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organic whole. This is sufficient reply to the objection that the view here presented results in atomism in belief and conduct, and destroys all possibility of realizing at length the unity of the absolute and ideal truth and life. It is true, as was said above, that the individual apprehension of truth is for the individual at the time final and authoritative. It is not possible that it should be otherwise. But all the time the principles of unity exist and are at work, and are certain at length to manifest themselves, and that, too, increasingly. The fact is, the pure individual — the is a mere abstraction of crass metaphysics; it has no real existence. Philosophy that is thoroughgoing reveals the fact of the real community, and at bottom the identity in nature, of the finite and infinite, their difference being not of kind, but simply of degree in faculty and function. This fact it is which gives certain assurance of the ultimate attainment of the absolute ideal. This is the meaning of 1 John iii. 2, 3. It is this principle which makes the Incarnation possible; and the fact of the Incarnation, and of the attainment of the absolute ideal in his own personal experience by Christ, is proof that it may at length be attained by us. The fact that we see no greater approximamation than is as yet evident is no argument against its ultimate realization. We are not half awake as yet to our exalted privilege.

There is no room, then, for agnosticism, "ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth" (2 Tim. iii. 7). Agnosticism strictly means that knowledge is impossible. Resting upon shallow thinking, and wrongly interpreting the variant results of human thought and inquiry, the theory strikes at the roots of our knowledge of the infinite, and claims to have destroyed it and all possibility of its future reappearance and growth. But a profounder and truer philosophy proves the claim false, and limited but real and increasing knowledge says: Knowledge is possible and progressive, that is, a universe exists, inherently rational, which we may and do know with ever-increasing fullness and completeness; therefore hope on, labor on, and push forward the bounds of knowledge- limina scientiæ as rapidly and as thor— oughly as possible. The real significance of Lessing's famous "Search for truth, rather than its possession," is not that the attainment of truth is impossible, but rather that the human mind, having in its very constitution infinite elements and a capacity for an infinite ideal, can never rest satisfied with any present attainment or form of expression as final, but must continue to strive

after the perfect truth as embodied in the infinite. In the words of Augustine, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, O Lord, and our heart is restless till it rests in Thee."

We place the final and absolute authority in Jesus Christ because He is the absolutely perfect ideal and archetypal being. But why a personal ideal and authority? Why not the self-evident principles of truth apart from any personality? Because truth exists only in connection with mind, or as an expression or embodiment thereof. The universe itself, indeed, in its ultimate ground and essence, is thought and will, its expression and manifestation, that is, has its basis in personality. There is no truth independent of mind, outside of thought, consciousness. It may be beyond my thought, my consciousness, as much of it is, but not beyond thought and consciousness per se. Here lies the real significance, the heart and core, of the ontological argument for the existence of the Infinite and Absolute, that is, God, and the possibility of knowledge of Him. Furthermore, truth realized in personal character is certainly superior to truth in abstract form. And this both as visible, or capable of being so, and as motive. Character is the most worthful and abiding thing in the universe, and the greatest force therein. The deepest in us demands personality as well as truth. The ultimate cry of every soul is, "Oh, that I knew where I might find Him!" (Job xxiii. 3). Truth actually realized in character is easily seen, and people in general are far more susceptible to motive centring in a person. Perhaps, also, it is true in the last analysis that none are really moved by purely abstract truth. It is certain that nearly all, if not all, are more easily and profoundly moved by truth in personal form. And Christ is the personal realization of absolute truth.

With regard to the relation between the historical Christ and the absolute Christ in our thought, it must be stated that the historical, as conceived by the writers or redacteurs of Scripture, forms, and must form, the basis of the ideal. Men did not and could not think out with complete clearness and thoroughly consistent detail such an ideal character as is therein portrayed, apart from the actual appearance of the same among them. Sufficient impression was made upon those with whom Christ associated in his earthly life to enable them to catch and retain and preserve the essentials of the portrait, even though there were features therein that escaped their vision, and lines too delicate for their powers of apprehension and interpretation. Here, as else

where, facts and their interpretation, theory, go together and mutually work upon each other in the attainment of the result. But no theory is possible save upon the basis of some fact observed and meditated upon till it gives up its secret and reveals its significance.

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This means that the Scripture records, when critically substantiated, are historically valid, though it is impossible to show that they are throughout equally trustworthy or significant, and unnecessary to hold any special theory about them in parts or as a whole. We are to take all on its merits, and accept the results of thoroughly earnest, honest, painstaking, and competent inquiry. There is "more truth and light yet to breake forth out of" God's holy Word," in a much deeper and broader sense than John Robinson meant, even from the personal Logos, Jesus Christ. The view here maintained is radically and fundamentally different from that which is ordinarily current among so-called orthodox theologians and the rank and file of the clergy and laity. In theory at least, it is maintained that, when a man is satisfied that a given truth comes from God, or that God has spoken, he at once acknowledges the authority of the utterance, whether it appeals to and awakens any response in his nature or not. But this is not a true statement of the case, and besides it fails to take into account the ground for considering the utterance one of God. The fact is, the decision of this question is the prior one, and depends upon the idea one has of God, the quality of the so-called truth, or that which claims to be such, and the thoroughness with which all the criteria, philosophic and practical, are applied; that is, the ultimate decision is that the authority rests in the quality of the truth itself, and in the person, because he is what he is in intelligence and character. History and philosophy are both essential to the ascertainment of truth. But the ultimate criterion is philosophical, not historical. History itself rests upon philosophy. That anything happens does not make it ideal or binding. The origin of a principle or truth is not its justification, a common fallacy in much of the investigation of the present day. The study of origins is of priceless value. But the ultimate criteria of absolute worth are philosophic and ethical.

The view here set forth is of value, not only in the realm of theology and the philosophy of religion, but also in that of the religious life. In fact, its influence in the religious life is of far greater moment. It is to be remembered that these realms are 1 Dexter, Congregationalism, p. 404.

organically related as parts of one whole, and that in fact no separation between them is possible. A philosophical theory or supposed insight into facts and truths, copía, for that is strictly the meaning of the word "theory," -bears fruit immediately or at length in life. Let, then, the teacher or preacher of truth set forth its nature and relation to life in the clearest and most forcible manner possible, trusting it to make its own way and vindicate its own authority. Then it will rule, never otherwise. This is in fact what happens everywhere in life where the knowledge is real and actually authoritative and controlling. It is the method of Jesus Christ, who, whenever He referred to book or other authority, always did so because his hearers acknowledged it as such, or thought they did; and his reference in all cases approves only what is intrinsically excellent and worthful, as is perfectly evident to a careful and thoroughgoing observer.

Unless the popular mind is intrinsically incapable of apprehending profound truths, even when clearly presented and properly illustrated and enforced, it would seem every way preferable to maintain, so far as possible, scientific exactness in the presentation of real truth. Such procedure conduces to clearness of thought, and to economy of energy in the furtherance of truth and its application to life. The use of popular conceptions constantly ministers to confusion of thought, and necessitates great waste of energy afterwards in counteracting and obliterating the error and other mischievous and pernicious results that necessarily follow in its train. It seems at least the wiser not to say the more righteous course for every public teacher honestly to shoulder the responsibilities of his position, to spare himself no travail of thought necessary to gain for himself, and effectively to set before others, clear conceptions of truth. Only in this way can he help them to a really genuine and worthful moral and religious life and character.

In conclusion, let not the argument of this paper be misunderstood. Its purpose is construction, not destruction. It aims to exhibit the true psychologic and philosophic basis of revelation and its authority, by setting forth the actual experience of men in these things. Its polemic, if so it must be considered, is not against revelation or its authority, but against a false conception thereof. If the view here set forth is erroneous, let the error be exposed. If it be true, let us accept it and act accordingly. Alfred G. Langley.

NEWPORT, R. I.

THE POETRY OF ALFRED AUSTIN.

"CONTEMPORARY popularity," said one of the keenest of American critics long ago, "is a matter of accident not always proportioned to desert." The judgment pronounced upon an author's works by the readers of his time may be a correct one, but whether a later generation of readers will confirm the earlier verdict depends upon circumstances quite other than those which swayed the minds of the author's contemporaries. English readers, who take their dime novelists more seriously than Americans do their own writers of the same class, have given their Rider Haggards and Hugh Conways a far more conspicuous position in the world of letters than we should think of assigning to our Mrs. Southworths and Sylvanus Cobbs, but only very devoted adherents of these two English writers, like Mr. Lang and Mr. Comyns Carr, for instance, would be likely to assert that the fame of Messrs. Haggard and Conway was proportioned to desert. Once the world adored the lines of the late Mr. Tupper, and laughed at those of Mr. Coventry Patmore. Now we are beginning to see that Mr. Patmore is really a poet, though by no means a great one, and we have found out that Mr. Tupper never was a poet, great or small. The judgments once passed upon these two men were purely accidental ones, by no means dependent upon the merit of the performances of either.

At the present time Mr. Lewis Morris is a poet very much read in England, his "Epic of Hades" having some time ago passed through twenty-five editions. Fluently prolix, he pleases many readers, because, while seeming to address himself to their intellectual faculties, he in reality makes only the smallest demand upon the exercise of such powers. The quality of his poetic inspiration reaches his admirers in a very much strained condition; but if there are those who like water-gruel poetry, we need not complain, unless they insist that we shall join them in gathering laurels to adorn the brow of the water-gruel poet. In America the poetry of Mr. Lewis Morris is by no means so well known as in England, but three American editions of "The Epic of Hades" show that it is not without readers.

The American popularity (or want of it) of the lesser English poets of our time is a curious matter for contemplation; and by the lesser poets I mean (speaking only of men just here) such writers as Dobson, Gosse, Lang, Lewis Morris, Edwin Arnold,