He here takes stand, with able, manly argument, against the doctrine that any man before death "sins away his day of grace," or-if we understand him-commits "the unpardonable sin." Against this doctrine he arrays in mass the counter principle that the Atonement reaches not only every sinner but every sin. Still, with every respect for the able author, we do not see how this contravenes the declaration of Christ that there is one sin without forgiveness, inasmuch as it blasphemes and drives away, by its enormity, that spirit whose gracious aid is condition to all repentance. Our impression is that millions are lost because we cannot awaken their fear to one who perishes from "despair."

ART. XII.-THE DENIAL OF FINAL CAUSES.

THE remarks on final causes at page 39 are so obtruded upon the train of thought that we could have easily separated them from the article, but have preferred to retain them as a specimen of the godless naturalism which is at the present day infecting European science. From the fact that certain phenomena appear in nature, which plainly serve no purpose of utility, it is inferred that there is no design in creation at all; that things are used, because there are antecedent favorable conditions for use; but that use is not the end or purpose for which anything exists. "So the true naturalist will say that birds fly because they have wings; but never birds have wings in order that they may fly." It is not clear from Martins's quotation whether De Candolle intended to limit all

reasoners by his maxim, or naturalists as such only. If the latter, he was only stating the boundaries of natural science. It may indeed be true, that such is the only maxim for the naturalist; but that does not settle the question whether a thinker of a wider range may not accept both propositions, and say, "Not only do birds fly because they have wings, but they have wings in order that they may fly."

Our naturalist affords us in this essay a beautiful view of the structural system of living nature. One thing strikes us on a comprehensive glance at its whole. The principle of its plan, namely, the blending of uniformity and variety, is a contingent, not a necessary principle. It is not a system of organic necessity, originating like the steps of a geometric demonstration, solely possible, selfexistent, and rising with a structure, in which every successive step results from the preceding. A system of uniformities with ad libitum variations is a system of a selective character, picked out of countless other supposably possible systems, formed with an outline and a coherent intellective plan, of which the principles are intellectively detected, and are found to be perfectly in accordance with the laws of volitional thought. The only solution of their origin then, since blind causational necessity is out of the question, is intelligent choice; and intelligent choice, present at and anterior to the selection of the plan, and comprehending the whole, basing it on its actual principles.

What are those principles? The naturalist tells us in this article. They are "uniformity in type and variety in modification." This is the fundamental law, and the whole system is its fulfillment. But what is the law for? It is for the purpose of regulating the actions of every part of the system, so as to produce its whole. What are the actions of its parts and particles for? To so obey the law as to complete its organic plan. What is the synthesis of law and actions for? To produce the entire system. The very selection of the system, of its laws, and of the action of the elements according to its laws, is inexplicable without the supposition of design. So far, then, from furnishing a refutation of the law of design thus far, the whole scheme of the naturalist seems obliged to illustrate its existence.

But how are these laws by us discovered? By observing the facts. But does not the same observation find out that the subserviences to use are quite as numerous as the "varieties in modification?" Are there not infinite multiplicities of curious, wonderful, and use-serving action and operation attained at least by the way? The naturalist will tell us that he had nothing to

do with these. We reply, then he had nothing to do with, and no right to say anything about the existence or non-existence of the doctrine of ends. If he has nothing to do with this, others may belong to a broader and higher school; and over-passing his limits, they may say that we have something to do with them. They may claim to find uniformity in type, variety in modification, and both subservient to infinite varieties of use.

This subserviency to use is no more to be destroyed by the existence of arrangements made to secure other principles, namely, the law sometimes of uniformity, sometimes of variety, than the fact of variety and uniformity is destroyed by the myriads of subordinations to the law of use. The fact, at any rate, of subserviency to use is too universal and overwhelming in amount, and too positive in its character and in its artistic complicated and converging combinations, to be possibly mistaken without a most perverse and inveterate purpose to be mistaken. But in the light of the remarks thus far made, let us survey the exceptions to the law of use by which Martins and Goethe would overthrow its existence.

That the useless nipple is given to man on the law of uniformity does not in the least contradict the fact that the breast is given to the woman for use; namely, for the purpose of nourishment; a purpose without which the race cannot be preserved; a purpose demonstrated by its pervading character for the female of a large genus of beings, for which it is necessary as a means of generic existence. That the useless wings of the apterix preserve the law of uniformity does not disprove that those of the eagle and the lark preserve the law of use. That the ox hooks because he has horns nobody denies; but the fact that there are animals not so well provided does not in the least disprove the purpose of fulfilling the law of variety by making him an aggressive and self-defensive animal. There may be a variety of variations from the law of use without destroying that law, as well as from the law of uniformity of type without destroying that law. Each law may take its turn, and with due "variety" blend, even in the same case.

Nor

There is in this matter a question which both Martins and Goethe overlook. The true question is not, "Why do birds fly ?" but, How came this complicated, converging, and most exquisite adjustment of conditions by which birds are able to, fly? does Mr. Darwin's "natural selection" at all aid us here; for the question still recurs, How came this most complex and yet most complete system, in which "natural selection" has its chances of effective work? "Natural selection" operates with wonderful success; but it must possess as truly wonderful a synthesis of prin

ciples, a framework and system within which to work, as genius ever invented or art constructed. What is the solution to this so complicated yet so complete and structural a system?

It is a plain first principle of all reasoning that an immediate and ample solution of a problem should not be rejected in behalf of a more distant and less ample one; still less for no other whatever. Of this complicated system we have a complete and ample solution, if it may but be even for a moment tried. The supposition, namely, of an anterior Intellect conceiving the plan with an executive Will adequate to its execution, does furnish all the conditions necessary for the solution of this question; and there is not only no better, but there is positively no other whatever. And we might leave it for matter of reflection whether it is not intuitively certain that Mind such as, or at least analogous to, the mind which we are conscious ourselves of possessing, must not be the cause of plans, of a nature, so purely rational.

Take for instance the human tongue, viewed as the organ of speech, and consider what an infinite number of adjustments of the most complex character must precede, in order to its being an articulate organ. And still further back, consider its connection with the anterior physical frame of man; then its adjustment to the ear not merely of the individual, but of all other individuals; requiring another system to match of exquisite adjustments in the ear itself. Then consider the relation of both with sound; and of sound with thought, in order to its adaptation to be the medium of communicating that thought from mind to mind. Escape if you can, without an abdication of common sense, the perceiving that the ear and the tongue are predictive of human intercourse, society, and a social system. Is it not most plain to every man's reason that all this can have no antecedent solution but, the presupposition of an anterior potential Mind, a mind which understands mind, which designs design, which anticipates facts, society, history, and makes the most wonderful provision for such results? The man who comprehends all these innumerable and infinitesimal requisite complications, and then says, "Men talk because they have lungs, throat, tongues, vocality, ears, and minds, all adjusted harmoniously and converging to this result," and refuses to admit that "these conditions are designedly.combined in order that speech and the social system may exist," disuses his honest common-sense.

We said that living nature is not like a geometric problem of Euclid, whose origin is in necessity, and whose every step follows in the whole structure with an intrinsic adamantine necessity. We will now say that it is like a parable of the divine Lord of