Italian war of 1859, and of the Seven Weeks' War in 1866, might disclose some such deafness as affected DAUN when he left LAUDOHN to take care of himself at Liegnitz. Upon this occasion "neither the Marshal (DAUN) nor LASCY through the press, or political affiliations - makes himself the representative of a party or the available weapon of a "ring." As a striking evidence of what difficulties and complications arise from such jealousies between generals of equal rank and reputation, even in absolute monarchies, take the case of GNEISENAU, in the Waterloo campaign of 1815. His abilities were conceded by all. Like NAPOLEON's idea of the French republic, they needed no acknowledgment. They were as clearly visible as the sun; the blind could appreciate them. Throughout the campaigns of 1813-'14 (after the untimely fall of SCHARNHORST at Lutzen, or Gross Gorschen), he had mixed the pills which BLUCHER administered. Nevertheless, the four senior Prussian generals considered "it a point of honor not to allow themselves to be put under the command of a junior in commission." TAUENZEIN founded his claims on his storm of Wittingberg; YORK on his success (subordinate to the direction of BLUCHER, and according to the plans of GNEISENAU) at Wurtemburg, from which he derived his title, and to his patriotic course at TAUROGGEN, which committed Prussia to the War of Liberation for Germany; BULOW for his undoubtedly glorious conduct at Gross Beeren and Dennewitz, and KLEIST to his equally conceded decisive gallantry at Culm. What was the result? BLUCHER was indispensable; and if BLUCHER had command, GNEISENAU was indispensable to him, and, as chief of his staff, and cognizant of his plans, must succeed to the supreme command in case of BLUCHER'S fall or illness. The result was, TAUENZEIN and YORK were honorably shelved with peace commands in war time; KLEIST received the command of the "army of reserve," which BLUCHER and GNEISENAU, by their conduct of affairs, rendered unnecessary; and BULOW was placed at the head of another reserve corps, not expected to be brought into action. He was not at Ligny, and was somewhat blamed for dilatoriness at that period of the campaign; and as he could not object to serve under BLUCHER, and as BLUCHER kept the saddle, he was pushed forward into Waterloo. That victory settled the matter in regard to the obedience of Prussian generals, in 1815, as the victory of the Katsbach crushed out all such bickerings in the Russian lieutenants of BLUCHER in 1813. Still, if such things can occur in absolute monarchies, how much more likely are they to do so in republics, and the more reason to provide against them by instant removals and subsequent severe punishments in case of any display of lukewarm co-operation on the part of any corps or division commander. Such jealousies would have ruined NAPOLEON'S cause in Spain under the most favorable auspices; they did ruin it, and speedily, under existing circumstances. King JOSEPH, nominally commander-in-chief, could do nothing with the arrogant lieutenants, French marshals sent him by NAPOLEON and JOURDAIN, his chief of staff (whom the Emperor acknowledged to be a true patriot, yet disliked him because he had gained what NAPOLEON had not-a battle (Fleurus) which saved France - a victory as influential, if not more so, than any of his own), threw up his hands in despair at the insubordination of those on whose cheerful co-operation success inevitably depended. The culmination of the row was Vittoria, and ended the French career in Spain. MASSENA previously had had to send NEY home for positive disobedience; and WELLINGTON Owed more than one escape from the closing vice because one jaw, a French marshal (who, according to LANNES' idea, was better than a king) would not work evenly, or make his moves subservient to another marshal after such moves were indispensable to success. SOULT, in 1814, implored SUCHET to join him for the battle of Thoulouse, offering to cede the chief command to him and fill a second part if he would do so. SUCHET, playing the despotic king in Catalonia, liked that duty better than propping a lost cause under another; and taking the hint of Marshal CLARKE, Duke of Feltre, the French Minister of War, who knew "the thing was played out," "could not see it "- that is, the force of SOULT's disinterested patriotism; and so SOULT came to grief, and WELLINGTON beat him and captured Thoulouse. POPE was exactly in the same plight as GNEISENAU, JOURDAIN and MASSENA. (his lieutenant) heard the firing of the artillery, behind Pfaffendorf, at the distance of half a mile (2 miles English), although there were two hundred cannon playing in the two armies," and heavy cannon at that. There is a similar story told of GORGEY, when he left the First Corps, under NAGY SHANDOR, exposed on the 2d August, 1849, to the attack of the whole Russian army, under PASKIEWITCH. The evening before he said to his staff, “To-morrow, NAGY SHANDOR will get a dressing;" and yet he, the superior, took no measures to protect his subordinate from the licking (Wicks, German) he was sure to receive. Our own military records are not free from such antagonisms. The New England troops would not support SCHUYLER against BURGOYNE; even STARKE held back, and LEE ruined himself by such conduct at Monmouth. Unfortunately, history swarms with such exemplifications of the country subordinated to self, and at Solferino there was considerable ill-feeling evinced at the non-co-operation of one never before so reproached, whose corps, says BOSSOLI, was nicknamed by its comrades, "La Providence des familles." KEARNY seemed to feel none of that unwillingness to serve under POPE which actuated so many of his rank in the army of the Potomac. He appeared to comprehend the whole case. "How do they expect POPE," he wrote, under date of August 4th, 1862, "to beat, with a very inferior force, the veterans of EWELL and JACKSON? Get me and my 'fighting division' with POPE," and in the same letter, "with POPE's army I would breathe again." Little did he dream, when he wrote thus, that within three weeks he would "breathe freely again," as he desired, and, alas! in another week, breathe no more the breath of this life. With what eagerness he looked forward to being relieved from what, to him, was the crushing weight of irresolute mediocrity, superior in rank, inferior in capacity, vacillating in purpose and weak in execution, and of a following (Gefolge) as devoted to the interests of their chief, or, rather, through him to their own interests, as the Homeric Myrmidons to Achilles, or the Leichtach, or foster-brethren-life-guard, to a Highland chief.• KEARNY'S breathing again was very much like the rally or flow of spirits in a man about to perish, which the Scotch called "fey." His prayer was granted, and Shicksal-the best word for Fate, since it signifies something sent by a higher power which a mortal cannot shun-relieved him and placed him where there was no Laodicean controller of events to fetter his ardent soul or trouble his spirit more. "The retreat (after GROVETON) was conducted in good order across Bull Run. General STAHL'S brigade was the last to cross Stone Bridge, which was accomplished at midnight, without molestation from LEE, who was too much exhausted to make the attempt to rout the forty thousand men who had resisted the attack of all his troops - the same army which had compelled General MCCLELLAN, commanding an army of a hundred thousand, to move from the Chickahominy to the James. "The battle of GROVETON was, therefore, one of the most bravely fought and obstinate contests of the war; - fought by General POPE under adverse circumstances, - great inferiority of numbers, with a subordinate commander who disobeyed orders; with other officers who manifested no hearty co-operation. It will be for the future historian to do full justice to the brave men who made so noble a fight, who, had they been supported as they should have been, would doubtless have won a glorious victory." - CARLETON'S "Following the Flag," pages 180, 181. "This latter (JACKSON) meets the army of General POPE on the very battle-field of Bull-Run; this time there is no panic, but a dreadful effusion of blood that lasts two days."' -"The United States during the War." By AUGUSTE LAUGEL, pages 2-5. "KING'S Division of our corps had encountered, near Groveton, JACKSON's forces, whom KEARNY had in the afternoon driven out of Centreville, and who were retreating towards Thoroughfare Gap to form a junction with the main army. About the same time RICKETT'S Division became engaged with LONGSTREET's Corps, near Thoroughfare Gap, about eight miles further west. Both actions were severe, but not decisive for either side.”— WOODWARD'S "Our Campaigns," page 176. *Our loss during the day was estimated by General POPE at from six to eight thousand killed and wounded and Generals HOOKER and KEARNY, who had been over the whole field, separately estimated the loss of the enemy at from two to one and from three to one of their own."-- WOODWARD'S "Our Campaigns," page 181. * In the examination of this campaign, the writer has received the greatest assistance from army maps and an exquisite series of plans of POPE's battles, furnished to him by Major-General A. A. HUMPHREYS, Chief-of-Engineers, U. S. A., whose kindness in similar respects, has been previously noticed. The plan of the battle-field of Chantilly was drawn for the writer by Brevet Colonel W. H. PAINE, Topographical Staff. The writer cannot refrain from expressing his obligations to these gentlemen; also to the latter for most valuable information which enabled him to form his judgment. THE IMPETUOSITY OF KEARNY AND HOOKER'S ATTACK AT BRISTOW AND BULL RUN 2D. "On Wednesday last, 27th August, KEARNY and HOOKER attacked the enemy about one and a-half miles beyond Bristow; the enemy at that point being commanded by General EWELL. Our forces attacked the rebels with such impetuosity, that they fell back in some confusion at least two miles. Night came on, which saved the enemy from total rout. Yesterday (Saturday, 30th August), at daybreak, Generals KEARNY and HOOKER opened the ball, the enemy falling back toward Centreville. At this point our forces came up with them, when a severe engagement ensued, which lasted. until dark, with heavy losses on both sides. The enemy fought with great desperation, and the shades of night again caused a cessation of hostilities."- New York Herald, Sunday, Aug. 31st, 1862, p. 5, col. 1. "General HooKER, as at Williamsburg, bore the brunt of the battle on Thursday (28th August), and as he fought the rebel General JOHNSTON at Williamsburg and defeated him, so he fought the rebel General JACKSON and utterly routed him. On Friday (29th August) he was reinforced by General KEARNY's Division, as at Williamsburg, and so these two divisions, forming HEINTZELMAN's Corps, drove the enemy to the wall. HOOKER'S and KEARNY's Divisions have done more fighting than any others in the Army of the Potomac, and their ranks are terribly decimated."- New York Herald, Sept. 2d, 1862, p. 1, col. 3. On the night of the 22d of August occurred the "camisado," or surprise, of Catlett's Station, by STUART. Contrary to the opinion generally received as correct, STUART's Chief-of-Staff, VON BORCKE, in his "Memoirs of the Confederate War," demonstrates that all our troops did not behave badly; and that some of the Union infantry, despite the surprise, storm and fearful darkness, stood up to their work like true Northern men. On the 23d, LEE was in possession of POPE's secrets; on the 24th, his movements, based on their discovery, were matured; and on the 25th, JACKSON was off on that daring flank march which did result so disastrously to us, but should have ended so ruinously to him. The very night of STUART'S "onfall," PHIL. KEARNY, ever foremost as in front of Alexandria, July, 1861; as into Centreville, Manassas, 9-11th March, 1862; as up to Williamsburg, 5th May, and at Fair Oaks, 31st May, 1862 was at Burke's Station, and on the morning of August 25th, when JACKSON moved, at Warrenton. Thus the first, the very first division of the "Army of the Potomac," which effectually in its place in the line, re-enforced the "Army of Virginia" was KEARNY'S, brought up by the same energy which carried it ahead of, and by, all others, for HOOKER's salvation, in the first battle of the Peninsula. POPE had not been surprised, in the true sense of the term, by LEE. He was aware of the flanking movement of Jackson; but, even in this critical emergency, he was crippled by the |