Perkins vs. Superintendents of the Poor. asked for; but after the delivery of the lumber in part payment of plaintiff's note, held by the defendants, the property in the lumber was changed, and the defendants were not wrong doers in keeping possession of it. The receipt would have been evidence, and nothing more, of the delivery of the lumber in part payment of the note; and of this fact, as appears *from the testimony upon the trial, the plaintiff had [504*] already abundant evidence within his reach. The judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed, with costs. Judgment affirmed. PERKINS VS. SUPERINTENDENTS OF THE POOR OF LAPEER COUNTY. A certiorari lies to the county court to review a judgment of that court on proceedings instituted under ch. 42, R. S., as the cause cannot be carried to the circuit court of the county for review, under ch. 92, R. S. MOTION to dismiss certiorari. Stevens, for the motion. Goodrich, contra. By the Court, WHIPPLE, C. J. Proceedings in this cause were instituted against the plaintiff in error under the provis NOTE.- Bastardy proceedings in the county court being special proceedings, can not be reviewed in the circuit court by certiorari, like an ordinary judgment of the county court, and therefore there is no other remedy than the common law remedy by certiorari direct from the supreme court Warner v. Porter, 2 Doug. 358; Cross v. People, 10 Mich. 24. Where appeal can be had, certiorari should not be allowed, People v. Farwell, 4 Mich. 556, unless circumstances exist which show that a failure of justice will result from denying it; Farrell v. Taylor, 12 Mich. 113. The writ sustained in a street opening case notwithstanding an appeal was given by statute, Specht v. Detroit, 20 id. 168; People v. Brighton, 20 id. 57. For similar spe cial proceedings in which certiorari is the proper remedy, see Root v Barnes, ante, 37; People v. Judge of Branch Circuit Court, 1 Doug. 319; Jerome v. Williams, 13 Mich. 521. Perkins vs. Superintendents of the Poor. ions of ch. 42, R. S. The respondent having recognized to appear in the circuit court for the county of Lapeer, the cause was subsequently transferred to the county court, where a trial was had and a judgment rendered, to reverse which the writ of certiorari in this cause is prosecuted. A motion is now made to dismiss, on the sole ground that this court has no jurisdiction of the cause. It is urged by the defendants in error, that the judgment below must first be reviewed by the circuit court by certiorari, under the general provisions of the revised statutes which authorize that tribunal to review all judgments of the county court. The ground assumed by the defendants must be esteemed conclusive, unless it is clear that the judg ment authorized to be rendered by the provisions of ch. 42 is such an one as to make it impracticable for the respondent to avail himself of the remedy which ch. 92, R. S., furnishes to parties aggrieved by the judgment of the county court. It is to be noticed that the proceedings against the respond ent were special, and the form of the judgment upon [505*] conviction peculiar. The *respondent, upon conviction, is to be adjudged the father of the child, and to stand chargeable with its maintenance. It is difficult to conceive how the respondent could have availed himself of the general provisions which prescribe the mode of reviewing a judgment of the county court by the circuit. Section 48 of chapter 92, R. S., directs a bond to be given in double the amount of debt, damages and costs that may be awarded against the appellant. It is quite clear, then, that the judgment to be reviewed by certiorari, must be one for debt or damages. The proceeding under chapter 42 contemplates, as I have shown, no such judgment, and the respondent could not, therefore, avail himself of the provisions of chapter 92, to have the judgment of the county court reviewed. The remedy by certiorari authorized by that chapter, applies solely to judgments rendered by that tribunal in the ordinary exercise of its original and appellate jurisdiction, and not to judgments rendered by virtue of the special proceedings authorized by chapter 42. Perkins vs. Superintendents of the Poor. There being, then, no other mode of reviewing the judgment before us, the respondent had the right to avail himself of the general superintending power which this court possesses over all inferior jurisdictions, and to have the proceedings of the court below reviewed by this court in the mode authorized by the common law. Motion denied. VOL. I.-40 625 APPENDIX. *MOSES VS. STEAMBOAT MISSOURI. [507*] By the act to provide for the collection of demands against boats and vessels, Sess. L. 1839, p. 70, no specific lien is given upon the vessel, until an actual levy under the attachment; and the remedy given by the act is general, and not restricted to causes of action arising within the state. This case was decided in the Supreme Court, in March, in 1842. The following is the opinion of the court: By the Court. This is a case certified from Wayne Circuit Court by Mr. Justice Morell, the presiding judge of that court. The plaintiff filed his claim and sued out an attachment against this boat, under the act of April 10, 1839, entitled "An act to provide for the collection of demands against boats and vessels." The plaintiff's claim is for work and labor in building the boat. The claim, when filed with the clerk of the circuit court, stands as the declaration of the plaintiff, under the provisions of the fourth section of the act. To this claim, a plea on behalf of the owners of the boat, to the jurisdiction of the court, was filed, setting forth that the demand of the plaintiff did not arise in this state, but in the state of Ohio; that the boat was built in Ohio, and that the cause of plaintiff's action is for labor in building and furnishing the boat in the state of Ohio, previous to the 7th July, NOTE. Overruled by Bidwell v. Whitaker, p. 469, which see and note. Vide, also, Parsons v. Russell, 11 Mich. 113; and note to 3 Mich. p. 1. |