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eyes, and grateful to her taste. Because we see nothing at variance with our knowledge of God, in assuming, that, as to Him it belonged to place the creature whom he had formed in a state of trial, to Him it also belonged to appoint what should be the trial of that creature's obedience. That which is placed out of our reach cannot be a visible and palpable test of our submission to authority. Nor can an objection be alleged agaiust the primary prohibition, on account of its prescribing abstinence from an object' alluring to the eyes and grateful to the taste,' unless it be asserted that it is not consistent with a Divine constitution, that the tests of our probation should comprise agreeable objects. The narrative in the third chapter of Genesis, is understood by the Author in an allegorical sense. The tree of life in the garden of Eden was, he imagines, 'the symbol of 'inoral purity in the immediate presence of God—the tree of 'the knowledge of good and evil, the symbol of the marriage
state--the eating of its fruit means, the first act by which • Adam recognised Eve as his wife ;---and finally, the serpent is the symbol of desire planted in the human frame, but which
carried to excess becomes sensuality and other bad passions.' It is no new opinion, that the serpent is the symbol of desire, and that the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil denotes the sexual union : the ancient allegorists have so interpreted the narrative. But it seems to be so palpably opposed to the details in Genesis, as well as so replete with inconsistencies, or so beset with difficulties, as to be scarcely tenable, For when God blessed the original pair, he said to them : “ Be fruitful and multiply;" a command which would not seein to be very consistent with the notion that the offence of eating the forbidden fruit could have reference to any thing relating to marriage. And if the serpent wbich beguiled Eve, really means the principle of desire implanted in the human frame, which, directed to improper objects and carried to
excess, becomes sensual and criminal,' then it follows, that directed to proper objects and not carried to excess, it is not sensual and criminal, and might therefore, as it was implanted in the buman frame, be a principle perfectly innocent. Marriage may be, and unquestionably is, as Dr. Jones represents,
the cause of much evil to those who are not properly united :' but can this be applied to the primitive pair?
As a specimen of the rutional modes employed by the Author in explaining and vindicating passages of the sacred writings, we copy the following comment on the third verse of the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.
• The Christian law, inasmuch as it penetrates the innermost recesses, reaching even the heart, condenins or acquits those under its jurisdiction, not from their outward actions, but, from the motives
which gave them birth, far surpasses all other laws in excellence and efficacy. Its superiority to the law of Moses is set forth in the following passage : « For what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, having sent his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, condemned sin for sinning with the flesh.” Here again sin and flesh are personified, and represented as having a criminal intercourse with each other. They however conduct their intrigues with so much secrecy, that the law, or the legitimate husband of the Aesh, though convinced of their guilt, had no means sufficient to arraign and punish the offenders. The law, we are told, was weak through the flesh. By which we are to understand, that through the imperfection of human discernment, it could not recognise crimes that were only intended or meditated in the heart; nor punish, for want of clear and positive evidence, such things as are done in secret. This neither the law of Moses nor any human law could effect. But in order to supply its inability, the omniscient creator, seeing sin making a private appointment with flesh, invests his own son with the dress and similitude of the former, and dispatches him to the very place where, under the covert of darkness, the latter had agreed to meet him. Flesh arrives at the place appointed ; the Son of God drops his feigned appearance, and stands before her in the figure of her real husband. Thus he detects their guilt; exposes the odious character of sin, and brings the partner of his crimes to merited punishment. Divest the paragraph of its personification, and you have this simple meaning : The Christian law, far surpassing all other laws in extent and efficacy, pronounces a person criminal, though his crimes may be unseen by man, and though committed only in design. Extending its cognisance to the bosom of men, beyond the reach of human discernment, it decides upon their characters from the motives and designs of their hearts, and thus detects and punishes sins, which pass un. detected and unpunished by other laws." ;
pp. 99—101. Dr. Jones, in considering the history of the temptation of Christ, which he regards as a symbolical representation of the difficulties with which our Lord had to contend, in the discharge of his office, and of the feelings which such difficulties naturally awakened, reviews the hypothesis of Farmer, which he pronounces to be remote from the truth. Of Farmer's theological reputation, as connected with the “ Inquiry,” a severe judgement is delivered in the following sentence.
• With the New Testament in our hands, we feel ourselves surrounded with the mild and benignant splendour of truth and reality; but this critic would involve our hemisphere in gloom, at the moment the sun of righteousness sheds his purest, serenest rays on our hori. zon; and with preposterous officiousness, would reflect on our path the livid light of a midnight taper, when the Son of God himself stands before us, clothed with the luminary of day.' p. 124.
The following remarks are truly excellent, the sentiment most correct and admirably expressed, and well deserving of the se
rious attention of those persons whom it immediately concerns, not forgetting the learned Essenus bimself.
• He who hopes to gain the favour of the public, as a translator of the Scriptures, must in some respects consuit the public taste. His object should be rather than produce a new, to improve the old translation, supplying its defects; correcting its errors in sense or in grammar; polishing it where it is vulgar; and rendering it more smooth and flowing where it is inelegant or inharmonious in arrangement. At least, however new his translation might be, he must not seek to give it the roundness and variety of a modern English composition, but study to preserve the characteristic tenour of the original ; its unvaried ease ; its graceful simplicity; its freedom from the studied pomp and variety of diction on common subjects; and its natural elevatiou into true sublimity, when swelling with the weight and amplitude of the sentiments which it conveys: and these characteristics are often happily preserved in the authorized version, however defective in many places. These excellencies, wherever they occur, are rendered more indispensable by being long familiar to our ears; having been made the lessons of our childhood, and still the subjects of solemn meditation in our riper years.' p. 141.
of Mr. Bellamy the following opinion is delivered.
• This gentleman seems to have been brought up amongst the rabbies, and to have drunk deep of their learning. But he has not been fortunate in the period of his birth. Had he flourished in the dark ages, he might have imposed on the public without impeachment, such mystic conundrums for Hebrew lore ; but it is too much in the present enlightened state of criticism, to expect men to receive his Cabalistic nonsense, though delivered with the authority of an oracle.'
Art. III. An Inquiry on the Duty of Christians with respect to War:
including an Examination of the Principle of the London and American Peace Societies. In a Series of Letters. By John Sheppard, Author of Letters descriptive of a Tour on the Continent,
in 1816. 8vo. pp. 188. Price 6s. London. 1820. THIS "HIS is decidedly the best work that we have yet seen
on the subject of War, viewed in connexion with the practical question of the duty of a private Christian. To dilate on the horrors of war, is the easy task of the poet or the historian; but no one was ever yet, by the most pathetic representations of the miseries incident to the stirring conflict of armies, inspired with a virtuous detestation of the principle of war. To prove that not a single war has been undertaken, in which ' the millions lavished on the cause, have not all been cheated
away from us by the phantom of an imaginary interest,'— would also be easy ; but it would leave untouched the main question, whether War in itself, be in any case compatible with Christian principle.
It is generally known, that the Society for the promotion of permanent and universal Peace,' set out with the broad position, as their fundamental principle, that all war is inconsistent with • Christianity, and that all co-operation in war is, on Christian
principles, unlawful.' This is understood to be the prevailing sentiment of the respectable Society of Friends, and with this is in general connected another principle, that all resistance of evil by physical force or violence, is inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity. The denial of a right in society, to take away life, under any circumstances, seems to follow almost as a corollary. Could this last opinion, indeed, be substantiated, the question of the lawfulness of war would be at once determined,
Whether the private defence of his own or another's life be lawful for 'a Christian living under civil government,' is, however, an inquiry by no means necessarily connected with the present subject. The Author takes a perfectly distinct ground, in contending, in opposition to the principle of the Peace Society, that all war is not unlawful : bis simple argument is, the necessity of civil
government, and of the coercive authority involved in it, as recognised by the Christian revelation.'
« It is the end of coercive authority to restrain and punish evildoers, in conformity to justice. In order to that end, its amount and its exercise must be correspondent to the number and the means of those evil-doers. For, it is evident, that a body of determined rioters, or a corps of banditti, or invading foreigners, cannot be coerced by the ordinary instruments of municipal law. Such evil-doers would unavoidably become, if not adequately resisted, the givers and executors of the law which their own will might dictate. The only possible way of controlling suo, offenders is by an armed force superior to their own. If the ruler “ beareth not the sword in vain," it must be because there are other swords at his direction. The mere display of his own, as an ensign of office, can, in such cases, avail nothing. If the lives of such associated offenders are forfeited without judicial condemnation, it is on the same account as the life of a single criminal has sometimes been, on account of resistance to the lawful apprehension of his person. If they do not so resist, or even if they sur. render themselves after resistance, they become prisoners of the State. The. person
who takes up arms, at the summons of his government, to assist in apprehending these criminals, whether domestic or foreign, serves the State in essentially the same manner as the officer of justice who apprehends, by force, an armed and resolute robber. The one force is called, from its organization, civil; and the other, military; but their acts in such cases admit of no real distinction. A contest against either banditti, rebels, or invaders, may be protracted, offensive, and bloody ; and so, on a minute scale, may be the pursuit of a single desperate robber ; yet both may be purely defensive of the public peace.' pp. 3–5.
• That there may be cases of defensive war, not at all differing in Vol. XIV. N. S.
principle and design from the acts of civil power, will, I think, be indisputable, if we suppose the institution of a court of international appeal, such as the Peace Society itself very laudably suggested to lhe Congress of Aix la Chapelle, for the prevention of the appeal to arms. As soon as we conceive of a court of justice acting in this wider sphere, it must be immediately perceived what would be the ultimate form of its interpositions to “ keep the peace" in Europe.
• If such a court of international appeal had been instituted in 1802, after the peace of Amiens, does any one imagine that the Dey of Al. giers would have concurred in it; or that the First Consul of France, had he done so, would have really submitted to its decisions ? We shall suppose, for argument's sake, that the character of Alexander, who had newly ascended the Russian throne, had been then what it now appears, and that he had honestly acceded to the formation and jurisdiction of the court, in concert with the British and some other European governments, and with the North American States. We shall then suppose, that, on differences arising between France and Russia, the latter power expressed a sincere readiness to submit them to the international court, but that Napoleon (whether he had nominally acceded to that institution or otherwise) declined all appeal and arbitration, and marched into Russia at the head of his armies, as he did a few years after. What was the international court to have done in such a conjuncture, but to have sanctioned, if not assisted, the Russian government in collecting a superior force, (which might be named, when acting under that sanction, an immense military poJice,) to seize or expel those invading robbers ? What officers of justice would be competent to inforce the decisions of such a court, except that dreadful array called an army?
Again, let us suppose the corsairs of Algiers to attack the merchant ships of Great Britain or America, and carry their crews into slavery : a supposition too often justified by facts. In what way could the court repress or prevent these barbarous aggressions, except by authorizing the British or American governments (if it be implied, in the notion of such a court, that every act of national hostility would require its sanction) to capture those pirates, or even assault them in their strong hold. To allege, that such an international court, being founded on principles of peace, must not direct or authorize the use of force against determined aggressors, whether by land or sea, is to deny to it the very same kind of power which must necessarily reside in courts of narrower jurisdiction, unless crime is to be prevented or punished by miracle.
In fact, to deny to the supreme authority, whether national or international, the right of coercion, is a contradiction : it is to deny to it that which is its essence. But the only coercion which can be exercised by the supposed international court, is, defensive war. It is the use of arms in defence of public peace and justice; and, if this were not allowed as the dernier ressort of such a court, it would be like a municipal court whose judge and officers were impowered to use only persuasion.' pp. 7-10.
• So long as there are individuals, associated bodies, or governments,