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and the unconditionally limited?

These are the questions

that meet us on the threshold of philosophy. This intuition of the absolute and infinite has been the dream of philosophers from the dawn of speculation unto the present day. It underlies the whole scheme of mystical theology, and its possibility is regarded by Fichte and Schelling as requisite to afford a valid basis for a real philosophy. To reach it, system has been reared on system,

46

High as the tower which builders, vain,
Presumptous, piled on Shinar's plain;"

and the result has been alike, a "confusion of tongues." To these questions Sir Wm. Hamilton returns a direct negative. All knowledge exists in and by consciousness, but consciousness is only possible under the conditions of difference, plurality, and relation; and is, therefore, only of the conditioned, the relative, the phenomenal, the finite. The absolute that which exists absolutely in itself and out of relation-and the infinite-cannot be objects of positive thought; they can only be conceived by abstracting the conditions under which thought is realized; they are negations of the conceivable. But, though inconceivable, they are not, therefore, to be regarded as non-existent. All positive thought is of the conditioned, and is "the mean between two contradictory extremes, both of which are inconceivable, but of which, as contradictories, one or other must, by the fundamental laws of thought, be admitted as necessary." "The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other as equally possible; but only as unable to understand, as possible, either of two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true."

"We are thus taught the salutary lesson that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the measure of existence; and are warned from recognizing the domain of our knowledge

as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very conscious. ness of our inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality."

The end, therefore, of this philosophy is the knowledge of our own ignorance. The conflicting claims of faith and reason are reconciled, and the boundaries of each determined. Reason is shown to be limited, but not fallacious. Faith is seen to be the complement of reason. Either without the other is inadequate to the whole of man's being. Those who assert the sufficiency of reason, whose speculations have never carried them as far as that "wall of adamant" which closes in all human knowledge, and of which, to use the metaphor of Sir James Mackintosh, "few suspect the existence until they are dashed against it," may echo the watchword of Abelard,— Intellige ut credas; but those who have fathomed the depths of consciousness, and explored the boundaries of human knowledge, will be inclined to accept the advice of the Prophet,-Crede ut intelligas, as the dictate alike of a higher faith and a profounder philosophy.

The CHAIRMAN having invited discussion ;

Mr. BIRCH bore testimony to the general accuracy with which the principles of Sir William Hamilton had been expressed in the paper. He drew especial attention to the threefold division, by Sir William Hamilton, of the Philosophy of Mind, into Phenomenology, Nomology, and Ontology, and expressed his deep regret that whilst the two former had been fully treated in the Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, we did not possess any similar exposition of the latter.

The Rev. Mr. MACNAUGHT could not admit what appeared to be the practical result of this philosophy. We had no right to require belief in that which was incapable of logical proof; but the proof of a given fact did not necessarily involve a knowledge of its mode of existence. That which could not be logically defined was unintelligible, and, therefore, unworthy of belief. Referring to Bishop Berkeley's system, he thought it had been somewhat misunderstood. He did not think Berkeley meant to deny the existence of matter, but simply the existence of substance, as distinct from, and independent of, the qualities of matter.

Dr. IHNE complained that Sir William Hamilton had not solved the great problem of philosophy, i.e., the knowledge of the absolute and the infinite. All philosophers, from Plato downwards, had split upon the rock of the absolute, and Sir William Hamilton had avoided the danger instead of overcoming it.

Mr. CLARK then replied,-All knowledge departed from certain primary principles, which must be assumed to be true, though as being the basis of our reasoning they were incapable of logical proof, i.e., of being deduced from higher principles than themselves. It was erroneous to suppose that nothing was to be believed which was not susceptible of being logically defined and proved. The facts of consciousness could not be so established, yet it was impossible to doubt their existence. Take the example of time. Either time had a commencement, or it had not. But it was impossible to conceive, i.e., to construe positively in thought an absolute commencement of time; in other words, a period so remote that we could conceive nothing beyond it. On the other hand, it was equally impossible to conceive an absolutely unlimited, or infinite time, for that, amongst other difficulties, would require an infinite amount of time for its accomplishment. Both these notions are equally inconceivable— both are equally beyond the grasp of the logical understanding; but one or other must necessarily be believed as true. Precisely the same reasoning may be applied to the doctrine of space; and it might be shewn that whilst the notion of space as absolutely limited, on the one hand, or as infinite on the other, was inconceivable; one or other must, necessarily be believed as true. It would be easy to multiply indefinitely illustrations of the same principle; and so far from its being true that all belief rested upon logical demonstration, a careful analysis would shew that all demonstration rested upon assumptions necessarily believed, but unsusceptible of proof. The objection of Dr. Ihne might apply to those philosophers who, like Fichte, Schelling, and Cousin, asserted the immediate knowledge of the absolute and infinite to be the end of philosophy; but did not apply to Sir Wm. Hamilton, who declared at the outset that, by man, with his present faculties, such knowledge was unattainable. The services of Sir William Hamilton to philosophy were not, as had been asserted, purely negative; on the contrary, by showing the impossibility of arriving at truth in the direction hitherto sought, he has concentrated attention upon those paths in which she might certainly be found.

On the motion of the PRESIDENT, the thanks of the Society were unanimously voted to Mr. Clark for the paper he had read.

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