Comparative Corporate Governance: Shareholders as a Rule-makerSpringer Science & Business Media, 24 трав. 2005 р. - 445 стор. It is fairly easy for a Finnish Jurist to understand German Company law. On the other hand, UK Company law seems very confusing. What is even more confusing is that the UK corporate govemance model is often regarded as one of the best in the World. Clearly German law cannot be as bad as it is often said to be. This books results from these kinds of thoughts and an interest in comparative law, Company law and securities markets law. I wanted to find out whether the functional method would give anything new to say about the regulation of corpo rate govemance in Germany and the UK. As I have been lecturing on Company law and corporate govemance myself, I also wanted to write a book that I could use as a textbook in my courses. For this reason, I focused on one of the key questions in corporate govemance: the regula tion of shareholder activism. |
Зміст
I | 1 |
II | 9 |
III | 10 |
IV | 15 |
V | 16 |
VII | 18 |
VIII | 19 |
IX | 21 |
LXXVIII | 234 |
LXXX | 237 |
LXXXI | 239 |
LXXXII | 242 |
LXXXIII | 243 |
LXXXIV | 246 |
LXXXV | 250 |
LXXXVI | 252 |
X | 22 |
XI | 23 |
XII | 24 |
XIII | 26 |
XIV | 27 |
XV | 28 |
XVI | 30 |
XVII | 34 |
XVIII | 35 |
XIX | 37 |
XX | 38 |
XXI | 44 |
XXII | 47 |
XXIII | 53 |
XXIV | 58 |
XXV | 60 |
XXVI | 64 |
XXVII | 66 |
XXVIII | 71 |
XXIX | 77 |
XXX | 79 |
XXXI | 81 |
XXXII | 82 |
XXXIII | 86 |
XXXIV | 93 |
XXXV | 94 |
XXXVI | 95 |
XXXVII | 100 |
XXXVIII | 101 |
XXXIX | 104 |
XL | 105 |
XLI | 112 |
XLII | 114 |
XLIII | 116 |
XLIV | 120 |
XLV | 122 |
XLVI | 135 |
XLVII | 143 |
XLVIII | 146 |
XLIX | 149 |
L | 151 |
LI | 152 |
LII | 159 |
LIII | 166 |
LIV | 169 |
LV | 179 |
LVI | 181 |
LVII | 191 |
LVIII | 196 |
LIX | 198 |
LX | 202 |
LXII | 203 |
LXIII | 204 |
LXIV | 206 |
LXV | 210 |
LXVI | 216 |
LXVII | 217 |
LXVIII | 218 |
LXIX | 221 |
LXX | 222 |
LXXI | 224 |
LXXII | 225 |
LXXIII | 226 |
LXXV | 228 |
LXXVI | 233 |
LXXXVII | 253 |
LXXXVIII | 261 |
LXXXIX | 271 |
XCI | 272 |
XCII | 273 |
XCIII | 276 |
XCV | 277 |
XCVI | 278 |
XCVII | 279 |
XCVIII | 284 |
XCIX | 287 |
C | 296 |
CI | 305 |
CII | 306 |
CIII | 307 |
CIV | 316 |
CV | 336 |
CVI | 339 |
CVII | 348 |
CVIII | 352 |
CIX | 353 |
CX | 354 |
CXI | 355 |
CXIII | 358 |
CXIV | 360 |
CXV | 362 |
CXVI | 363 |
CXVII | 364 |
CXVIII | 365 |
CXIX | 366 |
CXX | 373 |
CXXI | 374 |
CXXII | 379 |
CXXIII | 380 |
CXXV | 384 |
CXXVI | 385 |
CXXVII | 389 |
CXXVIII | 393 |
CXXIX | 394 |
CXXX | 395 |
CXXXI | 397 |
CXXXIII | 398 |
CXXXIV | 399 |
CXXXV | 401 |
CXXXVI | 404 |
CXXXVII | 406 |
CXXXVIII | 407 |
CXL | 408 |
CXLI | 409 |
CXLII | 410 |
CXLIII | 412 |
CXLIV | 413 |
CXLVI | 414 |
CXLVII | 415 |
CXLVIII | 416 |
CL | 418 |
CLI | 419 |
CLIII | 421 |
CLIV | 423 |
CLVI | 426 |
CLIX | 427 |
CLX | 428 |
431 | |
Інші видання - Показати все
Comparative Corporate Governance: Shareholders as a Rule-maker Petri Mäntysaari Обмежений попередній перегляд - 2006 |
Comparative Corporate Governance: Shareholders as a Rule-maker Petri Mäntysaari Попередній перегляд недоступний - 2009 |
Загальні терміни та фрази
AktG Aktiengesellschaft Aktiengesetz 2002 apply appointment articles of association auditors Aufsichtsrat BCLC BGHZ board of directors breach of duty co-determination Combined Code common law Companies Act 1985 Company Law 2003 company secretary comparative lawyer comply contract controlled company Corporate Governance Code court Davies PL delegated Directive disclosure duty of care employees example fiduciary duties Foss v Harbottle FSMA German Corporate Governance German law Gower and Davies Haftung Hopt KJ Hüffer internal issuer Law Commission liability limited listed companies Listing Rules majority management board members managing director markets meeting minority shareholders Modern Company Law monitoring organ pany parent company person powers pre-emptive rights Principles of Modern provisions public limited-liability companies Regulation remuneration representatives require Sarbanes-Oxley Act share capital shareholders statutory board members sub-board managers subsidiary supervisory board takeover third parties tion transactions Transparency Directive two-tier board UMAG Vorstands voting