easier to promise than to give. But our readers will be weary of Messrs. Bowles and Gilchrist, and, worse than all, of the reviewer.

ART. VIII. ANSWER TO THE QUERIES OF D. F., IN OUR THIRD NUMBER, ADDRESSED TO THE REVIEWER OF WILKINSON'S ME

MOIRS.

'AN Inquirer after Truth' is always entitled to respect, and not having any reason to doubt the genuineness of the character assumed by D. F. we hasten to redeem the pledge given for us, in No. 3, of the Repository. As our answers to the queries of this correspondent will be full and frank-" nothing extenuating, nor setting down aught in malice," we cannot but hope that they will also be satisfactory.

1st. Why was General Hampton permitted to escape, without a trial and without arrestation?"

To this question we reply, that it takes for granted premises not entirely correct: General Hampton was not permitted to escape without arrestation-for he was arrested, by a letter from the Secretary of War, of the 19th January, 1814. From this letter, we make the following extract: Major General Wilkin'son having exhibited charges against you, and having demand'ed your arrestation, it is not for the executive authority to 'take upon itself the responsibility of judging the case, or of refusing to this demand of the general, a court of inquiry, 'which shall decide whether your conduct, during the last cam'paign, has, or has not, been censurable. The court will be 'instituted, as soon as may be practicable.'

But the main question recurs;-why, after having arrested General Hampton, was he not brought to trial? Was this step in advance, a mere signal for retrograde movements? Did it make part of the grand tactics of that era? Was there a connexion between the general and any department of the government, rendering necessary, or useful, both conciliation and concealment? Had he been made to understand, that every evil has its corresponding good, and that the invasion of Canada might be defeated, without producing any great national calamity? And lastly, was the escape from justice, of which we now speak, the reward, at once, of his silence and his crimes? On these suggestions it is not our intention, at present, to speak positively they have been often made, and, so far as we know, have never been refuted; but our immediate use for them is merely to illustrate the following facts, which neither can, nor will be contradicted. The letter of arrestation, quoted above,

found the general at the Bowling-Green, (Virginia,) whither he had been permitted to go, for the recovery of his health. Instead of concluding, that this act of the government imposed upon him any new or increased injunction to remain where he was, he considered it as conferring the liberty of going where he pleased; and accordingly, without giving any answer to the Secretary, or any notice to the department of his intended movements, he made his way to South Carolina. From this "vantage ground," the theatre at once of his wealth and his influence, he opened a negociation with the government, and in a few days, through the urgency of colonel Taylor of the Senate, and the mediation of the Secretary of State, obtained an order that the War Department should tread back its steps, discontinue the prosecution, and accept the general's resignation.*

2d. Why was the private letter of General Wilkinson to Geneal Lewis opened and read at the War Office?"

If the former query was founded on premises not entirely correct, this is still more so-for though the letter in question was read, it was not opened in the. sense of the querist; which, at least, appears to have taken for granted some unworthy practice -some violation of trust-some outrage committed on the wax, or the wafer, which held it together. Such, however, was not the fact the letter was an open one, altogether unsealed-put up with others, addressed to the Secretary, and received at the War Office, in the absence of that functionary. Like all other packets, so addressed, and having an official stamp, this was opened, and the despatches it contained read by the first clerk, general Parker, who supposing (we think very reasonably) that an unsealed letter to a Major General of the army, and accompanied by others on public business, was, like those, intended for the perusal of the Secretary, went on to read this also. Finding the contents (as he thought) of very equivocal character,† and such as might have been expected from the Fat Knight to Ancient Pistol-he despatched it by express to the Secretary; who, in his turn, communicated it to the President, with the following question: whether a superior officer, sending such a letter to one of subordinate rank, ought to be continued in com

* An application was made to the Secretary of War on this subject, with view of engaging him in the measure, and perhaps of making him responsible for it; but he declined taking part in it, unless ordered to do so by the president.

It appears by General Lewis's testimony, page 131, vol. 3, of the Memoirs, that the letter, according to the recollection of the Secretary and of General Parker, contained a sentiment, "advising him not to expose his person in battle, and representing that generals, who were choice spirits, ought not to be exposed to the same hazards, as younger officers."

mand? The President's reply was not exactly such as Frederick or Napoleon would have made :-" The letter," said he, "is prima facie highly improper; but as it is quite improbable that General Lewis will suffer it to influence his conduct, it may be sealed and forwarded, and passed over without farther noticeand with the less objection, as after all it may be but a ruse of Wilkinson, to prevent Lewis from undertaking any thing of eclat, until he (W.) shall have arrived at the army." This opinion was adopted and followed: nor would the letter have attracted farther notice, but for the remarkable coincidence between its supposed doctrines and the conduct of the General throughout the campaign.

6

3d. Why is the history given by General Wilkinson, of the causes of the capture of Washington, passed over in silence? Was it because his story is unanswerable?"

This question is free from the defects of those we have discussed, but has others peculiar to itself: it wants both judgment and delicacy-judgment, because a strict and logical answer to it would explain nothing, and might even be given in a monosyllable; and delicacy, because our personal motives for passing over the general's history of what he has facetiously called the Bladensburgh Races, and of many other incidents of the war, have been already assigned, and ought, we think, to have satisfied every honest inquirer. Still, as the subject is important, and may be as little understood by others as by our querist, we have no scruple to enter upon it, and have even some hopes of being able to present it under new and interesting aspects. By this engagement, however, we are not to be understood as binding ourselves to follow the general, paragraph by paragraph, through the bulky and ill-arranged matter he has spread before us-for to do this would require the patience of Job and the age of Methuselah ;-but, what will better promote the progress of truth, we will carefully assemble the causes which, in his opinion, were most efficient in producing the capture of Washington; and give to each that degree of examination which may be necessary either to refute, or to establish it. The result will probably satisfy D. F. that our past silence has not arisen from a conviction that the general's story is, in all its parts, unanswerable.

According to our historian, the capture of Washington is ascribable-to want of foresight, in not perceiving that the Capitol would be the object of the enemy's attack; to want of diligence, in not preparing sufficiently against this attack, after the intention of the enemy had become apparent; to want of judgment and skill, in not properly employing the means of defence actually possessed; to certain ministerial interferences with the legitimate authority and arrangements of the commanding Ge

neral; and "though last, not least," to the non-acceptance of Gen. Wilkinson's services, tendered to the government on the 18th of August, as Commander in Chief.

6

To make good his first position, (want of foresight,) Mr. Wilkinson says: From the conduct of the President, it was not 'suspected that he had the remotest idea of the attack of the 'enemy upon the Capitol, much less that he had received an ' intimation of such designs from our Commissioners in Europe. 'It was believed that his judgment was regulated by the opinion ' of Gen. Armstrong, who, it was well known, treated every 'suggestion of danger with ridicule,* until the enemy was dis'covered in full march from Upper Marlborough.'-Yet (in page 750, Vol. 1st.) this very historian tells us, that towards the end ' of June, 1814, the President had conceived the idea, that the ' enemy might make the Capitol an object of attack, and that 'advices received on the 26th of that month confirmed his sus'picions'-and then goes on to enumerate certain public measures of the government, taken on that supposition, and among others, the designation of a large force for the defence of the district. Now, two propositions, which so flatly contradict each other, cannot both be true; either the President took no public measure, nor made any public declaration, inducing even a suspicion that he had the remotest idea of the attack of the enemy, as the first proposition asserts;-or, as the second admits, he did suspect the designs of the enemy as early as the month of June, and had that suspicion confirmed on the 26th of that month, and did immediately proceed to take measures to guard against them. To settle the point between these conficting statements, we are compelled to recur to other testimony than that of the Memoirs, and to this end we shall employ the letter of Mr. Monroe to the investigating committee of Congress, and the report made by that committee to the House of Representatives. On or about the 1st of July last,' says Mr. Monroe, the President convened the heads of depart'ments and the Attorney General, to consult them on the mea'sures which it would be proper to adopt for the safety of the · City and District. He appeared to have digested a plan, of the 'force to be called immediately into the field-the additional

6

* This would have been carrying the jest a little too far :-but it is true, that the Secretary's uniform creed was, 1st, that as Washington presented no military object, it was highly improbable that the British would carry their attack there; and 2d, that if they did, provided the country was honest to itself, there was no danger. The event demonstrates that both opinions were right:-the attack never would have been made, but for those symptoms of terror which we took no pains to conceal; nor would it have succeeded, but for "unskilful dispositions and groundless panic." See Winder's official account of the battle.

'force to be kept under orders to march at a moment's notice "its composition-and necessary equipment. The measures sug gested by the President, were approved by all the members of the administration.' In the month of June,' says the Report of the Committee,* certain intelligence being received of the 'complete success of the Allies in the subjugation of France, the President saw that the enemy had the inclination and 'power to increase his military and naval forces against the United States, and, in that event, he believed that a variety ' of considerations would present this City as one of the promi'nent objects of attack. On the 26th of June, despatches were 'received from Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard confirming the 'views of the President, which induced him to convene the 'heads of departments on the 1st of July, at which time he pre'sented the plan of a force immediately to be called into the 'field, and an additional force to be kept in readiness to march without delay, in case of necessity.'

These extracts settle the question of foresight; and show that from the moment of the pacification in Europe, not from that of the enemy's march from Upper Marlborough, the President foresaw the possibility, and even the probability of the enemy's attack on Washington.†

The general's second position (want of preparation) has not been more fortunate than his first; for after laying it down broadly and positively, and without any qualification, he turns short upon it, combats it stoutly, and, as we think, completely

This committee was composed, of Mr. Johnson of Kentucky, Mr. Lowndes of South Carolina, Mr. Stockton of New Jersey, Mr. Miller of New-York, Mr. Goldsborough of Maryland, Mr. Barbour of Virginia, and Mr. Pickens of South Carolina.

Had this not been the case, and had the President limited his belief to the mere possibility that the enemy might attack Washington, he would have been justified, as well by sound military reasoning, as by the event :by the former, because no one has ever pretended that Washington furnished an object equivalent to the risk; and by the latter, because the official letters of Admirals Cochrane and Cockburn, and of Gen. Ross, unite in showing that this attack was but a contingent part of the plan, and only to be made, if, after arriving at Marlborough, and feeling his opponent, he found it could be done with safety. What then were the facts which produced the movement? In a march of forty miles, from Benedict to Marlborough, through a country abounding in defiles, he had received neither interruption nor annoyance. On arriving at the latter of these places, he had seen the flotilla (both the cause and the object of the expedition) abandoned without a contest. In repulsing the attacks on his out-posts, he had made an offer of battle, which had not been accepted: and lastly, he had found the dispositions given to our army such, as removed all alarm with regard to his flanks or his rear. Reasoning from these facts, and concluding that they proved either the feebleness or the fears of his enemy, he determined, on the 23d of August, and not before, to carry Washington by a coup de main!