ing the capture of their redoubtable adversary, or the admirable constancy of the hero thus pursued, which succeeded in forcing a passage."

A similar result to the one proposed was indicated by the simple occupation of Gallicia by SCHWARTZENBERG in 1813. (Charras, Guerre de, 1813, iv. 100, etc.) The French had to abandon Poland at once and fall back behind the Elbe. Then, had Prussia been ready to move, the French would certainly have been thrown back, with ease, beyond the Rhine.

A French army could have lived off the Shenandoah Valley, which would have obviated transport; the Union army ought to have done so.

In 1814, BLUCHER's line of advance of the Army of Silesia was equivalent to the "forwards" of an army up the Shenandoah, the main army of the Allies representing ours under GRANT in the Wilderness.

MASSENA, as admitted by NAPIER, need never to have fought the battle of Busaco, 1810, which he lost, had he turned WELLINGTON at the first, through the Valley of the Mondego, to the right, or as he afterward attempted to do, when too late, through Boyalva, to the left.* As an example of this course, take GRANT's campaign of the spring of 1862. ALBERT SYDNEY JOHNSTON was at Bowling Green; the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson threw him back two hundred miles, beyond the Tennessee.

In fact, the grand tactics, whose successful carrying out General KEARNY witnessed at the Col de Mousaia, in 1840, was an exact type of the stragetical plan MCCLELLAN should have followed, only on a grander scale, and more extensive, but not more difficult theatre of action. NAPOLEON III conceived similar moves in 1859. Why they failed is incomprehensible, considering the generals and troops he had under his control. At a later date, writing upon the same subject, GENERAL KEARNY says: "It would have been so beautiful to have pushed after the enemy, and in doing so, isolate Fredericksburgh, carry it easy, occupy that road, and thus turn those river batteries;

* HARPERS' ALISON, III, LIX. 349-50, especially 350, Col: 2.

all the while near enough to Washington in case of any attempt upon it."

Then as to reconnoissances in force, KEARNY exactly agreed with GUROWSKI (recall NAPOLEON'S demonstration the night before Waterloo to discover if the English were retreating or determined to stand the hazard of the morrow's die):

"MCCLELLAN acts as if he had taken the oath to some hidden and veiled deity or combination, by all means not to ascertain any thing about the condition of the enemy.

"Any European, if not American old woman-in pants, long ago would have pierced the veil by a strong reconnoissance on Centreville. Here 'All quiet on the Potomac.” ”

"And I hear generals, WEST POINTERS, justifying this colossal offense against common sense, and against the rudiments of military tactics, and even science. 'Oh noble, but awfully dealt with American people!" "*

Had MCCLELLAN ever read the extraordinary military career of JOHN CAVALIER, with which KEARNY was well acquainted, and of which he often spoke, he would have understood the enormous advantages enjoyed by LEE, occupying a central position in a mountainous country, well known to him and his subordinates, and have provided against them, as GRANT eventually did, or any GENERAL would have done. CAVALIER, it is true, was a marvel of genius, a heaven-born general, A peasant by birth, and bred a baker's apprentice, before the age of twenty he became general-in-chief of the Protestants of Languedoc, with no other knowledge of tactics but.what he had picked up by watching the manoeuvres of troops in the streets. of Anduze, or acquaintance with strategy except through the inspiration of common sense. He never had over three thousand men in hand and actually engaged in a body under his command, and never wanted more, but he kept that number always complete, every one of which was a picked and tried soldier. Like STONEWALL JACKSON, he was a fanatic, and his troops. were thoroughly fanaticised, fighting with the halter around their necks, and worse.

*GUROWSKI's Diary, 1, 157. Compare 97, 127, 133, etc., with LANGEL'S “United States during the War," 208, 284-'6, 240, etc., etc.

This, together with a discipline of iron, quadrupled their strength. Even all this, however, without the genius of CavaLIER, would have accomplished nothing. To and fro, like FREDERIC THE GREAT in the Seven Years' War, he shot like a shuttle, and either paralyzed, held at bay, or beat sixty thousand Royal troops, of whom twenty thousand were veterans, cavalry as well as infantry, well supplied with artillery, commanded by one Marshal of France, three able LieutenantGenerals, three Marechaux-de- Camp, and three Brigadiers, no less distinguished. Marshal MONTREVEL estimated CAVALIER'S numbers at twenty thousand, although they never exceeeded three thousand, "forged in the fire of battle and tempered in the sweat of marches." CAVALIER was constantly victorious in isolated encounters, until a simultaneous concentrated movement nearly destroyed his column at Nages, when he descended from his mountain fastnesses into the lowlands, cutting loose from his base. Nevertheless he did not succumb to any force of arms, although he must have finally been worn out by constant hammering. He fell a victim to a diplomacy, which, in its deceit, resembled that which put an end to the Algerian war by the seizure of ABD-EL-KADER—and terminated the Seminole war by a similar treacherous capture of OSCEOLA. As it was, the necessity of crushing him promptly and matching his genius, forced LOUIS XIV to send into the south of France the finest soldiers and best officers at the disposal of the French Minister of War. The English critic speculates with horror upon the effect of the presence of those generals and troops in Germany, but especially at Blenheim, both of which CAVALIER kept fully employed in distant Languedoc. Had CAVALIER never risen or been less than he was, the sun of LOUIS XIV would not have set in disgrace, and his motto of "NEC PLURIBUS IMPAR," "not an unequal match for numbers," might have been realized in an empire as extensive as that of NAPOLEON; and, as it was based on religion, more durable.

Indeed, the failure of the English fleet, under Sir CLOUDESLEY SHOVEL, to co-operate with CAVALIER frustrated the grandest plan of the Camisard leader and his adherents. Had the English captains succeeded in establishing a communication with

the Cevenol leaders, and furnishing them with the needed supplies, it is almost impossible to calculate the enormous results which might have followed.

But the reader may say, what has this to do with our war? Everything. The plan of operations which finished CAVALIER was the plan of KEARNY who was worthy to be named with VILLARS, who ended CAVALIER's career as GRANT ended LEE's. Incessant activity, simultaneous attacks of converging columns, allowing no respite, high-souled magnanimity blended with soldierly decision-no "pottering, half-heartedness," but BLUCHER-like "FORWARDS," everywhere, when the tide had turned, and was on the rise; and it was on the rise in the winter and spring of 1862.

KEARNY knew all this well. He was thoroughly posted in military history. His information in this regard surprised generals of the highest rank and ability abroad. Nevertheless, he could take advice from outsiders, and thankfully avail himself of the industry and ability of others, even if they did not bear the trade-mark of the National Military Academy - that Academy, the glory of our country in its grand men, whose natural greatness it so greatly develops; the damage to our people in the caste-influence, and prejudices it has engendered; a curse almost, in particular cases, in its little men, by permitting them to claim weight for their opinions on exhibiting the original stamp of its mint. Sending a man to West Point who has not soldierly instincts in him, does not make him a soldier, any more than the mode of officering the English church makes good Christian ministers. It creates a caste like the Egyptian priesthood, whose members claim for every one within the pale all the dignities and emoluments of the office; in which individuals may possess the spirit, but it would not be natural to believe that the whole did.

Alas! were not all of KEARNY'S forebodings, founded on the apathy and mismanagement of that fall, winter and spring, fully realized in the sacrifices and incapacity of the ensuing summer and autumn ?

CHAPTER XVIII.

PLANS AND CORRESPONDENCE.

ULYSSES. They tax our policy and call it cowardice;
Count Wisdom as no member of the war;

Forestall prescience, and esteem no act

But that of hand. The still and mental parts,
That do contrive how many hands shall strike,
When fitness calls them on, and know, by measure
Of their observant toil, the enemies' weight,-
Why, this hath not a finger's dignity:
They call this hed-work, mappery, closet-war;
So that the ram, that batters down the wall,
For the great swing and rudeness of his poise,
They place before his hand that made the engine,
Or those that with the fineness of their souls
By reason guide his execution.

SHAKSPEARE's Troilus and Cressida.

"All the time which subsequently elapsed" on the morning of Waterloo, after his dispositions were made, was time squandered, absolutely lost (by NAPOLEON); and often in war, losses of this kind can never be repaired."

CHARRAS' "Histoire de la Campagne de 1815, Waterloo."

"In this the King of France [LINCOLN] established his own headquarters [Washington]. He did not himself pretend to be a soldier, further than a natural indifference to danger, and much sagacity qualified him to be called such; but he was always careful to employ the most skillful in that profession, and reposed in them the confidence they merited." LINCOLN, it is stated, used to call K-E-R-N-Y "his general."— Quentin Durward.

MANY persons have supposed that KEARNY's unfavorable opinion of MCCLELLAN was subsequent to those displays of inability — that is, inability to adjust, direct and fight so vast a force as the country confided to him;* in fact, to fill commensurately the immense role to which circumstances, to retard and ripen events, assigned him

an inability which paralyzed

*“The first, most important, and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-'2. It was most unfortunate, that, with the finest MEN and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with so little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies," &c., &c. Major-General A. PLEASANTON'S Supplementary Report. Examine carefully pages 3 to 6.