hangs on the staircase of the New York Historical Society, and in itself is a valuable piece of history.

As this advance and occupation of Centreville and Manassas was a very important incident in KEARNY's career, and one almost unknown to his countrymen, too much evidence cannot be brought together in establishing the fact beyond doubt or cavil. JOHN S. FOSTER, in his "New Jersey in the Rebellion," presents the following statement:

"Meanwhile the torpor which had characterized the War Department, and operated as a check upon all movements in the field, had been dissipated by the selection of EDWIN M. STANTON, a man of rough but inexhaustible energy, as Secretary, in place of SIMON CAMERON, and a vast army having been accumulated on the south of the Potomac, on the 27th of January, 1862, an order was issued by the President, directing General MCCLELLAN to 'impel all the disposable force of the army,' on or before February the 22d, for the seizure and occupation of a point upon the railroad north-westward of Manassas Juuction. The Commander-in-Chief, however, by inducing the President to consent to an advance upon Richmond, by way of the Peninsula, obtained a practical suspension of this order, and no advance, consequently, was made at the time designated by the Executive. All this time, however, General KEARNY, restive under constrained inaction, was watching with sleepless vigilence for opportunity to show the folly of inactivity, and at length he realized his desire. On the 7th of March his Brigade was ordered to Burke's Station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, for the purpose of guarding a party of laborers, and reaching there, on the following day, made an extended reconnoissance of the country for several miles around. Subsequently, he was informed by some negroes, that the enemy was preparing to leave Manassas. * He was not slow to act upon this hint.

"Apprising General FRANKLIN of the information received, but without awaiting orders, he at once pushed on with his troops, throwing out skirmishers over a wide extent of country, and driving steadily before him the scattered pickets of the enemy. On the 9th the Second and Third Regiments, with a squadron of the Lincoln Cavalry, occupied Sangster Station, a point on the Alexandria railroad, about five miles from Bull Run and nine from Manassas Junction; the Fourth Regiment acting as support to the advance. Here they surprised a detachment of Rebel cavalry, killing three, and capturing a lieutenant and eleven men, and losing one officer of the cavalry, killed at the first fire. The First Regiment had, meanwhile, advanced to Fairfax Court House, whence, on the morning of the 10th, a detachment under Major HAT

* "Rebel reports show that their (rebel) evacuation of their winter camps was completed on this very day," 8th March, 1862.-FOSTER, page 71 to text pages 70–72. rebels advanced to Vienna to cover their preparations for retreat."-TOWNSEND'S (gigantic) Cyclopedia of the War, R. 21, 62, March 10th. Herald, March 12th, 1862.

"The

FIELD and Captain VAN SICKLE was sent forward to Centreville, which place was entered about noon the remainder of the regiment coming up shortly after, under Lieutenant-Colonel MCALLISTER. On the same day, the remainder of the brigade, pushing cautiously forward, reached, and at ten o'clock in the morning, entered the abandoned works at Manassas Junction - eight companies of the Third Regiment being the first to take possession, and hoist the regimental flag. The withdrawal of the enemy at this point had evidently been precipitate, and an immense amount of hospital and commissary stores was found, together with eighty baggage-wagons, several locomotives, four or five cars, two hundred tents, and other property of value. Among the trophies were also seven flags, one of white silk, with the motto, Carolinians in the Field Traitors, Beware,' and another bordered with heavy silver fringe, with the inscription, 'State Rights: Sic Semper Tyrannis.'

Any one who is familiar with the grand operations of war, will perceive that KEARNY's advance on this occasion, very much resembled one, with which every one who pretends to be acquainted with military history, ought to be aware, that of SEYDLITZ On Gotha, in 1757.

At the same time, the sudden abandonment of their hutted camp by the rebels, calculated to have been capacious enough for 60,000 men, and presenting certain evidence to a soldier's eye, that it had recently sheltered 30,000, resembled the flight of the Syrians, in the days of King Joram. These had been investing Samaria, and reduced it to great straits, when they became impressed with the idea that they were about to be attacked by overwhelming numbers, and fled for their lives, leaving their camp even as it was.

About two thousand two hundred and fifty years after this occurrence, during the Italian war of 1848, something similar took place, when that obstinate octogenarian, RADETSKY, ate up CHARLES ALBERT's dinner at Codogno.

Neither of these are the case in point referred to. The example of SEYDLITZ, however, is apposite almost to the letter.

In October, 1757, the French and Franco-Germans advanced with the expectation of getting possession of Torgau, Wittenberg, Leipsic, and especially Dresden, depots as important to Prussia at that period, as Washington* to us at all times.

*General MITCHELL, in his "Biographies of Eminent Soldiers," FREDERIC THE GREAT, page 306, says the delay of Marshal SOUBISE at Halberstadt saved Magdeburg, whose loss to Prussia would have been equivalent to that of Washington in our case.

On the 13th (19th) October, SEYDLITZ, an officer most famous as a leader of cavalry, was detached by FREDERIC THE GREAT, to watch the enemy. Remarkable as he was in the conduct of his own proper arm, SEYDLITZ displayed equal capacity in the direction of every other, and of all the arms combined.

It is more than likely that several of the victories credited to FREDERIC were due to the generalship of SEYDLITZ, his eye, head and hand; Freyberg, in 1762, certainly was in this union of qualities. KEARNY closely resembled this Prussian. Both, bred cavalry officers, were as sagacious strategists and as perfect tacticians as they were hard fighters. It is more than probable that FREDERIC's greatest defeat at Cunersdorf might have been averted, or greatly lessened in degree, had not SEYDLITZ been stricken down, severely wounded, even as KEARNY was killed, at a crisis.

In advance of the main Prussian army, the dispositions of SEYDLITZ, which cleared the French out of Gotha, were elegant. FREDERIC cannot repress his admiration.*

Just as KEARNY, in approaching Manassas, expanded his brigade over the country, so as to make the rebels imagine he was the van of the whole Union army, even so SEYDLITZ disposed of his cavalry force on the 13th (19th) October, 1757. It would seem that he spread his hussars over an extensive front, vast in proportion to his numbers, with his dragoons — who skirmished on foot as well as mounted-in the second line, so as to give the idea that he was followed by a large body of infantry, deployed in line of battle. Meanwhile, his supports were posted so as to be able to protect his retreat, in case the enemy discovered his strategem. The French and their Ger

* Any other general," says FREDERIC, "except SEYDLITZ would have applauded himself to have escaped, in such a situation, without loss. SEYDLITZ would not have been satisfied with himself, had he not derived gain. The example proves that the capacity and fortitude of the general, are, in war, more decisive than the number of his troops. A man of mediocrity, who should perceive himself under such circumstances, discouraged by the awful appearance of the foe, would have retired as he approached, with the loss of half his men, in a skirmish of the rear guard, which the superior cavalry of the enemy would have been in haste to engage. The artful use made of the regiment of dragoons, extended and shown to the enemy at a distance, was highly glorious to General SEYDLITZ in so difficult a situation."

+ Compare pages 44-48-General SEYDLITZ, a Military Biography, by Captain ROBERT NEVILLE LAWLEY, 2d Life Guards: London, W. Clowes & Sons, 14 Charing Cross, For private circulation only, 1852.

man allies were convinced that no less than the whole Prussian army was upon them. They abandoned Gotha precipitately, leaving behind them, prisoners, booty, and the very dinner of their Commander-in-Chief.

The exalted opinion of FREDERIC himself, in regard to this achievement, is fully borne out by NAPOLEON in his "observations" on this campaign. "SOUBISE at once transferred his head-quarters to Gotha, and occupied the town with eight thousand grenadiers and a division of cavalry. He had scarcely installed himself therein, when SEYDLITZ dispo-ing his fifteen squadrons in a single rank (or line), marched boldly upon the head-quarters, which hastened to save itself as quickly as possible, in the direction of Eisenach. The eight thousand grenadiers retreated, after firing a few shots; the head-quarters baggage, and prisoners fell into the hands of the Prussians. This shameful event was the prelude to ROSBACH." Even as this dash of SEYDLITZ into Gotha, was the prologue to ROSBACH, even So KEARNY's stoop on Manassas, might and should have been the prelude to a grand victory and a decisive campaign, had MCCLELLAN permitted him to follow it up. As he said on another occasion, "If you once whip, you must always whip. It becomes a way of doing the thing." In the same manner that SEYDLITZ swept down like an eagle with wide extended wings, upon Gotha, even so KEARNY made his bold, skillful, and energetic movement on Manassas, and gobbled tents, small arms, stores, prisoners, booty, and trophies; among these seven flags, one of white silk, belonging to a South Carolinian corps, and, according to a private account, another, the flag of a Georgia regiment. A cotemporaneous letter states, that KEARNY's brigade was eleven miles in advance of any other troops.

According to a Major-General, who followed in the track of KEARNY, and wrote on the 11th March, from Fairfax Court House

"The enemy has abandoned his works at Centreville and Manassas, and filed, leaving tents and barracks standing, many tools, spades, etc., and considerable provisions. Whiskey in all the tents and barracks, pretty much."

This energetic and successful movement of KEARNY invites and will reward reflection. Reader, soldier or civilian, is it

probable that a general like JOE JOHNSTON would have abandoned commissary's stores, war materials, some of which were articles difficult to replace, and left behind him flags, and even his unburied dead* in the hospitals, unless the evacuation of his works had been hurried by a sharp aggressive? That general who conducted his retreat, during the Atlanta campaign, so as to rival that of the Allies after LUTZEN and BAUTZEN, in 1813, and left not a linchpin behind for SHERMAN, was not the man to yield any booty or trophies except under compulsion.f

In the first place, it is useless for the rebels to deny what follows, because it is the sworn evidence of unbiassed witnesses, and what MCCLELLAN himself admits, must be conceded by his friends. "I should judge," swears I. S. POTTER, " as far as I am able to do so, that the troops had left there in great haste. Several hundred barrels of flour, that they had attempted to destroy by burning, lay there in a pile partly consumed. There was also a part of a train of cars there, partially destroyed. Among other things, I found a very complete printing office, with press, types, forms standing, an imposing stone, army blanks, etc., and I should think a little newspaper had been printed there. They left tents standing, both at Manassas and Centreville."

BAYARD TAYLOR testifies that the last of the rebels left Centreville on Sunday morning, and there were a few left at Manassas Junction on Monday as late as 2 P. M.

JOHN T. HILL, a resident at Centreville, swore that General JOHNSTON returned to that place on Saturday evening, staid all night, and left on Sunday morning, 9th March, by the way of Stone Bridge, which was then blown up. He had with him 2,000 Infantry and 2,000 Cavalry. They moved off in a hurry,

*See Report Col. SIMPSON, 3d N. J. V., attached.

To the reader who may not be familiar with the operations in 1813, it is due to state that the Allies withdrew so defiantly that NAPOLEON could gain no advantage over them. In an ebullition of indignation, or ill temper, he sacrificed some of his best troops in a reckless charge upon their rear-guard, near Reichenbach, and exposed himself and staff so recklessly that his favorite, DUROC, and General KIRGENER were killed by a cannon ball, following on just behind him. The noble conduct of the Prussians and Russians drew forth, then, the bitter exclamation, "What! after such a butchery, no result? No prisoners? Those fellows will not leave us a nail; they rise from their ashes. When will this be done?"