« НазадПродовжити »
own power, as he will himself, for th: preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive the aptest means thereunto.
By liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him.
A law of nature (lex naturalis) is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound jus and lex, right and law; yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear ; whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which, in one and the same matter, are inconsistent.
And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case. every one is governed by his own reason; and there is
nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies ; it followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a right to every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man (how strong or wise soever he be) of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or general rule of reason, “ that every man ought to en- deavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.” The first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature; which is,“ to seek peace, and follow it.” The second, the sum of the right of nature; which is,“ by all means we can, to defend ourselves."
From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law; “ that a man may be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to a:l things, and be contented with so much liberty aga ast other men, as he would allow other men against himself;" for as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing any thing he liketh, so long are all men in the condition of war. But if
other men will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason for any one to divest himself of his : for that were to expose himself to prey fwhich no man is bound to) rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel; " Whatsoever ye require that others should do to you, that do ye to them.” And that law of all men, “ Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.”
Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a
The final cause, end, or design of men, (who naturally love liberty and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which we see them live in commonwealths) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent (as bath been shewn) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visie ble power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the 14th and 15th chapters.
For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and (in sum) doing to others as we would be done to,) of themselves, without the terror of some power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants without the sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure' a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep then, when he can do it safely) if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another, hath been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the laws of nature, that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do cities, and kingdoms, which are but greater families (for their own security) enlarge their dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue or weaken their neighbours, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour.
Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great as is sufficient to carry the victory; and therefore gives eneouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of war, as to move him to at'tempt.
And be there never so great a multitude, yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgments, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help but hinder one another; and reduce their strength, by mutual opposition, to nothing: whereby they are easily not only subdued by a very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a common power to keep them in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need be, any civil government