it is not necessary to determine any of those extreme questions. In the present case I think no loss was sustained by any of the risks in the policy-the loss was occasioned by the extreme mismanagement by the plaintiffs of their regulator. I have no reason to alter my opinion. Dallas, J. was of the same opinion, and the rule was refused.

Upon this decision Mr. Ellis (p. 27,) observes-It does not appear whether the proposals of the policy in this case protected the insurers from making good any loss or damage occasioned by the misapplication of fire heat under process of manufacture. It probably did not, or it otherwise would have been made a strong point for the defendants. It may be inferred, therefore, from this case, that damage by heat alone, without ignition, even where there is no express provision, is not covered by the ordinary indemnity against loss or damage by fire, and a fortiori, where this provision is introduced, and the misapplication of fire heat occasioned by ignition, the insurers will not be liable.

The policy was on premises "where no fire is kept, and where no hazardous goods are deposited. Held, that these words mean the habitual use of fire and deposit of hazardous goods; and therefore, where the fire happened in consequence of making a fire, and bringing a tar-barrel on to the premises to repair them :-Held, that the insured were entitled to recover." Dobson v. Southby, M. and M. 90.-Tenderden.

In the case of a freight policy, the underwriters were held not liable for the loss of freight, in consequence of part of the goods being left behind by the captain, on account of their being so damaged in a storm that they are liable to ignition, and that, to enable him to carry them forward, a process must be undergone, and the ship detained, at an expense which would be equal to the amount of the freight. Moody v Jones, 4 B. & Cr. 394.

If goods are put on board the ship in a very damaged state, in consequence of which they are liable to ignite and generate a fire, by which they are consumed, the underwriters are not liable for the loss. Boyd v. Dubois, 3 Camp. 133. The underwriters are not discharged by the circumstance of the goods having been damaged, or by the non-communication of that fact to the underwriters: but if in consequence of the damage which the goods have previously received, they consume themselves, the underwriters are not liable for the loss.

3. Insurance of specific articles to be construed by the general scope of the policy.

The meaning of the terms used in a policy will vary, according to the business to which they are applied. The plaintiff, a Coach-plater and Cow-keeper, insured his "stock in trade, household furniture, linen, wearing apparel, and plate,” against fire for one year. Upon a fire happening within the year; and consuming, amongst other things, a large stock of linen drapery goods which he had purchased a short time before on speculation, and which, it was, contended, were protected by the policy under the denomination of “linen”Lord Ellenborough held, that the word linen in the policy, evidently meaning, from the terms with which it was accompanied, household linen, or linen

1

used by way of apparel; and consequently did not protect the linen drapery goods on speculation :-the party insured not being a linen draper. Watchorne v. Langford and others, 3 Camp. 422. So, in Moadinger v. The Mechanic's Fire Ins. Co. of the City of N. Y. 2 Hall, 490, the plaintiff effected an insurance on "his stock in trade, as a baker, and on household furniture, contained in a framed dwelling-house and bake-house, front and rear, situated at No. 17 Thames street." It was insisted by the plaintiff that the terms “stock in trade" covered not only the flour used by him in his bake-house, but also all the implements and fixtures belonging to his business. The judge instructed the jury, that the terms stock in trade, when applied to a baker's property, must be intended to mean something more, than when used among merchants, from whom they were borrowed, and to whose business they were originally applicable. The terms when used in a policy, to designate the property of a mechanic, must be taken to mean whatever was necessary for the conducting of his business; and in the case then before the Court, not merely the flour used for baking. Moadinger v. The Mechanic's F. Ins. Co., 2 Hall, 490. The plaintiff was a baker, carrying on business in a limited way. On the day of the fire, his whole stock of bread was upon his cart, and he contended, that in order to give effect to the intention of the parties, his fixtures and implements of business, must be considered as covered by the terms "stock in trade" as used in the policy; and of this opinion was the Court saying :—“We think the policy protected every thing which was necessary for carrying on of the plaintiff's business; and such ought to be the construction in all cases relating to the pursuits of mechanics-A mechanic who insures his stock, covers his implements of trade also. ib. The stock of a merchant comprehends articles entirely different from the stock of a farmer; but the terms in all cases, apply to personal property only. ib.

The insurance also was 66 on household furniture," and the plaintiff claimed to recover for the loss of five portraits, with their frames, twelve silver tablespoons, twelve tea-spoons, and a silver sugar-tongs. Defendants objected, because the 8th condition annexed to the policy provided that "jewels, plate, &c. should not be included in any insurance, unless specified in the policy." But the Chief Justice charged the Jury, "that although plate and paintings" were not covered by the policy, unless specified, yet he doubted, whether the condition could be applied to the portraits, or silver spoons specified in the plaintiff's schedule; and he accordingly instructed the jury to consider them as covered by the policy. Upon exception taken, Held, that the charge of the Judge was correct. ib.

The stock of a baker "contained in a framed dwelling-house and bakehouse, front and rear, situated at No. 17 Thames st." Thirty barrels of flour, were stored under a shed which led from the bake-house to the front house, and the judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the flour thus stored. Moadinger v. The Mechanic's Fire Ins. Co. 2 Hall, 490.

4. Commencement and Duration of the Contract.

In general the risk commences from the signing of the policy, the payment of the premium, or of a deposite on account thereof; and it will in general end with the term for which it is made. In England insurances against fire are in general either annual, or for a term of seven years, at an annual premium; and the offices as an indulgence to the assured, generally allow fifteen days from the expiration of each year; and the assured is considered under the protection of the policy till the expiration of the fifteen days, provided the premium be paid within that time. Ellis, p. 49.

The plaintiffs stipulated to pay £7 10s. half-yearly on the 10th day of June and the 10th day of December, and that they would, as long as the managers agreed to accept the same, make their payments within the 15 days after the time limited; but no insurance is to take place until the premium be actually paid. The continuation of the term, therefore, depends on two circumstances, which may both concur, namely, that the insured should pay the £7 10s. and that the insurers should agree to accept that sum. Barely stating these facts is sufficient to show that the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover." The judgment was afterwards affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber. See Hughes on Ins. 508. Soon after this decision the Royal Exchange Assu. Co., the Phoenix, and some other companies, gave notice that they did not mean to take advantage of the judgment so pronounced, but would hold themselves liable for any loss during the 15 days which are allowed for the payment of the renewed premium upon annual policies, and others for a longer period, but that every policy for a shorter period than a year would cease at six o'clock in the evening of the day mentioned therein. Ib. By a policy under seal referring to certain printed proposals, a fire office insured the defendant's premises from the 11th of November, 1802, to the 25th December, 1803, for a certain premium, which was to be paid yearly on each 25th of December; and the insurance was to continue so long as the insured should pay the premium at the said times and the office should agree to accept it. And by the printed proposals, it was stipulated that the insured should make all future payments annually at the office within fifteen days after the day limited by the policy, on pain of forfeiting the benefit thereof, and that no insurance was to take effect till the premium was paid. And by a subsequent advertisement (agreed to be taken as part of the policy) the office engaged that all persons insured there, by policies for a year or more, had been and should be considered as insured for fifteen days beyond the time of the expiration of their policies. Notwithstanding this latter clause, the assured having, before the expiration of the year, had notice from the office to pay an increased premium for the year ensuing, otherwise they would not continue the insurance, which the assured had refused; the office was held not liable for a loss which had happened within fifteen days from the expiration of the year for which the assurance was made; though the assured, after the loss, and before the fifteen days expired, tendered the the full premium which had been demanded. The effect of the whole contract taken to

gether, was only to give the assured an option to continue the insurance or not during fifteen days after the expiration of the year ensuing, notwithstanding any intervening loss, provided the office had not, before the end of the year, determined the option by giving notice that they would not renew the contract. Salvin and Others v. Jones and Others, 6 East, 571.

A covenant in the lease of a house to insure, and keep insured, a given sum of money upon the premises, during the term, in some sufficient insurance office, is not void for uncertainty, but means that the premises shall be insured against fire, in some office where insurances against fire are usually effected. Where there was such a covenant in a lease on the part of the tenant, he effected an annual policy on the premises with an insurance company, in the usual printed form, by which it was declared that the policy shall be for such longer period as the tenant shall regularly pay, and the company receive the premium, during which the company was to be liable. The policy expired on the 25th of March, 1811; but the tenant did not pay the premium for a renewal until the 25th of April following; the company then gave a receipt for the premium, stating the insurance to be from Lady-day, 1811, till Lady-day, 1812. Here the covenant was ruled to have been broken, by reason of the non-payment of the premium on or before the 9th of April, and the lease was held void under a clause of re-entry, Doe d. Pitt v. Shewen, 3 Campb. 134. Lord Ellenborough C. J. in this case said, "that it may admit of considerable doubt, whether by the revenue laws the policy could be lawfully renewed by the payment of the premium after the end of the fifteen days. At any rate its existence was suspended from the 9th to the 25th of April, the covenant to insure was therefore broken, and the landlord was entitled to recover at law, whatever relief there might be for the tenant in equity." On the 19th of January, defendants applied for insurance by letter desiring to be informed in regard to the terms of insurance. The office replied on the 21st of the same month stating the And on the 22d the defendants again wrote the plaintiffs thus-" We have received yours of the 21st instant and accept your terms for the stock in the Gleaner and wish a policy filled, viz. on 26 horses, valued at $2200, and on 20 oxen valued at $800-$3000." It was held, that no contract was perfected, because the first two letters were conversant about an open policy, while that of the 22d, requested a valued policy. This was a new proposal, which the defendants might presume the underwriters would accept, but they could not know it. The office had assumed no such obligation. The policy transmitted, was not conformable to the proposition; and there having been no union of minds between the parties, the Court decided, of consequence, that there was no contract; and the note given for the premium in suit was not recoverable. Ocean Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 3 Conn. 225.

terms.

The contract must be complete; otherwise the company shall not be liable to pay any loss. Therefore where the plaintiff applied for insurance, and the defendants prepared an application and a note for the premium dated the 16th January, which was sent to the plaintiff to be signed and returned by mail. He signed the application on the 28th of January and returned the same by mail together with the premium note to his agent on the 28th of the same

month. The House was burnt on the 31st of January, but the papers were not sent to the office until the 3d of the ensuing month. Held, that at the time when the fire took place, there was no complete contract of insurance between the parties, but only a negotiation which had not resulted in a contract. Thayer v. Middlesex Mutual F. Ins. Co. 10 Pick. 326.

It is settled, that a policy of insurance on a voyage from a particular part to a specified port or ports, and until moored 24 hours in safety, against the usual risks, has the effect to prolong the time for which the assurers have engaged to be liable, without varying the nature of the perils insured against. If without this clause the vessel be insured to her port of destination, the voyage is determined on her arrival and being moored on the usual anchorage ground; but with this clause the policy is further extended twenty-four hours. If there-· fore no loss, for which the underwriters are answerable, shall happen during the voyage, or during twenty-four hours after, they are discharged. And the vessel is safe within the terms of the policy, until she suffers a loss insured against. Bill et al. v. Mason, 6 Mass. 313. This construction seems necessa

ry to give some termination to the risk; for if it was held that the vessel was not moored in safety while she is in hazard of a loss, she never can be moored in safety; for in the finest weather she may be in danger of fire, lightning, enemies and other perils, if not exposed to any sea risks.

5. Effect of notice by an Office to determine a contract, except upon payment of a higher premium, and of the time allowed for the payment of premiums.

After notice by the Sun Fire Office under the following circumstances to determine a contract, except upon payment of a higher premium, and refusal on the part of the insured to pay such premium, the insured were held to be protected by the policy during the fifteen days allowed by the Office for the payment of the premium, &c. for the following year.

The allowance of the fifteen days is to be considered as forming part of the period covered by the policy for the following year, but, in order to discharge the Office of liability during that period, there must be notice to determine the contract.

Where the insurance company reserves to itself the right to refuse to renew the policy, unless upon payment of a higher premium, the assured has an option to continue the insurance or not during the time mentioned for the payment thereof. If the assured refuse to accept the increased rate of premium, the company will not be liable for a loss; though the assured, after the loss, and before the time specified for the payment of the premium has expired, tender the full premium demanded. He shall not have a right to revoke his refusal after a loss has happened and thereby claim to recover for what he had previously determined he would not be insured. Salvin v. Jones, 6 East. 571. It is made a condition with most Offices, that persons insuring property should give notice of any other insurance made elsewhere on the same property on their behalf, and cause a minute or memorandum of such other insurance to be endorsed on their policies; and in this case the company is only