Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics: JITE, Том 151

agency costs agents analysis applicant approach assumed behavior Cambridge capital cartels claimants Coase competition constraints consumers contract corner solution crime rate Cuanajo culture customers decision Dictator Game discussed distribution economists effect efficiency empirical employer environmental equilibrium example expected external factors firms frontier function game theory gesamte Staatswissenschaft Group hostility income increase individual industry information asymmetry innovation Institutional and Theoretical Institutional Economics investment Jensen and Meckling Journal of Economic Journal of Institutional labor liability moral hazard Nash equilibrium norms Nova Aliança optimal organization outcome paper Paragominas Pareto optimal personality political preferences production property rights punishment rationality region regulation result retail risk rules São Felix sector settlers social solution squatters standard strategies structure Superfund Tailândia Theoretical Economics theory tion trade transaction costs Tucumã Ultimatum Game University Press wage wealth WILLIAMSON