"THIRD BRIGADE: ' Brigadier-General HIRAM G. BERRY commanding, until August 19, 1862; Colonel O. M. POE, 2d Michigan Vols., commanding from August 20, 1862, to September, 1862. "2d Michigan Vols. 3d Michigan Vols. (6 5th Michigan Vols. "37th New York Vols. "TROOPS 1st New York Vols. Joined Brigade June 3, 1862 "ARTILLERY OF DIVISION: แ แ แ Company G, 2d United States Artillery. Relieved July 18, 1862. Company B, 1st New York Artillery. Relieved June 5, 1862. "Company E, 1st Rhode Island Artillery. Company K, 3d United States Artillery. Joined July 18, 1862." Yorktown was evacuated on the night of the 3d of May. Eleven thousand men under General MAGRUDER (who adopted here the strategem of KEARNY when approaching Manassas, and extended his little force over a distance of several miles, so as to give it the appearance of large numbers), had delayed nearly 90,000 infantry, 50 batteries of artillery, 10,000 cavalry, and a seige train of 100 guns, from the 4th day of April previous. This fact is proof enough of the correctness of KEARNY'S opinion, both as to the injudiciousness of the route and the lack of comprehensive generalship in his commander. On the night (3d May) Yorktown was evacuated, one of KEARNY's new brigadiers, CHARLES D. JAMES ON, "General of the Trenches," was the first to discover the fact, or, at all events, the first to enter the enemy's works, at 6 A. M. on the ensuing day. On the 4th, towards midday, STONEMAN, with the cavalry and some light batteries, got off in pursuit of the rebels; at early noon (10 A. M. ?) HOOKER moved. KEARNY did not start until 9 A. M. on the 5th. Between the Divisions of HOOKER and KEARNY strung out SUMNER's corps of about 30,000 men. When STONEMAN, HOOKER and SUMNER marched, on the 4th, it was a bright, sunny, or fair May day for Virginia. In HooKER's Division the men threw away all superfluous baggage, in consequence of the heat, and some actually dropped down from the same cause. It was not only hot, but dusty. What a contrast when KEARNY's turn to advance came on the morning of the 5th. The rain commenced falling, sprinkling, about dark, on the 4th, increasing in violence until about 11 P. M., when it set in for a regular storm. During the night it was not heavy enough to wet through the blanket covering the writer's informant, but towards morning (3 A. M.) it increased in violence.* After daylight (5th) rain fell in torrents. The roads had become soaked with water and were perfectly horrible-ankle deep for the men, and, seemingly, bottomless to the artillery. The dif ferent commands and arms, between Yorktown and Williamsburg, between KEARNY and HOOKER, became intermingled. The confusion, worse confounded, was hourly aggravated by the weather, the mud and the muddled condition of affairs in the rear, in the direction of the movements: Witness HEINTZELMAN'S statement, that he had orders from MCCLELLAN himself to assume command at the front; whereas SUMNER was acting under exactly similar instructions from MARCY, Chief of Staff. On the afternoon of the 4th, STONEMAN ran into, or overtook the rebel rear-guard, beyond WHITTAKER's house, between three and four miles this side and in sight of Williamsburg. The pursued stood at bay, turned upon and repulsed the pursuers. Here there is as much confusion in the accounts of what followed as there was confusion reigning among the dislocated * There is a great discrepancy, however, in the accounts of this rain-storm which exercised so great an influence on events and cost us precious time, when Time was THE element of success. It might almost be said this rain saved Richmond. It justified the remark attributed to General Dix, that, "the season was even yet too early for operations on the peninsula, since a single storm would convert its treacherous soil into a quicksand." The drizzle commenced from 11 to 12 P. M. on the 4th, and at 3 a. M., 5th, the rain came down in earnest. Twelve hours of steady down-pour was sufficient to convert the face of the country into a quagmire, in which, according to Captain CHARLES H. SCOTT, 4th New York Independent Battery, the horses sank to their knees, and another informant goes further, averring that the men, even, found the mud kneedeep. DE TROBRIAND speaks of artillery horses as "killed, or drowned in their harness in the mud on the 5th, and of advancing "to the battle through an ocean of mire, amid wearied teams, and in the midst of an inevitable disorder, which left strag glers enough in the rear." How much does this add to the glory of KEARNY, in that he carried his men through all this into the field to save a lost battle, an achievement almost equal to that accomplished by the resolution of BLUCHER at Waterloo. commands. About 5.30 P. M. SUMNER, with SMITH'S Division, came up; but nothing seems to have been done. Darkness shut in upon the opposing forces before HOOKER got into position. Then the Union forces bivouacked in the woods and the rain, which had just commenced, and slept in the consequent mud. It was nearly midnight when the van-guard of the Army of the Potomac sank down to rest—if such a suspense could be termed rest under the most trying circumstances for soldiers young in active campaigning. It was a terrible initiative for the Army of the Potomac, with a battle certain at the breaking of the day. Still, they stood it nobly, and proved, as was said of other troops on other fields, "that it took an awful deal to take it out of them." CHAPTER XXII. THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG, MONDAY, 5TH MAY, 1862. KEARNY AT WILLIAMSBURG. "He (Lieutenant-General, or General of Division, the COUNT DE LORGE), gave his orders with a coolness which made it easy to see that he is the relation (nephew) of the incomparable M. DE TURENNE. (Major-General PHIL. KEARNY was nephew of the admirable Brigadier-General, Brevet Major-General, STEPHEN WATTS KEARNY.) He had a horse killed under him (this occurred to P. K. at Fair Oaks). If God had taken him from us (at the battle of Williamsburg) everything was lost." Rousset's Histoire de Louvois, ii., 164. “And now, my son, let me enjoin you that whenever you hear the names of Generals HANCOCK and KEARNY mentioned, respect and revere them, for never was American valor more beautifully illustrated than by these Generals on the field of Williamsburg!" "Siege of Washington," Captain Adams. * * "After the battle of St. Quintin (August 10, 1587) EMANUEL PHILIBERT had France at his discretion. Had his counsels been instantly followed, the Spanish army would have dictated its own terms before or within the walls of Paris. But the narrow * mind of PHILIP II frustrated the victory, and the great opportunity was lost. It is well known that when CHARLES V received the first tidings of the glorious battle, in his retirement at Yuste, he made up his mind that his son must be in full march upon Paris; and when fallen from his expectation, he sunk into one of his fits of deep gloom, and refused to open further dispatches." GALLENGA's History of Piedmont. * “Seydlitz, with his conquering regiments, lay reorganized behind Zorndorf. Undaunted amidst the general alarm, he excited sixty-one squadrons to fresh exertions, by shouting' My children, follow me!' 'WE FOLLOW,' answered his brave men with one accord. His well known voice was in their ears; his glorious example beamed before them. rushed "Dashing through the gaps in the Prussian line, the whole mass upon the foe. The Russians slightly disordered, as before, by their own successes, could not withstand the onset: fled in confusion, and were driven in the morass under Quartschen." Capt. LAWLEY's Gen. Seydlitz. “ WILLIAM (III of England) lost the fruits of his victory at the Boyne by not pressing the Irish on their retreat. Drogheda, a nominal fortress, without ramparts, bastions, or outworks, with only seven iron cannon, a garrison of twelve hundred men, and a cowardly governor, arrested his career but a single day. Three more days elapsed before his entry into Dublin, a distance of twenty-two miles only. He thus gave his enemies leisure to retreat and opportunity to reorganize. Even then, it was not too late to press and pursue with his whole force. The fortifications of Limerick had moldered to decay; he gave the Irish time to repair and add to them. He divided his forces, sending DOUGLAS with ten thousand men to besiege Athlone, while he with the remainder marched southward along the coast. Before Athlone, DOUGLAS Sustained a signal defeat. WILLIAM himself did no more than take Wexford, which was betrayed, and Clonmel, which was ungarrisoned-petty conquests, interposing delay, when expedition was essential." O'CONOR'S "Military History of the Irish Nation." We now know that the Sikh power was completely broken by the repeated heavy blows of MUDKI, FEROZESHAH, ALIWAL and SOBRAON; but such was not then the general opinion, and there was not wanting many, even in high places, to solemnly warn the governor-general against crossing the Sutlej; as some of them said, 'only to be driven back with disgrace.' Better men declared that we had not means to lay siege to Gobindgurh and Lahore, and that, without such means it would be injudicious to cross. While thus pressed on the spot, there had been for some time as impressive suggestions from irresponsible persons elsewhere to advance and hazard all in the Punjab, before our train and ammunition had come up. The governor-general's practical common sense steered him safely between these extremes. He waited an hour beyond the arrival of the siege-train; he felt that all now depended on Time, on closing the war before the hot season could set in on our European troops, entailing death in a hundred shapes on all ranks, and the expenses of another campaign on the Government." SIR HENRY MONTGOMERY LAWRENCE's Essays, Military and Political, written in India; London, 1859. "Moreover, AHITHOPHEL said unto ABSALOM, 'Let me now choose out twelve thousand men, and I will arise and pursue after DAVID this night. And I will come upon him while he is weary and weak-handed, and will make him afraid, and all the people that are with him shall flee.'"-2d SAM: xvii. "The Prince (of Wahlstadt, BLUCHER) had a very prompt and penetrating eye. If he said, 'That village there, those heights, or that copse must be taken,' or 'this or that wing, or the center must advance, in order to prevent such one or another result,' in every case the order was apposite, and perfectly practical. In such wise, alone was the battle of Laon, the key to (the capture of) Paris (in 1814) won. NAPOLEON himself exerted all his might to break the right wing and center (of BLUCHER), and get possession of the direct road to Laon. The Prince patiently observed the changes of the struggle, even until evening; at length he spoke: 'Now it is time to put an end to this business.' Then he took out his watch and gave the order accordingly, to make a general attack at a designated time; YORK especially shall pass from his defensive to an offensive as fierce as his force will permit; let him set fire to the adjacent village and rout the French and pursue them as fiercely and as far as circumstances will permit.' A decided victory was the result, in which YORK had the greatest share.” BIESKE'S Blucher. It is very questionable if any portion of the Army of the Potomac ever fought as well—perhaps "well" is not the word - rather, ever showed more bulldog pluck than HEINTZELMAN'S corps at Williamsburg. Not that this glorious army did not fight marvelously well on other occasions; but WELLINGTON admitted that troops green to fire often face death with more reckless enthusiasm than veterans who have learned from experience the folly of exposing themselves needlessly. The "Iron Duke" spoke of the young British officers who had never been under fire before, hastening to meet death at Waterloo as gaily as if they were going to a ball. Perhaps one reason for this apparent indifference arises from the fact that men of a brave |