fest that the two fundamental conceptions, " annual produce of land and labour," and "exchangeability," do not coincide; for we may have the produce of land and labour which is not exchangeable, and there are stupendous masses of exchangeable property-nay, in this commercial country enormously the greater portion-which is in no way whatever the produce of land and labour.

It would be far too tedious to investigate separately every writer's definition of Wealth. To investigate Smith's fully was due to the reputation of the Wealth of Nations. But the real points in debate are whether such things as services, labour, and the sciences, and also such properties as Credit, the Funds, Copyrights, and similar property are to be included under the title of Wealth. The better way will be to examine the opinions of some of the principal writers on each of these points separately and then to state the reasons which decide the question.

4. The earliest definition of Wealth that we are aware of is that given by Aristotle, Nicomac. Ethics B. V., c. 1:—

Χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα, ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.

And we call Wealth everything whose value is measured by ||

money.

Or rather we may say everything which is exchangeable, money itself being an exchangeable quantity.

Now it is evident that the generality of this definition includes both of the two latter species of quantities we have mentioned above: because a person's labour or services may be measured in money; and also Debts, Copyrights, the Funds, and all that class of Property, may be bought and sold for money.

On Immaterial Wealth.

5. The subject of Wealth is discussed in one of the earliest Economic Treatises in existence. It is a remarkable dialogue named the Eryxias. It is often printed along with Plato, and is one of the three usually attributed to Eschines Socraticus, which, however are all declared to be spurious by critics. The learned Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, thinks that this dialogue may not improbably belong to the early Peripatetic

period. This dialogue is but very little known, and as it discusses a question which is at the very root of Economics, we shall give a pretty full extract from it.

The scene is laid on the return of the ambassadors to Sicily, who, discoursing on the subject with Socrates, mention that they had seen the wealthiest man in Sicily. This leads Socrates to discuss the nature of Wealth. After some preliminary discussion, Socrates says, § 23:

"It now remains to be considered what wealth itself is; for, unless you know this first, you will not be able to agree whether it is a good or an evil. And I am ready to look into the matter with you as far as I am able. Let him, therefore, who says that wealth is a good thing, say what he thinks about it.

"Eryx.-But I do not, Socrates, define wealth in any different way from what others do. For I think that to be wealthy means to possess many good things (xohuara); and I think that Critias, here, does not think that wealth is anything else.

"Socr.-And still it remains to be considered what are goods (xonuara), that we may not again hereafter seem to differ on the point. For instance, the Carthaginians use such money (vóμopa) as this: in a small bit of leather is enclosed something as large as a stater: but what the thing is, which is wrapped up, nobody knows except the makers. Then, when it is sealed up, they use it as money. And he who possesses the most of this, seems to possess the most good things (xpμara) and to be the wealthiest person. But if any one among us possessed the greatest quantity of this, he would not seem to be any richer than if he possessed so many pebbles from the hill. And at Lacedæmon a piece of iron is used as money, and this, too, useless iron. And he who possesses a great quantity of this iron is esteemed wealthy, but anywhere else its possession is worth nothing. And in Ethiopia they use carved pebbles, which a Laconian could make no use of. But among the nomade Scythians, if any one possessed the house of Polytion, he would not be thought any the more wealthy than if any one with us possessed Lycabettus. It is plain, therefore, that neither of these things can be wealth (krýμara), if those who possess them are none the richer on that account. But there are some persons to whom each of these things is wealth (xonuara), and those who possess them are wealthy; and to others they are

not wealth, and they are not richer for possessing them. Just as the same things are not good or base to all persons, but different to different persons. But if we wish to consider why, among the Scythians, a house is not wealth, but it is to us; or why skins are wealth among the Carthaginians, but not with us; or why iron is wealth to the Lacedæmonians, and not to us; shall we not best discover the reason thus? For instance, if any one at Athens happened to possess a thousand talents' weight of the stones in the market place, of which we make no use, would he be thought wealthier on that account?

"Eryx.-I think not.

"Socr.—But if he possessed a thousand talents of the stone Lychnite, should we say that he was very wealthy?

"Eryx.-Certainly.

"Socr.--Is it not for this reason, that the one is useful to us, and the other useless?

"Eryx.-Certainly.

"Socr.-Therefore that is the reason why houses are not wealth among the Scythians, because they have no need of a house. Nor would any Scythian prefer to have a house, however beautiful it might be, rather than a sheepskin cloak, because the latter is useful to him, and the other useless. So, again, we do not think that the Carthaginian money is wealth to us, for we can buy nothing that we want with it, as we can with silver, so that it is useless to us.

"Socr.-Whatever therefore is useful to us is wealth (xpipara); whatever is not useful to us is not wealth.

"Eryx.-How is this, Socrates? Is there not something we use in conversing with one another, and in injuring each other, and many other things? Are these things wealth to us? And yet they seem to be useful. Not even yet has it seemed clear to us what wealth is. For nearly all of us agree that to be wealth, it must be something useful: but what kind of useful things? Since it is not every kind of useful thing that is wealth.

"Socr.-Come, then, shall we not rather discover what we are seeking, if we investigate the question in this way:-What is that for which we use wealth, and for what object has the possession of wealth been discovered, as drugs to drive away diseases? Perhaps this may make it clearer. It appears, there

fore, necessary for a thing to be wealth, that it must also be useful. And of useful things, there is a certain species which we call wealth. It remains to inquire for what kind of use are the things called wealth to be used; for all things are to be called useful, which we use for any purpose. As all things which have life, are living beings. But there is a certain race of living beings which we call man. But if any one were to ask us what is that thing, which if we were free from, we should not require the physician's art, or its instruments, should we be able to say if diseases should leave our bodies, or did not at all exist, or if existing, were immediately driven away? It is clear that medicine is the science which is useful to remove diseases. Again, if any one should ask us what is that thing which, if it were removed, we should have no need of wealth, should we be able to say! ? If not, let us look into the matter again. Suppose a man could live without food or drink, and was neither hungry nor thirsty, is there any reason why he should want these things, or silver, or anything else, with which to purchase them?

"Erya.-I think not.

"Socr.-And is this not true of other things? If we did not require for the service of the body what we do want now, both heat and cold sometimes, and other things besides, which the body requires, those things which we now call wealth would not be wanted by us. This would be so, at least, if no one wanted any of those things, for the sake of which we desire to have wealth: so that we had sufficient of what we daily require for the desires and wants of the body. If, then, the use of wealth is to minister to the wants of the body, if these wants were taken away, we should have no use for wealth, perhaps, indeed, there would be no such thing as wealth at all. "Eryx.-So it seems.

"Socr.-It appears, then, to us, it seems, that those things which are useful to this purpose are wealth. But what are these kind of things? Can we say that the same thing is useful for the same purpose at one time, and useless at another? "Eryx.-I should not say so. But if we want the same thing for the same purpose, it seems to me to be useful. And if not

so, not so.

"Socr.-Therefore if we could cast a brazen statue without

fire, we should not want fire for this purpose. not require it, it would be of no use to us. argument holds good with regard to other things.

"Eryx.-It seems so.

And if we did

And the same

"Socr.-Therefore of those things which any thing else can be done without, none appear to be useful, for this purpose at least.

"Eryx.-Certainly not.

"Socr.-If, therefore, we should be able without silver and gold, and similar things, (which we do not use for the purposes of the body like meat and drink, and clothes, and bedding, and houses,) to satisfy the wants of the body, so as no longer to want them, gold and silver and similar things do not appear to us to be wealth, so far as regards this at least, if we could do without them.

"Eryx.-They would not.

"Socr. These things would certainly not appear to us to be Wealth, if they were not useful: but those things would be wealth by means of which we could buy what is useful to us.

"Eryx.-O, Socrates! I could never be persuaded to believe that gold and silver, and such things, are not wealth. For I am firmly persuaded that the things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that what is the most useful to us of all things is wealth. Surely it cannot be said that these things are not useful for our existence, if we can buy necessaries with them.

"Socr.-Come, then, how shall we settle this matter? Are there certain persons who teach Music, or Grammar, or some other science, who in return for this obtain what is necessary for them, as a remuneration for this instruction?

"Eryx.-Certainly there are,

"Socr.-Therefore these men can purchase necessaries for themselves with this instruction, exchanging some of it for these things, as we do gold and silver.

"Eryx.-Certainly they can.

"Socr.-If, then, they gain by this means what they require for their living, this thing would be useful towards their subsistence. For we have already said that silver is useful for the purpose of purchasing the necessaries of life.

"Eryx.-It is so.

"Socr.-Therefore if these sciences are useful for this pur