Hiney vs. Cade. The errors assigned upon the record are of such a character as to warrant the reversal of the judgment below if we have jurisdiction of the cause. [164*] *The preliminary question will be first examined. The general jurisdiction and powers of this court are defined by the second and third sections of chapter 88 of the revision of 1846. The second section provides, that the supreme court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction of all such matters and suits at law and in equity, as may be lawfully brought before it, and shall also have jurisdiction of suits, actions and matters brought before it by writ of certiorari or writ of error, when the same shall be allowed by law, to any inferior court, to magistrates or other officers, as well in cases of prosecution for any offense, misdemeanor or penalty, in the name of the people of this state, as in other cases; and shall have authority to issue writs of error, prohibition, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, procedendo, supersedeas, and all other process that may be necessary for the due execution of the law, and the administration of justice, and the full and perfect exercise of its jurisdiction, and to hear and determine them according to the principles and usages of law and equity. The third section provides, that "The supreme court shall have the general supervision of all courts of law of inferior jurisdiction, to prevent and correct errors and abuses therein when no other remedy is expressly provided by law." These sections confer upon the supreme court the most ample powers to issue the great remedial writs therein specified, and to review the proceeding in and control the actions of all inferior jurisdictions. They will justify the issuing of the writ of error in this case, unless subsequent legislation has provided another tribunal, where judgments in the county courts are to be reviewed before they can properly come under the cognizance of this court. The forty-fifth section of chapter 92 of the new revision, provides as follows: "No appeal shall be made or allowed of any case tried or determined by a county court; but in all cases of judgments rendered in such courts, either party think Hiney vs. Cade. ing himself aggrieved or injured by such judgment, may remove the same by certiorari into the circuit court for the same county in which such judgment was rendered." This section, it is true, does not in terms conflict with the provisions authorizing this court to issue writs of error to review the judgment of inferior courts; but still it makes a specific provision as to how judgments in the county courts are to be reviewed. It makes the circuit court the tribunal by which errors in the county courts are to be corrected. *From a judgment of the circuit court the appellate [*165] jurisdiction of this court may be successfully invoked. The apparent conflict in the provisions of our statute, establishing our courts and defining their jurisdiction and powers, has resulted from the circumstance that a part of these provisions was the work of the reviser, and the remaining portion that of the legislature: the consequence has been that our whole judicial system has become so complex, and the laws establishing the system are so inartificially drawn, as to produce almost inextricable confusion. One leading idea, however, pervaded the minds of those who erected the system; that idea was, that, as far as practicable, tribunals of original and appellate jurisdiction in matters of law, and of original jurisdiction in equity, should be established in each county. Keeping this in mind, and surveying our whole judicial establishment, as it lies scattered through the revision, and the legislation of the last two winters, and I think it manifest that all judgments rendered in the county courts in civil causes must first pass the ordeal of the circuit, before they can be reviewed by this court. The writ of error having issued improvidently, we have no jurisdiction of the case, and cannot therefore, apply a corrective to the errors which pervade the record below. Cause dismissed. 207 Loomis vs. Foster. LOOMIS VS. FOSTER. The general issue, not guilty, in replevin under R. S. 1838, p. 523, as amended by Sess. L. 1839, p. 230, sec. 44, puts in issue every fact stated in the declaration necessary to sustain plaintiff's action, and not the detention of the property only. ERROR in Allegan Circuit Court. Replevin under R. S. 1838. The declaration averred a wrongful and unlawful de[*166] tention by Loomis of a *grey horse belonging to Foster. Plea, not guilty. On the trial, Foster proved that on 30th April, 1844, before suit was brought, he demanded the horse of Loomis, who refused to give him up, stating he owned the horse himself. Foster then proved his damages by reason of the detention and rested. Thereupon Loomis offered to prove the horse belonged to him; but the court rejected the evidence, on the ground that by his plea of not guilty he admitted the property and the right of possession to be in Foster, and that the detention only was put in issue. Loomis excepted to the opinion of the court. He then requested the court to charge the jury that Foster, to recover, must prove property in the horse, in addition to the detention of the horse by defendant. This the court refused, and, in charging the jury, stated it was not necessary Foster should show either a right of property in the horse, or a right to the possession. Moore, for plaintiff in error. H. K. Clark, for defendant in error. By the Court, WING, J. It is urged in support of the decision of the circuit judge, that there were two material allegations in the declaration, one or both of which defendant NOTE. For defenses admissible under general issue, see Belden . Laing, 8 Mich. 500; Snook v. Davis. 6 id. 156; Craig v. Grant, 6 id. 447, The plea admits jurisdiction, Henderson v. Derborough, 28 id. 170. Emmons v. Dowe, 2 Wis. 322; Dimond v. Downing, id. 498; Douglass v. Garrett, et al., 5 id. 85; Swain v. Roys, 4 id. 150; Ronge v. Dawson, 9 id. 246; Martin v. Watson, 8 id. 315. |