unless insured as such, although the party may have a lien for advances. Bricta v. N. Y. Lafayette Ins. Co. 2 Hall, 372. But the words "goods held on commission in fire policies, are equivalent to the clause "for whom it may concern," usually inserted in marine policies. They contain a distinct declaration to the insurers, that the assured is acting for the benefit of his consignors and that other interests, than his own, is to be protected by the policy. It surely is not necessary to the validity of such an insurance, for the factor to insert the names of his principals in the policy. Such a requisition would be embarrassing in the extreme, and often impracticable. It cannot be foreknown whose goods will be there. See observations of Ch. J. Jones and Mr. Justice Oakley, in De Forest v. The Fulton F. Ins. Co. supra.

(c) The interest of carriers.—A carrier may insure the goods he contracts to convey; yet he has neither the legal title, nor the beneficial interest in them, but he is responsible for their loss. His insurance is upon the goods; yet his indemnity is against the consequences of his implied guaranty for their safe carriage, and not against the loss or deterioration of the property by the perils insured against. By Jones, C. J. in 1 Hall, 110. So in Oliver v. Green, 3 Mass. 133, a part owner of a ship chartered the residue of her, with an agreement to pay a specific sum if she should be lost, and insured the whole ship as his own property, without stating the nature of his interest; and he recovered for the whole value of her, notwithstanding the objection of short interest was taken. So in Bartlett v. Goodwin, 13 Mass. 267, the charterer of a vessel who agreed to insure her, was held to have an insurable interest; and he recovered the actual value averring an interest in himself.

These may be said not to be apposite examples, as the charterer is deemed the owner of the ship for the voyage, But his title, at best, is but temporary, and terminates with the voyage. He has the use of the ship for the time the charter-party has to run; but he has not the right of property. The legal ownership continues in him who lets her to hire, and the insurable interest of the charterer, in the cases cited, consisted in his exposure to damage from his engagement to protect the owner from loss, against the consequences of which engagement, he insures for his indemnity. So, again, a creditor may insure the life of his debtor, because his debt would be put in greater jeopardy by the death of the debtor. And it has been held, that a creditor may insure the goods of his debtor, destined for the payment of his debt, though consigned to another person. Yet these insurances are, in effect, for the use of the debtor and enure to his benefit. And that objection was urged against the insurance effected by a creditor, to whom the bill of lading had been assigned; but it was held to be untenable. By Oakley, J. 1 Hall, 111.

A pawnee, depository or common carrier, may legally insure their respective interests, subject to the rules of the different offices by most of which the nature of the property insured is to be specified; "and it may be observed in general (adds Mr. Ellis, p. 22), that although the st. 14 Geo. 3. c. 48, has a tendency to throw considerable difficulties in the way of recovering upon a loss both on fire and life policies, by putting the claimant to the proof of his inter

est, in order to entitle him to recover, the offices in general from a sense of liberality and the good faith due to the public, seldom avail themselves of this objection when the claim is even tolerably fair and honest. In fact, such would be the difficulty of ascertaining the precise quantum of interest in many cases, in order to comply with the third section of the act, that this clause would, if insisted on, materially affect the whole system of fire and life insurance, by making the sum to be paid upon the event happening, a constant subject of doubt and litigation." The words of the S. 3, are-" And in all cases, where the insured hath interest in such life or lives, event or events, no greater sum shall be recovered or received from the insurer or insurers than the amount or value of the interest of the insured on such life or lives, or other event or events."

(d) Indorser of bill of lading.-The consignor of goods for sale usually effects the insurance for himself on maritime risks, the consignee is not expected to insure the goods against maritime risks on the voyage of importation. By Jones, C. J. in 1 Hall, 120. The reason why the consignee does not insure in such cases, without an order from the consignor, is because the consignor being on the spot, is better capable of determining whether he will insure or not. And where the consignees make advances they insure for their own protection.

A bill of lading is transferable by the indorsement of the shipper or consignor. But if the shipper be the owner, and the ship be on his own account and risk, although he may not pass the title by a mere indorsement of the bill of lading, unless he be the consignee, or what is the same thing, it be deliverable to his order; yet by an assignment, either on the bill of lading, or any separate instrument, he can pass the legal title to the same, and it will be good against all persons, except a purchaser for valuable consideration by the indorsement of the bill of lading itself. Such an assignment not only passes the legal title, as against his agents and factors, but also against his creditors, in favor of the assignee. The result of the principle is, that bills of lading are transferable by indorsement, and this may pass the property. By Story, J. in 4 Mason, 515. See also 18 J. R. 157.

Though the second vendee of a chattel cannot, generally speaking, stand in a better situation than his immediate vendor, Small v. Moate, 9 Bing, 574; Dixon v. Yeates, 5 B. & Ad. 313; but on this rule there is an exception engrafted, for the vendee may, by negotiating the bill of lading to a bona fide transferree, defeat the vendor's right to stop in transitu. It is now the admitted doctrine in our courts that the consignee, under the circumstances above stated, may confer an absolute right and property, upon a third person, indefeasible by any claim on the part of the consignor.

Fraud on the part of the assignee; for instance, if he know that the consignee is insolvent and take the assignment of the bill of lading for the purpose of defeating the right to stop in transitu, and so defrauding the consignor out of the price, he will be held to stand in the same situation as the consignee; and the consignor will preserve his right of stoppage. By Ld. El

lenborough in 9 East, 514, and see Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio, 98. And if the bill of lading contain a condition, the endorsee takes it subject to that condition. 3 Camp. 92.

A factor stands in a different situation from a vendee with respect to his power to pass the property therein by an indorsement of the bill of lading. He might bind his principal by a sale of the property, but not by a pledge. By st. 4 G. 4. c. 83, amended by 6 G. 4. c. 94, usually called the Factor's Act, the law, was altered. But a fraudulent sale cannot be upheld under this act. 1 M. & M. 48.

The goods are in transitu so long as they remain in any place of deposit connected with their transmission. 8 Pick. 198. If after their arrival, however, at their place of destination, they be warehoused with the carrier, whose store the vendee uses as his own, or even if they be warehoused with the vendor himself, and rent be paid to him for them, that puts an end to the right to stop in transitu. See 2 Bing. N. C. 83; 1 M. & Wels. 20; 6 B. & C. 422; ib. 109; 2 Tyrwh, 217. The true distinction is, whether any actual possession by the consignee or his assigns, after the termination of the voyage be, or be not provided for in the bills of lading. When such actual possession, after the termination of the voyage, is so provided for, then the right of stopping in transitu remains after the shipment. Thus if goods are consigned on credit, and delivered on board a ship chartered by the consignee to be imported by him, the right of stopping in transitu continues after the shipment, (3 East, 381;) but if the goods are not to be imported by the consignee, but to be transported to the place of shipment, to a foreign market, the right of stopping in transitu ceases on the shipment, the transit being then completed; because no other actual possession of the goods by the consignee is provided in the bills of lading, which express the terms of the shipment (7 T. R. 442.) By Parsons, C. J. in Stubb v. Lund, 7 Mass. 453.

The same rule must govern, if the consignee be the ship-owner. If the goods be delivered on board of his ship, to be carried to him, an actual possession by him after delivery is provided for by the terms of the shipment; but if the goods are put on board his ship to be transported to a foreign market, he has on the shipment all the possession contemplated in the bills of lading. In the former case the transit continues until the termination of the voyage; but in the latter case the transit ends on the shipment. Ib.

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"The same distinction must exist in the case of a general ship.—If a ship sail from this country to Great Britain, with the intention of taking on board goods of divers persons on freight, to be transported to a foreign market, as the mercantile adventures of different shippers.-If goods are so shipped by the several consignors there is no transit to the consignees after shipment; and no right of stopping remains with the consignors. But it is otherwise when several persons import goods in a general ship on their own credit and risk, for a future actual possession by them is provided for in the bills of lading." Ib.

"An insolvent consignee may, before he receive the goods, disagree to the consignment, and the assent of the consignor shall be presumed unless he, in

a reasonable time, declare his dissent, or neglect to give notice of his assent. That he avail himself of this disagreement, the consignee should give reasonable notice thereof, and he must within a reasonable time declare his intention. For if, after notice he is silent, his assent shall no longer be presumed. If the goods arrive here before the consignor can have notice that his consignee had disagreed to the shipment, any person, at the request of the consignee, may receive and take care of them until the consignor can have notice; and an intermediate attachment shall not defeat his right. Per Parsons, C. J. in 5 Mass. 157. However, if the consignees here undertake to assign the goods, and authorize a sale thereof for the use of the consignor; this is in affirmance of the contract; and we cannot presume that the consignor would consent to the appointment of a factor, with power to receive and sell. The authority of the factor is derived from the consignee, and necessarily supposes an interest in the goods. Id.

Whether stoppage in transitu rescinds the contract of sale altogether, or only puts the vendor in possession of a lien on the goods defeasible on payment of the price agreed on, is still undetermined. See 10 B. & C. 99; 3 B. & Ad. 323.

In Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio, 98, it was held, that the vendor's right of stopping in transitu, was not founded on the right to rescind the contract, but rested on the ground of an equitable lien; and that the vendee had a right to redeem the goods on complying with the contract or paying the price.

(e.) Of joint and several interests in the same policy.-A factor or commission merchant who has the consignments of the merchandize of different employers, may cover the whole with one insurance, in the name of the consignee who has the actual possession and charge of the whole, and the same special property in all. The form of insurance now in use is, a general policy in the name of the commission merchant, on all the goods that may be in his warehouse, at any time within a given period, to a specified amount, whether held by him as owner, or in trust, or on commission. And under such a contract the insurers will be answerable for loss or damage by fire, within the terms of the insurance, to whatever merchandize or property may happen to be in the warehouse at the time of the fire, and be then held by the assured, as general or special owner, without regard to the time of his receipt of the goods in store, or the persons who may be interested in them. De Forest v. The Fulton Fire Ins. Co. 1 Hall, 84. A policy, thus made, cannot be considered as attaching specifically and solely, on the goods in the hands of the factor, at the date of the policy. The property of consignors is constantly changing, in the hands of the consignees; and it will and must often happen, that no part of the specific goods, originally covered by the policy, is exposed to loss, when any fire may take place. The goods of A., which occupy a place in his warehouse, at the present moment, may be sold before the close of the day, and the goods of B. take their place to-morrow; and in the course of thirty days, as many different lots of merchandize may have had the shelter of his warehouse, and been exposed for different periods of time, to the risk or loss or damage by fire therein. By Jones, C. J. ib.

Several insurable interests arise out of the same property. Where several are interested in the same subject, one may insure his interest without disclosing his title whether it be joint or several. Such an insurance is not within the clause, which requires notice to be given of any previous insurance. Tyler v. Aetna Ins. Co. 12 Wend. 507-9 ib. 404. See also the case of Oliver v. Greene, 3 Mass. 137. In the case of Holbrook v. Brown, 2 ib. 280, the captain of the vessel was entitled to certain commissions on her arrival and he effected an insurance on his "property in the vessel :" Held, that the word "property" was very comprehensive, and included the interest of the master, whether it was to be considered as commissions or as a specific proportion of the cargo belonging exclusively to him.

It is not now to be disputed, that several persons having several interests in property, may insure to the full value of that interest. There are numerous cases settling this point. By Parker, C. J. in Locke v. North Amer. Ins. Co., 13 Mass. 61. But one tenant in common has no right, merely in virtue of such relation to cause insurance to be made on property on board of a vessel for his co-tenant. 11 Pick. 85. Nor has a master of a vessel a right merely as master to procure insurance for the owners. ib. and see 1 Conn. 571.

Where the insurance is on property for whom it may concern, or for the owners generally in a marine insurance, it may be shown by extrinsic evidence, that the plaintiffs intended that the policy should cover separate or joint property, or both. And even where the assured are not named in the policy, it is competent to prove who they are by extrinsic evidence. Foster v. The United States Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 85.

Joint owners of property insured for their joint use and on their joint account cannot recover upon a count upon the policy, averring the interest to be in one of them only, Bell v. Ansley, 16 East, 141. If the assured aver an entire interest in themselves in the subject insured, such averment cannot be supported by evidence of a joint interest with others. Nor can the averment of a joint interest with others be supported by proof a sole interest. By Thompson, J. in Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Co., 1 Paine's C. R. 615; 1 Wend. 661. Where the insurance is made on the account of the others interested as well as himself, the joint interest should be truly averred, and proved as averred. Murray v. Col. Ins. Co., 11 J. R. 202. In the case of Foster v. The United States Ins. Co. 11 Pick. 85, G. B. & M. were joint owners of the vessel; G., who was master as well as owner wrote to the plaintiffs as follows:"The property to ship home in Sampson, say $1000, you will insure at lowest rate on account of owners." The policy was in the name of the plaintiffs thus :-"Cause Foster and Thompson, for the owners of brig Sampson to be assured, lost or not lost, $1000 on property on board brig Sampson, at," &c. There were several counts in the declaration, but the averments in the second count corresponded precisely with the fact; and G. recovered not only the amount of his property on his sole account, but his interest also in the joint property. The Court say-" We consider the policy to be effected for whomsoever it might concern, being owners of the Sampson, and that those were words of description of the persons who were to be assured, compre