the education and mental and moral culture of past generations, then we may venture to anticipate a future society which will not deteriorate, but which may continue to make progress, even tho the struggle for existence be suspended, the population regulated exactly to the means of subsistence, and the antagonism between the individual and the social organism extinguished, even as Mr. Herbert Spencer has anticipated" ("Data of Ethics," ch. xiv.). But if, as the writer believes, the views of the Weismann party are in the main correct; if there can be no progress except by the accumulation of congenital variations above the average to the exclusion of others below; if without the Benjamin constant stress of selection which this inKidd volves, the tendency of every higher form of life is actually retrograde; then is the whole human race caught in the toils of that struggle and rivalry of life which has been in progress from the beginning. Then must the rivalry of existence continue. humanized as to conditions, it may be, but immutable and inevitable to the end.

Mr. Kidd argues that this is the law of all progress. He says (pp. 35-37):

Looking back through the history of life anterior to man, we find it to be a record of ceaseless progress, on the one hand, and ceaseless stress and competition, on the other. This orderly and beautiful world which we see around us is now and always has been the scene of incessant rivalry between all the forms of life inhabiting it-rivalry, too, not chiefly conducted between different species, but between members of the same species. The plants in the greensward beneath our feet are engaged in silent rivalry with each other, a rivalry which if allowed to proceed without outside interference would know no pause until the weaker were exterminated. . . . The trees of the forest which clothe and beautify the landscape are in a state of nature engaged in the same rivalry with each other. Left to themselves, they fight out, as unmistakable records have shown, a stubborn struggle extending over centuries, in which at last only those forms most suitable to the conditions of the locality retain their places.

But so far we view the rivalry under simple conditions; it is among the forms of animal life as we begin to watch the gradual progress upward to higher types that it becomes many-sided and complex. It is at this point that we encounter a feature of the struggle which recent developments of biological science tend to bring into ever-increasing prominence. The first necessity for every successful form engaged in this struggle is the capacity for reproduction beyond the limits which the conditions of life for the time being comfortably pro

Natural Belection

vide for. ... Recent biological researches, and more particularly the investigations and conclusions of Professor Weismann, have tended to greatly develop Darwin's original hypothesis as to the conditions under which progress has been made in the various forms of life. It is now coming to be recognized as a necessarily inherent part of the doctrine of evolution, that if the continual selection which is always going on among the higher forms of life were to be suspended, these forms would not only possess no tendency to make progress forward, but must actually go backward. That is to say, if all the individuals of every generation in any species were allowed to actually propagate their kind, the average of each generation would continually tend to fall below the average of each generation which preceded it, and a process of slow but steady degeneration would ensue.

Mr. Kidd applies this principle to man, and says (pp. 31-34):

These laws, the observer soon convinces himself, have not been suspended in human society. On the contrary, he sees that they must have their most important seat of action there. To recognize this truth, one has only to remember that the discovery which in our time has raised biology from a mere record of isolated facts to a majestic story of orderly progress was not suggested by the study of life among the lower animals. The law, by the enunciation of which Darwin most advanced the science of the nineteenth century, took shape

Applied to Xan

in the mind of the great biologist, after observation of human society-that society in particular which we see around us at the present day. Speaking of the workings of his mind before the "Origin of Species" was begun, Darwin says: "In October, 1838-that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic inquiry-I happened to read for amusement Malthus on population; and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on, from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favorable variations would tend to be preserved and unfavorable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the foundation of a new species. Here, then, I had at last got a theory by which to work" ("The Life and Letters of Darwin," by his son, autobiographical chapter, vol. i.)... Looking around at the

Social

lowest existing types of humanity, and comparir nem with the highest, one feels immediately constrained to ask, Do we ever fully realize how this advance of which we are so proud, and which is represented by the intellectual social distance between these two extremes, has been brought about. We talk vaguely about it, and take for granted many things in connection with it; but the number of those who have grasped certain elementary biological laws of which it is the result, and which have controlled and directed it as rigidly as the law of gravity controls and directs a body falling to the earth, is surprisingly small. . .

At the outset we find man to be in one respect exactly like all the creatures which have come before him. He reproduces his kind from generation to generation. In doing so, he is subject to a law which must never be lost sight of. Left to himself, this high-born creature, whose progress we seem to take for granted, has not the slightest innate tendency to make any onward progress whatever. It may appear strange, but it is strictly true, that if each of us were allowed by the conditions of life to follow his own inclinations, the average of one generation would have no tendency whatever to rise beyond the average of the preceding one, but distinctly the reverse. This is not a peculiarity of man; it has been a law of life from the beginning, and it continues to be a universal law, which we have no power to alter.

As a result of this view, Mr. Kidd believes that to insure progress society must insure the perpetuation of competition. This, he says, is against the immediate interests of the industrially weaker classes, and therefore they are advocating socialism, the essence of which Mr. Kidd finds to consist in the elimination of competition. But Mr. Kidd says this cannot prevail, because it would mean biological deterioration and death. Through all our Western civilization Mr. Kidd finds a process going on born of the superrational sanctions of Christianity, tending to altruism, lifting up the lower classes, by an ever-widening democracy not toward socialism, but toward a condition where all classes can compete on planes of more perfect equality. He says (pp. 154-65):

The Reformation liberated, as it were, into the practical life of the peoples affected by it that immense body of altruistic feeling which had been from the beginning the distinctive social product of the Christian religion (p. 154). The clue to modern history, he says, lies "in the fact that it has consisted essentially in the gradual breaking down of that military organization of society which had previously prevailed and in the emancipation and enfranchisement of the great body of the people hitherto universally excluded under that constitution of society from all participation on equal terms in the rivalry of existence. And it tends to culminate in a condition

of society in which there shall be no privileged classes, and in which all the excluded people shall be at last brought into the rivalry of life on a footing of equality, of opportunity, the significance of the whole process consisting in its tendency to raise the rivalry of existence to the highest degree of efficiency as a cause of progress, to which it has ever attained in the history of life.

Mr. Kidd thus formulates his conclusions as to social reform (pp. 237, 238):

Not Socialism

In the era upon which we are entering, the long, uphill effort to secure equality of opportunity, as well as equality of political rights, will of necessity involve not the restriction of the interference of the State, but the progressive extension of its sphere of action to almost every department of our social life. The movement in the direction of the regulation, control, and restriction of the rights of wealth and capital must be expected to continue, even to the extent of the State itself assuming these rights in cases where it is clearly proved that their retention in private hands must unduly interfere with the rights and opportunities of the body of the people. But the continuity of principle may be expected to remain evident under the new appearances. Even in such cases, the State will, in reality, assume such functions in order to preserve or secure free competition rather than to suspend it. Hence, the general tendency must be expected to be toward State interference and State control, on a greatly extended scale, rather than toward State management. It may, perhaps, be inferred from this that the development of society in the direction indicated will itself be a movement toward socialism. This is not so. The gulf between the state of society-toward which it is the tendency of the process of evolution now in progress to carry us -and socialism is wide and deep. The avowed aim of socialism is to suspend that personal rivalry and competition of life, which not only is now, but has been from the beginning

Excise Duties

of life, the fundamental impetus behind all progress. The inherent tendency of the process of social development now taking place among us is (as it has been from the beginning of our civilization) to raise this rivalry to the very highest degree of efficiency as a condition of progress, by bringing all the people into it on a footing of equality, and by allowing the freest possible play of forces within the community, and the widest possible opportunities for the development of every individual's faculties and personality. This is the meaning of that evolutional process which has been slowly proceeding through the history of the Western peoples.

Contrary both to Mr. Spencer and to Mr. Kidd are the views of Professor Huxley. Of Mr. Spencer's view, Professor Huxley says ("Administrative Nihilism," an address delivered to the Midland Institute, Oct. 9, 1871):

One of the profoundest of living English philosophers, who is at the same time the most thoroughgoing and consistent of the champions of astynomocracy, has devoted a very able and ingenious essay to the drawing out of a comparison between the process by which men have advanced from the savage state to the highest civilization, and that by which an animal passes from the condition of an almost shapeless and structureless germ to that in which it exhibits a highly complicated structure and a corresponding diversity of powers. this appears to be very just. But if the resemblance between the body physiological and the body politic is any indication not only of what the latter is, and how it has become what it is, but of what it ought to be, and what it is tending to become, I cannot but think that the real force of the analogy is totally opposed to the negative view of State function.

All

Suppose that, in accordance with this view, each muscle were to maintain that the nervous system had no right to interfere with its contraction, except to prevent it from hindering the contraction of another muscle; or each gland, that it had a right to secrete, so long as its secretion interfered with no other; suppose every separate cell left free to follow its own "interests," and laissez faire lord of all, what would become of the body physiological?

The fact is, that the sovereign power of the body thinks for the physiological organism, acts for it, and rules the individual components with a rod of iron. Hence, if the analogy of the body politic with the body physiological counts for anything, it seems to me to be in Huxley Op- favor of a much larger amount of governposed to Spen-than I, for one, at all desire to see. But, mental interference than exists at present, or cer's View tempting as the opportunity is, I am not disposed to build up any argument in favor of my own case upon this analogy, curious, interesting, and in many respects close as it is, for it takes no cognizance of certain profound and essential differences between the physiological and the political bodies.

Professor Huxley then goes on to state his own views, and says:

"

When men living in society have once become aware that their welfare depends upon two opposing tendencies of equal importance the one restraining, the other encouraging, individual freedom-the question, What are the functions of government?" is translated into another namely, What ought we men, in our corporate capacity, to do, not only in the way of restraining that free individuality which is inconsistent with the existence of society, but in encouraging that free individuality which is essential to the evolution of the social organization? The formula which truly defines the function of government must contain the solution of both the problems involved, and not merely of one of them.

Locke has furnished us with such a formula, in the noblest, and at the same time briefest, statement of the purpose of government known to me:

THE END OF GOVERNMENT IS THE GOOD OF MANKIND" ("Of Civil Government," § 229).

But the good of mankind is not a something which is absolute and fixt for all men, whatever their capacities or state of civilization. Doubtless it is possible to imagine a true "Civitas Dei," in which every man's moral faculty shall be such as leads him to control all those desires which run counter to the good of mankind, and to cherish only those which conduce to the welfare of society; and in which every man's native intellect. shall be sufficiently strong, and his culture sufficiently extensive, to enable him to know what he ought to do and to seek after. And in that blessed state police will be as much a superfluity as every other kind of government.

But the eye of man has not beheld that state, and is not likely to behold it for some time to come. What we do see, in fact, is that states are made up of a considerable number of the ignorant and foolish, a small proportion of genuine knaves, and a sprinkling of capable and honest men, by whose efforts the former are kept in a reasonable state of guidance, and the

latter of repression. And such being the case, I do not see how any limit whatever can be laid down as to the extent to which, under some circumstances, the action of government may be rightfully carried. . . . The question when to draw the line between those things with which the State ought, and those with which it ought not, to interfere, then, is one which must be left to be decided separately for each individual case. The difficulty which meets the statesman is the same as that which meets us all in individual life, in which our abstract rights are generally clear enough, tho it is frequently extremely hard to say at what point it is wise to cease our attempts to enforce them.

Professor Huxley wrote before Mr. Kidd's "Social Evolution" appeared; but among his latest utterances he showed that there was a deep division to be drawn between the biological laws which govern the development of the lower forms of creation and those which govern man. He says ("The Struggle for Existence," in the Nineteenth Century, February, 1888, pp. 165, 166):

Society, like art, is a part of nature. But it is convenient to distinguish those parts of nature in which man plays the part of immediate cause as something apart; and, therefore, society, like art, is usefully to be considered as distinct from nature. It is the more desirable, and even necessary, to make this distinction, since society differs from nature in having a definite moral object; whence it comes about that the course shaped by the ethical man-the member of society or citizen-necessarily runs counter to that which the nonethical man-the primitive savage, or man as a mere member of the animal kingdom-tends to adopt. The latter fights out the struggle for existence to the bitter end, like any other animal; the former devotes his best energies to the object of setting limits to the struggle.

The history of civilization—that is, of society-is the record of the attempts which the human race has made to escape from this position (i. e., the struggle for existence in which those who were best fitted to cope with their circumstances, but not the best in any other sense, survived). The first men who substituted the state of mutual peace for that of mutual war, whatever the motive which impelled them to take that step, created society. But in establishing peace, they obviously put a limit upon the struggle for existence. Between the members of that society, at any rate, it was not to be pursued à outrance. And of all the successive shapes which society has taken, that most nearly approaches perfection in which war of individual against individual is most strictly limited.

Prof. D. G. Ritchie, in his "Darwinism and Politics," carries the argument still further, and shows, in the first place, that "the survival of the fittest" does not necessarily mean the survival of the best. He says:

The phrase "survival of the fittest" is very apt to mislead, for it suggests the fittest or best in every sense or in the highest sense, whereas it only means, as Professor Huxley has pointed out, "those best fitted to cope with their circumstances" (article "The Struggle for Existence," in Nineteenth Century, February, 1888, p. 165), in order to survive and transmit offspring. Now when we come to consider society, we have to deal with a very complex set of phenomena, and what is fittest in one aspect may not be fittest in another. But natural selection implies no further morality than "nothing succeeds like success.' If the struggle for food and mates be carried on on its lowest terms, the strongest and the strongest only would be selected. But cunning can do a great deal against strength. Now we cannot be sure that a good combination of strength and cun"Survival of ning will be selected: strength in some cases, cunning in others, is what we find by comparthe Fittest" ing different species of animals and different Not races of men. Again, the strongest and largthe Best est, and in many ways finest animals are not necessarily those most capable of adapting themselves to changed circumstances. The insignificant may more easily find food and escape enemies. We cannot be sure that evolution will always lead to what we should regard as the greatest perfection of any species. Degeneration enters in as well as progress. The latest theory about the Aryan race makes the Aryans come from the north of Europe, conquer the feebler races of the south, and, having proved its fitness in this way, prove its unfitness in another by being less capable of surviving in a warm climate than they; so that an Aryan language may be spoken where there remains little or no Aryan blood. Are we entitled to maintain, with regard to human races and human individuals, that the fittest always survive, except in the sense in which the proposition is a truism, that those survive who are most capable of surviving?

Further, we must emphasize the fact that the struggle goes

on not merely between individual and individual, but between race and race. The struggle among plants and the lower animals is mainly between members of the same species; and the individual competition between human beings, which is so much admired by Mr. Herbert Spencer, is of this primitive kind. When we come to the struggle between kinds, it is to be noticed that it is fiercest between allied kinds; and so, as has been pointed out, the economic struggle between Great Britain and the United States is fiercer than elsewhere between nations. But so soon as we pass to the struggle between race and race, we find new elements coming in. The race which is fittest to survive, i. e., most capable of surviving, will survive; but it does not therefore follow that the individuals thereby preserved will be the fittest, either in the sense of being those who in a struggle between individual and individual would have survived, or in the sense of being those whom we should regard as the finest specimens of their kind. Admirable, doubtless-this scheme of salvation for the elect by the damnation of the vast majority; but, pray, do not let us hear anything more about its "beneficence.'

I am not speaking at random about these ethical applications of the conception of struggle for existence. Darwin himself, as always, is most cautious and guarded in his reference to anything that lies outside his own special sphere of observation. He looks forward to the elimination of the lower races by the higher civilized races throughout the world ("Life and Letters," i., p. 316). He points out how "a struggle for existence, consequent on his rapid multiplication," has advanced man to his present high condition; "and if he is to advance still higher, it is to be feared that he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Otherwise he would sink into indolence, and the more gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted" ("Descent of Man," p. 319). This, doubtless, includes the old objection which Aristotle brought against Plato's communism, that man needs a stimulus to exertion and industry. But there is no jubilation, no exaltation of a natural law into an ethical ideal. And let us know how Darwin modifies this very statement in the words that follow:

"Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still is, yet as far as the highest part of man's nature is concerned there are other agencies more important. For the moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, etc., than through natural selection; tho to this latter agency may be safely attributed the social instincts which afforded the basis for the development of the moral sense."

Socialists, however, usually go further than any of the above writers, and argue from evolution not only that the struggle for existence is not the only law of human progress, but that it teaches the development and survival of combination over competition. Says a recent writer (anonymously):

Society an Organism

This law of organic evolution does not stop with the development of the physical. It is the same throughout the entire realm of phenomena. It passes over into the immaterial and builds up political, social, and moral institutions in almost precisely the same manner as physical organisms are formed. In the political aspect of the world the start is also had with the individual or unit. Then follows a community of units, the town, for instance. The same law of development or community of vital interests results in the organization of counties, states, and nations, each a political organism, with functions peculiar to its specific plane of being or place in the body politic; but all, when perfected, working harmoniously together for the common good and equal rights of the units, the individual men and women that form the organism or political body. This same law of progressive development also foreshadows the time when there will be a confederacy of nations, a political world organism, a race unity, the highest functions of which will be to secure to the race-unit-man the freedom of a fair chance in the exercise of his inalienable right to preserve and enhance his inherent individuality.

Socialists believe in the evolution of competition. Says W. D. P. Bliss ("Handbook of Socialism," p. 21):

Competition was once mainly physical; this produced the survival of the fittest to survive in physical strife. There were giants in those days," the Nimrods, the Goliaths, the Agamemnons, "kings of men.' Organized society gradually restrained that physical strife, and competition became chiefly military between states. This was the distinguishing feature of the Greek State and of the Roman civilization. It produced an Alexander, a Hannibal, a Cæsar, and continued to the time of Napoleon, and is not yet dead. But gradually advancing fraternalism has replaced military by industrial competition. To-day men strive neither with guns nor with

Excise Duties

poisoned arrows, so much as with cornerings of the market and with poisoned groceries. It has produced the survival of the fittest to survive in such a strife-the Rothschilds, the Jay Goulds, the Vanderbilts, the Pullmans, the Napoleons of finance. Therefore, Socialists do not urge the abolition of competition. They simply say that it is time to lift competition to a higher level, and make it intellectual, and not industrial. As organized fraternalism has to a large measure put down physical strife, and is putting down militarism, so Socialists would have it gradually supplant industrial competion by industrial cooperation.

A recent work, however, on social evolution is Prof. S. N. Patten's "Theory of the Social Forces' (January, 1896). He says (p. 7): “Evolution has thus far been studied as a problem of biology. This has been due more to what I would call a happy accident than to any necessity of the situation. Darwin admits that he obtained the clue to his theory through reading Malthus's 'Essay on Population,' and in many respects the attitude of the author of the 'Origin of Species' is that of an economist. It is only by later writers that the economic elements in the problem are neglected, and that the theory is based solely upon biologic evidence. The happy accident to which I have referred is the fact that the history of past organic life is so plainly recorded in the various organisms of the present and in the fossil remains of earlier forms.'

Professor Patten then goes on to argue that evolution is the result of the action of environment upon organism; that biology has studied organism (because of the "happy accident" that this is what could be best historically studied), but has neglected environment. He quotes Spencer as saying ("Psychology," vol. i., p. 134): Throughout biology proper the environment and its correlated phenomena are either but tacitly recognized, or overtly and definitely recognized, are so but occasionally, while the organism and its correlated phenomena practically monopolize the attention." Here Professor Patten finds the weak point in current economic discussions. They have overlooked environment, and, says Professor Patten (p. 5), "the present environment of the race is so different from its predecessors that a new social philosophy is demanded to explain its effects." Hence Professor Patten's essay is "an attempt to recast current social philosophy and to introduce into it elements which thus far have been overlooked." These elements are largely psychologic, and, according to Professor Patten, deserve to rank equally with the biologic factors. By such an analysis of man's present environment Professor Patten forecasts a social commonwealth," based upon a pure pleasure economy, even as state socialism, according to him, is the ideal of those suffering from the evils of a fair economy. This social commonwealth, however, he says, must not be assumed to be the highest or final state. "If a progressive evolution continues," he tells us (p. 6), 'other societies will be possible, each of which will differ from its predecessor as radically as the society I describe differs from our present society." See also the article on BIOLOGY.

Expenditures

name as early as 1643, being laid on ale and all forms of intoxicating drinks, and later on a long list of articles of food and clothing. The necessities of life were later excepted. Excise duties were at first duties on commodities produced in or out of a country. Robert Walpole, in 1733, introduced a famous excise scheme, whereby tobacco and, later, wine paid no duty, but were warehoused under the control of excise officers, and paid excise duties only as sold within the country. It produced a great excitement, and was abandoned. To-day excise duties are paid in England on many things, like beer, wine, spirits, tobacco, dogs, gun and game licenses, carriages, male servants, armorial bearings, railway tickets, by auctioneers, pedlers, farm brokers, tavern-keepers, etc.

In the United States excise duties were disliked as inheritances from the English Government, and an effort was early made to enact a constitutional amendment forbidding excise duties; but in 1790 Hamilton proposed and got passed an excise duty on spirits. In 1792 it was lowered, and under Jefferson abolished. War of 1812 led to an excise duty on distilled spirits, domestic refined sugar, salt, carriages, etc. But in 1817 these were abolished, and no excise duty was levied till the internal tax of 1862. (For a discussion of excise duties, see TAXATION.)

The

In

EXNER, WILHELM FRANZ: Austrian technologist; born in Gaenserdorf, Lower Austria, 1840; frequented the polytechnic in Vienna; became teacher in the real-school in Elbogen, Bohemia, 1862, and in that of Krems in 1865. In 1869 he was appointed lecturer on engineering and mechanic technology at the forestry academy at Mariabrunn, and in 1875 professor of forestry, forestry-engineering, etc., at the agricultural college at Vienna. Since 1874 he has been inspector of trade schools for the ministry of commerce. 1879 he founded the Technologische Gewerbemuseum (industrial museum) in Vienna, and has been its director ever since. Since 1882 he has been a member of the chamber of deputies of the Reichsrat, where he identifies himself with the German liberals. Since 1905 Exner has been a member of the Austrian Upper House. Among his works may be mentioned: "Holzhandel und Holzindustrie der Ostseeländer" (1876); "Das Moderne Transportwesen im Dienste der Landund Forstwirtschaft" (1877); "Die Hausindustrie Oesterreichs" (1890). He has edited "Beiträge zur Geschichte der Gewerbe und Erfindungen Oesterreichs" (1873), and the "Mitteilungen des Technologischen Gewerbemuseums" (1880, sqq). Address: Technologische Gewerbemuseum, Vienna, Austria.

EXPENDITURES (Family. See also PRICES): According to the well-known laws formulated by Dr. Engels, head of the Prussian Royal Bureau of the Statistics of Labor, expenditures in different families conform to the following principles:

1. That the greater the income, the smaller the relative percentage of outlay for subsistence. 2. That the percentage of outlay for clothing is approximately the same, whatever the income. 3. That the percentage of the outlay for lodging or rent, and for fuel and light, is invariably the same, whatever the income.

4. That as the income increases in amount the percentage of outlay for sundries becomes greater. These principles seem in the main substantiated by the most careful investigation,

Prof. John A. Ryan ("A Living Wage," p. 150, 1906) after a careful study of the evidence says:

"The conclusions that seem to be abundantly justified by the facts. may therefore be stated as follows: First: Anything less than $600 per year is not a living wage in any of the cities of the U.S."

Mr. Britt, of the Railroad Man's Journal, former editor of Public Opinion, contributed the following suggestive statements in The Independent, Aug., 1907:

Not long ago the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor statistics reported that in 797 stores in Boston the number of debtors on the hopeless list was 45.482, about 7 per cent of the population of the city, with a total indebtedness of $570,913. In the list of non-payers 2.32 per cent, or a little over 1,000, were classed as moneyed people. Therefore more