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the debate on the fate of the Myteleneans. He proposes and carries a decree to put to death the whole adult population of Mytelene, amounting, by Mr. Grote's estimate, to about 6000 persons, and including the commons, who, in the beginning of the revolt, and throughout the siege, had been unarmed and powerless, and who, the moment they got arms into their hands, opened the gates to the Athenians. The night brings repentance. The question is brought forward again on the following day. Diodotus pleads for mercy and prevails. Cleon pleads for butchery, and is damned by the same vote which redeems the humanity of the people. Now, these are matters of fact, and Mr. Grote does not pretend to cast a suspicion on the narrative of Thucydides. He only carps at the historian for naming the author of the decrees against the Myteleneans and Scioneans, and omitting to name the author of the equally infamous decree against the Melians-a variation which we can hardly suppose to have proceeded from partiality, if, as there is reason to believe, the great promoters of the decree against the Melians was Alcibiades, the rival and enemy of Nicias.

Again, Cleon comes forward to repel the overtures made by the Lacedæmonians for peace after their defeat in the Roads of Pylos. The manœuvre which he employed to discredit the good faith of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors on this occasion is admitted by Mr. Grote to have been a "grave abuse of publicity;" the impracticable demand of the status quo before the war, which he induced the Athenians to make, is admitted by Mr. Grote to have been impolitic.

And now comes the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria. Thucydides tells us that the blockade of Sphacteria lingered, that the Athenians grew anxious and impatient, that Cleon in a boastful hour upbraided the generals of the republic with their incapacity, and said that if he were in their place he would soon take Sphacteria; that Nicias, then general, offered to give him the command, and allow him to make good his boast; that Cleon shrank back; that Nicias and the Athenians held him to his word; that he then, finding that he had no escape, promised to bring the garrison of Sphacteria to Athens alive, or kill them in the island, within twenty days, and that by a strange freak of fortune his "mad promise" was fulfilled. Mr. Grote is scandalised at Thucydides for calling it a "mad promise," and we are surprised at Mr. Grote. The enterprise unquestionably was feasible, for it was achieved, thanks to the ability of Demosthenes, and to the accident, unknown to Cleon when he spoke, which had cleared the island of part of the wood, and rendered an attack more practicable. But it was mad of Cleon to undertake it; it was mad in a man wholly destitute of military knowledge and capacity, as he proved himself to be at Amphipolis, to undertake what had so long baffled the most gallant and skilful officer of Athens. Cleon himself thought so, unless Thucydides has told a downright falsehood, for he at first endeavoured to back out, and only put a bold face upon the matter when he saw that there was no retreat. It should be remarked, too, that he began by slandering the veracity of Demosthenes, who, through his envoys, had stated the need of

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reinforcements, and ended by taking the reinforcements which Demosthenes had required. The inconsistency which Mr. Grote fancies to exist between the account of this affair given by Thucydides and that given by Aristophanes, altogether escapes our understanding. Thucydides says that Cleon's promise was insane; Aristophanes, that the glory of its fulfilment belonged not to him, but to Demosthenes. The two statements are perfectly compatible, and even confirmatory of each other. As to the levity which the Athenians are represented by Thucydides as having shown on this occasion, it appears to us by no means incredible, or out of keeping with their general character. We should almost expect the same thing from an assembly of Frenchmen. They knew, moreover, that their best general was on the spot, and must have the real command. When Mr. Grote talks about the "overwhelming cheers heaped upon Cleon by his joyful partisans, who had helped to invest him with the duties of general, in confidence that he would discharge them well," he leaves his evidence, and even his good sense, behind him. As to the conduct of Nicias, it was perfectly justifiable, on Mr. Grote's own theory, which is in effect that Nicias was the representative of the government, and Cleon of the opposition. For it is the manifest duty of an opposition, and the only guarantee which it can give of its good faith, to be ready to take the place of those whose policy it attacks. There was no reason why Nicias should himself proceed to Sphacteria. He was general, it is true; but he was one of ten generals, and was no doubt then discharging that part of the duties of an Athenian Strategus,

which, in modern states, are discharged by a Minister of War.

After the battle of Delium, Cleon is, on the side of Athens, the main obstacle to peace. Thucydides charges Cleon with acting from personal and corrupt motives; and though Mr. Grote is very indignant, we see no reason to believe that Thucydides is wrong. It may be true that the leaders of the aristocratic party were more distinguished in the field, and that the leaders of the democratic party were more distinguished in the Assembly; but it by no means follows that demagogues like Cleon might not have a corrupt interest in perpetuating the war. They governed the Assembly by its passions and by its suspicions, and the war kept those passions and suspicions at fever heat. The war enabled a master of criminative eloquence to keep up a sort of reign of terror, both within and without the walls, over the wealthier class and over the allies. The decrees which Cleon obtained against Mytelene and Scione show how immensely the war must have added to the power and opportunities of a man in his position. Moreover, the ravages of the war were ruinous to the agricultural interest, and the agricultural interest is everywhere conservative. Nor would Mr. Grote convict Thucydides of falsehood in ascribing corrupt motives to Cleon, even if he could show, as he believes he can show, that it was for the real interest of Athens to continue the war. In this, however, we do not think he succeeds, even if we regard the question in an exclusively military point of view, much less if we take a broad moral and political view, and consider the effects of this half civil contest

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as described in the chapter of Thucydides on the Corcyrean sedition.

The last appearance of Cleon is at Amphipolis. Elated, as we cannot doubt that he was, by his success at Sphacteria, he ventures to take the sole command of an army against Brasidas, exposes his incompetence by a helpless inactivity, loses the confidence of his troops, endeavours to regain it by a rash advance, then orders a precipitate retreat, with an enemy on his unguarded flanks, takes to flight, and falls ingloriously. Mr. Grote cannot deny the glaring incapacity which he exhibited in this command, nor, consequently, the presumption which he showed in undertaking it. But he throws in a suspicion of political antipathy prevailing among the soldiers, which seems to us quite unsupported.

So far as comedy can confirm history, the comic character given of Cleon by Aristophanes confirms the historical character given of him by Thucydides. And though we readily concede that a literal fidelity is not to be expected from caricature, yet a general fidelity is to be expected from it, and, in fact, is necessary to its success. If Aristophanes had represented Pericles as he represents Cleon, his satire would have failed. The portrait must be recognised, or nobody will laugh.

On the whole, then, we do not think that our estimate of Cleon's character is materially altered by Mr. Grote's defence. Nor can we thank him for representing such a man as one of the ordinary and natural champions of liberty. But we can thank him for throwing new light on the political position of the Athenian demagogues, as "opposition speakers"