NEW DIFFICULTIES. 219 General station as to put restraint upon him. Garfield's arrival marks the beginning of that period of quarrels with the War Department, in which General Rosecrans frittered away his influence and paved the way for his removal. That great strategist and gallant soldier was always unwise in caring for his own interests, and generally very imprudent in his intercourse with his superiors. Yet he was nearly always right in his demands, especially when he made appeals to the War Department for more cavalry and revolving arms. In these requests Garfield was heart and soul with his superior. At the same time, he did all in his power to soften the tone of asperity, which his chief adopted in his dispatches to Washington. Sometimes he took the responsibility of totally suppressing an angry message. Oftener he ventured to soften the phraseology. But there was a limit, beyond which he could not go; and when Rosecrans had pronounced certain statements of the department, "a profound, grievous, cruel and ungenerous official and personal wrong," the good offices of the Chief of Staff were no longer efficacious; the breach was irreparable. Thenceforward he could only strive to make victories in the field atone for errors in council. He regarded the organization of the army as vitally defective. Almost the first recommendation, made by General Garfield, was in regard to the displacement of A.. M. McCook and T. L. Crittenden. This recommendation was made in the course of a discussion of the battle of Stone River, in which, Rosecrans explicitly said, these officers had shown themselves incompetent. Garfield, with his clear-headed judgment, utterly unmoved by popular prejudice, and thoroughly well able to perceive real ability beneath misfortune, recommended, that McCook and Crittenden be replaced by Irvin McDowell and Don Carlos Buell. Garfield did not take the ground, that Buell and McDowell had proved themselves equal to the high commands, which they had already held. Without discussing this point, he argued at length their masterly qualifications for important subordinate positions, as well as the fact, that this offer of an opportunity of coming out from the cloud, under which they rested, would insure their gratitude and incite them to their very best efforts. With George H. Thomas already in command, with men like these as his associates, and with the energy and genius of Rosecrans to lead, the Army of the Cumberland would have been the best officered army in the service of the nation. But "Rosecrans was unwilling to adopt the suggestion for a reason, creditable to his kindness of heart, but not to his military character. Crittenden and McCook ought to be removed. Of that he had no doubt; but 'he hated to injure two such good fellows;' and the two good fellows' remained with him until Chickamauga." URGING AN ADVANCE. 221 From January 4th to June 24th, Rosecrans lay at Murfreesboro'. Through five months of this delay Garfield was with him. The War Department demanded an advance, and, when the spring opened, with unusual vehemence. General Rosecrans delayed, waiting for cavalry, for reinforcements, for Grant's movements before Vicksburg, for the movements of the enemy, for the opinions of the generals. The Chief of Staff approved the delays, till the army should be strengthened and massed; but long before the delaying officers were ready, he was urging movement with all his power. In a private letter, dated June 12th, 1863, he urged an advance. He wrote: "Bragg's army is weaker than it has been sincc the previous battles. If Grant succeeds at Vicksburg, it will take weeks to recover from the shock and strain. * The turbulent aspect of politics in the loyal States renders a decisive blow against the enemy at this time of the utmost imThe country is anxiously ** portance. reasons I believe an immediate advance of all our available forces is advisable, and under the providence of God will be successful." This information he procured through a secretservice system, which he had established, and which was perhaps more perfect than in any other of the Union armies. As he subsequently said, he refused to believe that this army, which had defeated a superior at Stone River, could not now move upon an inferior with reasonable prospect of success. The Army of the Cumberland agreed with Garfield, who was a great favorite with the officers and men. His ringing letter on the atrocities of rebel prison-pens, written a few months previous, had added greatly to his popularity. The closing sentence of this letter reads: "We cannot believe that the justice of God will allow such a people to prosper. Let every soldier know that death on the battle-field is preferable to a surrender followed by such outrages as their comrades have undergone." ONE TO SEVENTEEN. 223 Finally, General Rosecrans formally asked his corps, division and cavalry generals about the propriety of advancing. With singular unanimity, though for divers reasons, they opposed it over their signatures. Out of seventen generals not one was in favor of an advance; and not one was willing to put himself upon record as favoring an early advance. General Garfield collated these seventeen letters, and fairly refuted their statements, adding a cogent argument against them and in favor of an immediate movement. This report, says an excellent authority, is "the ablest military document known to have been submitted by a chief of staff to his superior during the war. General Garfield stood absolutely alone, every general commanding troops having, as we have seen, either openly opposed or failed to approve an advance. But his statements were so clear, and his arguments so convincing, that he carried conviction. The considerations which led to his conclusions, he thus stated: i. Bragg's army is now weaker than it has been since the battle of Stone River, or is likely to be again for the present, while our army has reached its maximum strength, and we have no right to expect re-enforcements for several months, if at all. 2. Whatever be the result at Vicksburg, the determination of its fate will give large re-enforcements to Bragg. If Grant is successful, his army will require many weeks to recover from the shock and strain of his late campaign, while Johnson will send back to Bragg a force sufficient to insure the safety of |