tion, whether admitting representatives from the Colonies may not be a proper expedient for the present exigencies.

Two years ago, a proposal of this kind would not have borne a hearing: but so much is America altered by the late financial Acts, that a new system of policy, and of a more refined kind than was wanted heretofore, is now become needful. The patch-work government of America will last no longer: the necessity of a Parliamentary establishment of the Governments of America upon fixed constitutional principles, is brought on with a precipitation which could not have been foreseen but a year ago; and is become more urgent, by the very incidents which make it more difficult. The circumstance of the Americans justifying their disobedience by their not being represented, points out a method to enforce their obedience upon their own principles. Take them at their word; let them send representatives for the present time, and for the present purposes; thirty for the Continent, and fifteen for the Islands, would be sufficient. In this Parliament, the Colonies being actually represented, let the affairs of the American Governments be canvassed to the bottom; and let a general, uniform system of American Governments be formed and established by Act of Parliament, by which the Americans, according to their own principles, will be bound; and let the relation of America to Great Britain be determined and ascertained by solemn Recognition: so that the rights of the American Governments and their subordination to that of Great Britain, may no longer be a subject of doubt and disputation. When this great work is done, the American representatives may be dismissed, and left to attend their own Legislatures, which will then know the bounds of their own authority; or may be continued, as shall be most advisable.

The civil policy of America is composed of temporary expedients, all derived from the Crown only; not one of the American Governments has that sanction which none of them ought to be without, a Parliamentary establishment. And, until the Parliament shall establish the American Governments

upon a constitutional bottom, and ascertain the limitations and extensions of their Legislatures, it must be expected that the Governments will be continually subject to disturbance, whenever the Americans think fit to complain of innovations upon, and infringements of, their rights; that is, whenever anything is required of them which they don't like.

In a letter of December 14, 1765, he said:

The chief arguments of the Americans against their being subject to Acts of Parliament which impose inland taxes (and it will hold equally good against all other Acts of Parliament for the regulation of their internal policy) is, that they are not represented in Parliament. This is the Palladium of their cause: but they have of late discovered, that this is a dangerous argument; for if the Parliament should allow them to send representatives, they are concluded, and must then be bound by Acts of Parliament, according to their own principles. Therefore of late, when they use this argument, they add, that such a representation is impracticable. Now it certainly is not strictly impracticable; though it may be difficult, inexpedient or improper. But it seems to me, that it is both expedient and proper for the present time and purposes. The Parliament must now interpose for regulating the policy of America, or else all things will run into confusion. But if they proceed to such regulations, whilst the Americans dispute their authority, what can be expected but an enforced obedience, whilst the seeds of opposition lie ready to shoot up in proper season ?-whereas, if the Parliament first removes the pretence for the Colonies not being subject to it, there can be no pretence for their disobedience afterwards.

Besides, if the Parliament should undertake so important a work as the new modelling of the Governments in America, which seems to me to be at this time unavoidable, it appears reasonable that the Colonies should have their deputies in the House, both to hear and to speak upon the subject relating to them. If they were allowed this liberty, (even though they did not accept it, as probably some of them would not), they could not complain of their rights being disposed of without their

For a liberty of sending repre

being heard, as they do now. sentatives would conclude them, whether they sent them or not. And this leads me to say that I do not propose American representatives as a perpetual establishment, but only as a temporary ordinance. When the business is done, the Governments new modelled, their Legislatures established upon constitutional principles and a permanent bottom, and a Recognition of the supremacy of the Parliament of Great Britain passed by the new Legislatures as a first and conditional Act, there will be no longer occasion for American representatives; they may return and serve in their own Assemblies, which then may be as separate from that of Great Britain as that of Ireland.

Bernard's scheme made no impression either in Great Britain or the Colonies. Not only was it full of practical difficulties, but it was completely overshadowed by the plan of settlement advocated by William Pitt (afterwards Lord Chatham) during the debate in the House of Commons on January 14, 1766, on the bill for the repeal of the Stamp Act. In his speeches on that occasion, Pitt declared himself in favor of a great constitutional settlement on the basis that the correctness of the principle advanced by the Americans, that they could not be taxed by Parliament, should be admitted by the State of Great Britain, in consideration that the Colonies should admit that the British Parliament had complete legislative power over them, whether represented therein or not, in every respect save that of taxation. As Pitt then was, and for many years had been, the acknowledged leader of the Whig party, and the greatest statesman in Great Britain, this proposition, to which, under penalty of loss of his leadership, he had practically pledged the whole Whig party of Great Britain, was of the utmost consequence; and all discussion was immediately focussed on his plan of settlement and the points made by him in supporting it.

In his first speech he said:

At

Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift or grant of the Commons alone. In legislation, the three Estates of the Realm are alike concerned, but the concurrence of the Peers and the Crown to a tax is only necessary to close with the forms of law. The gift and grant is of the Commons alone. In ancient days, the Crown, the Barons and the Clergy possessed the lands. In those days, the Barons and the Clergy gave and granted to the Crown. They gave and granted what was their own. present, since the discovery of America, and other circumstances permitting, the Commons are become the proprietors of the land. The Crown has divested itself of its great estates. The Church (God bless it!) has but a pittance. The property of the Lords, compared with that of the Commons, is as a drop of water in the ocean; and this House represents those Commons, the proprietors of the lands; and those proprietors virtually represent the rest of the inhabitants. When, therefore, in this House, we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an American tax, what do we do? We, your Majesty's Commons of Great Britain, give and grant to your Majesty, what? Our own property?—No, we give and grant to your Majesty the property of your Majesty's Commons in America.

The distinction between legislation and taxation is necessary to liberty. The Crown, the Peers, are equally legislative powers with the Commons. If taxation be a part of simple legislation, the Crown, the Peers, have rights in taxation as well as yourselves; rights which they will claim, which they will exercise, whenever the principle can be supported by power.

In his speech in reply to objections, he said:

I maintain that the Parliament has a right to bind, to restrain America. Our legislative power over the Colonies is sovereign and supreme. When it ceases to be sovereign and supreme, I would advise every gentleman to sell his lands and

embark for that country. When two countries are connected together, like England and her Colonies, without being incorporated, one must necessarily govern; the greater must rule the less, but so rule it as not to contradict the fundamental principles that are common to both.

If the gentleman does not understand the difference between internal and external taxes, I cannot help it; but there is a plain distinction between taxes levied for the purposes of raising a revenue, and duties imposed for the regulation of trade, for the accommodation of the subject; although in the consequences, some revenue might incidentally arise from the latter.

Upon the whole, I will beg leave to tell the House what is really my opinion. It is, that the Stamp Act be repealed absolutely, totally and immediately; that the reason for the repeal be assigned, because it was founded on an erroneous principle. At the same time, let the sovereign authority of this country over the Colonies be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever;-that we may bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever, except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent.

In the House of Lords, Lord Camden (afterwards Lord Chancellor), during the debates on the repeal of the Stamp Act, insisted upon the distinction between taxation and other kinds of governmental power, in terms even more emphatic than those used by Pitt.

Dr. Franklin, the Agent of the Province of Pennsylvania, in his hearing before the House of Commons in February, 1766, in opposition to the Stamp Act, following Pitt in the idea that all external taxation (that is, by customs duties) was essentially a regulation of trade, assured the House that the Colonies only objected to internal taxation, and that any external taxation would be entirely satisfactory to them, and persisted in this