indeed, that it is of God's mere sovereignty, if any do thus will; but I equally know, that it is of man's own wilful and damnable wickedness, if he do not. It is not natural constitution, not want of provision on God's part, as in the case of devils, but hatred of holiness, that makes the only impossibility of his salvation.

That the doctrine vindicated in the foregoing remarks is that of the Church of England, appears, as clearly as words can make it appear, from the following passages. I take them as they stand in a note of the late Rev. Thomas Scott in his "Sermon on the Doctrines of Election and Final Perseverance," with his remarks on each.

1. I learn to believe in God the Father, who hath made me and all the world.

2. In God the Son, who hath redeemed me and all mankind.

3. In God the Holy Ghost, who sanctifieth me, and all the elect people of God. (Church Catechism.)

Here election is supposed to be connected immediately telep with sanctification, not with redemption: and this ap pears to me most evidently the scriptural way of stating the subject; though it differs, in some measure, from many Calvinist creeds and systems.

"Christ was crucified to reconcile his Father to us, and to be a sacrifice not only for original guilt, but also for the actual sins of men." (2d Article.)

"The offering of Christ, once made, is that perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction, for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual." (31st Article.)

Hence it appears that this was the deliberate judg

ment of our venerable reformers, and that it is the standard doctrine of our established Church.

I conclude this long note with the following paragraph from Mr. Scott's preface to the same sermon.

"The reader will perceive that the principal difference betwixt the statement here given of the doctrines in question, and that of many modern Calvinists, relates to redemption by the death of Christ, as being of infinite sufficiency, and therefore in some respects the common benefit of mankind. This view of the subject makes not the least difference in respect of the entire freeness of salvation by the sovereign purpose and grace of God, made known in the effectual calling of his chosen remnant; while it gives the preacher an immense advantage in fulfilling the ministry of reconciliation, and yields the awakened sinner the greatest encouragement in applying to Christ for salvation. On this ground we may say to any human being, "Believe in the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved." But on the other plan no sinner can know, previously to conversion, whether he has any more right to rely on the merits and mediation of Christ than fallen angels have."

That Mr. Scott, by "infinite sufficiency," meant an intended sufficiency, appears from his calling it "the common benefit of mankind:" also from his reference to Archbishop Usher's letter as coinciding with his own view, and indeed from the whole tenor of his remarks in the sermon itself.

NOTE 7.-p. 60.

I have made no use, in these discourses, of any considerations grounded on the idea of the new covenant being in its nature testamentary, simply because I cannot make up my mind that it is so. Witsius, Book 3. chap. 1. sect. x. takes for granted that the covenant is also a testament. Owen is equally decided in adopt

ing the same view.

His apology for the interchange of renderings of the same word, dia0kn, at one time by covenant, at another by testament, may be seen in his Exposition of the Hebrews, ix. 15. So, also, Rosenmüller, "Quia apostolus in superioribus hæreditatem commemoraverat, dilabitur ad notionem testamenti."

There are, however, many objections to this varying interpretation. In the first place, it is hard to attach any meaning to the expression, "the Mediator of a testament: nor does the term dia0nkŋ ever occur, in scripture, in such a connexion as should unquestionably fix the sense of it to be that of a testament, or will of a deceased person Further, it is not easy to perceive in what sense the Mosaic covenant can be called a "first testament" at all. Certainly it required not the death of its mediator, for its validity. On the other hand, it must be confessed, that the difficulty is considerable, in the way of rendering the term, invariably, by covenant. This arises, principally, from the 16th verse of this ixth chapter. Ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη, θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου. If διαθήκη be, here, covenant, it seems necessary to render roû dialeμévov the party contracting

the covenant. (Comp. Acts iii. 25.) Whereas, a covenant by no means requires, for its establishment, the death of the party negociating it.

The difficulties on both sides are fairly and fully stated, in Slade's Annotations on the Epistles, vol. ii. p. 238-241. The following valuable criticism on the verses under consideration, (Heb. ix. 15, 16,) is from the pen of Professor Scholefield, the present Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge. It occurs in a work already noticed, (page 334,) entitled, "Hints for an improved Translation of the New Testament," from which I have his kind permission to reprint it here. He observes,

"We are now arrived at a passage, perhaps, the most perplexing in the whole of the New Testament. The grand question, upon which the difficulty turns, is, whether dianŋ is to be understood of a covenant or a testament. In chap. vii. 22, as we have seen, it is rendered testament. (So also in Matt. xxvi. 28.) All through the 8th chapter it is covenant. In verse 4 of the present chapter again it is expressed by covenant; and, then, in the argument contained in the verses now before us, it is changed back to testament—of course in the sense of a will. (Compare especially, chap. xii. 24.) Waiving the question, whether the more general term, dispensation, do or do not better express the meaning of the word, our present inquiry is, under what particular form, whether a testament or a covenant, we are to regard the dispensation, so as to comprehend rightly the apostle's argument in this passage. After a long and anxious consideration of the passage, I come to

the conclusion that the word ought to be rendered cove

r

nant, though I am aware of great and serious difficulties in the way of this interpretation, which, I think, are not removed by any thing I have yet seen on the subject.* The passage is as follows:

:

And for this cause he is the Mediator of the new testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance. For where a testament is, there must also of necessity be the death of the testator. For a testament is of force after men are dead: otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth.

Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διαθήκης καινῆς μεσίτης ἐστὶν, ὅπως θανάτου γενομένου εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτη διαθήκη παραβάσεων, τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν λάβωσιν οἱ κεκλημένοι τῆς αἰωνίου κληρονομίας.

Ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη, θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεμένου.

Διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία· ἐπεὶ μήποτε ἰσχύει ὅτε ζῆ ὁ διαθέμενος.

"And for this end he is the Mediator of the new covenant, that, his death having taken place for the redemption of the transgressions under the first covenant, they that are called might receive the promise of the eternal inheritance. For where a covenant is, there must of necessity be brought in the death of the me

* The reader may find the arguments on both sides in a discussion of the passage which appeared in the Christian Observer for 1820-21. The letters of Mr. Faber in favour of the translation I adopt are strongly marked by the clear, straightforward, sound sense which distinguish that gentleman's writings; though he has left, as I have intimated, some weak points.