ORIGIN OF BERKELEY'S IDEALISM. In the various modifications of the old Theory of Ideas, they seem generally to have been supposed not only distinct from, but without the mind; though present at it. Farther, those Ideas, which were thought to represent Figures of External Bodies, were supposed to be really extended.-Such ideas were to the Mind, as the Seal to the War; and yet this distinction has been frequently confounded, by speaking of the Idea as a mere Sensation: an inconsistency chargeable, in particular, to the phraseology of Locke. Berkeley, like most preceding Philosophers, adopted Ideas as distinct beings from the Mind: but he made a vast change in the nature of these imaginary beings. He maintained not that they are merely present at, but that they are actually in, the Mind: though what he meant by in an inextended Mind, seems beyond all ordinary conception. But his most famous assumption is, that perceived Extension and Figure are not really extended; and that we are but deeply cheated in believing their real Extension. In a word, he affirmed that Extension and Figure are as mere Sensations as Blue and Yellow; and then, arguing justly that a Sensation can be resembled by nothing, but another Sensation, he insisted there cannot exist any external INERT Being possessed of any quality like to Sensation. Now it must, at the same time, be observed, that Berkeley maintained Ideas to be inert things themselves, and always existing in some Mind: therefore it could not be the INERTNESS of Body that made him deny any resemblance between its qualities and our Sensations; and something else must be the truly exceptionable quality.-This brings us, at once, to the true Origin of Berkeley's scheme, namely,-He held first, that the Mind is an inextended Substance: and next, that Ideas of Extension are actually in the Mind. It followed inevitably, that perceived Figure cannot be really extended; and therefore is not what it seems to be. Here it is highly to be objected, that, upon his own Principles, Berkely was the last man in the world who ought to have denied the reality of Extension. For he strongly asserted our Ideas to be what they appear to be, and nothing else; and therefore it would have been as philosophical in him to have maintained that ·Bitter is really Sweet, and every other Sensation really its own contrary, as to affirm that Extension is really inextended. The evidences of Consciousness are esteemed unquestionable even by Sceptics and if any thing which appeals to Consciousness can be supposed its own contrary, it is folly to talk of Human Understanding; for then all may be really nothing but chaos. Now I certainly do not agree with Berkeley that perceived Figure is mere Sensation; but yet deem it certain that it appeals, in a peculiar way, to Consciousness; and therefore is as really what it appears to be, as any sensation is really itself.-If my views prove well founded, it is our high and indestructible bulwark against Scepticism that the reality of Extension is upon the very same footing, in evidence, with the reality of any conscious fact. I have both in this inquiry, and in another Work, offered some farther objections to Berkeley's scheme; but a full-length refutation has not at any time been my aim; and here my object is chiefly to show its Origin, as an instance of the prodigious influence of the dogma of inextended Mind. REID'S INSTINCTIVE THEORY. The extravagance of Berkeley in separating his own Ideas into two contrary classes,-realities and cheats,-is a signal instance of the force of prejudice: but the history of Reid's Theory affords a far more extensive example.—This last-named Philosopher, in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers (Essay 2, Chap. 10.) makes the following observation." If I may presume to speak my own "If sentiments, I once believed the doctrine of ideas so firmly, as to embrace the whole of Berkeley's system in consequence of it.' Now this confession flashes noon-day light upon the origin of Reid's Theory: For first, we find him wholly in that extreme doctrine which was advanced by Berkeley, and therefore redoubted in the Mind's inextension ;-besides believing that perceived Figures are merely inextended Sensations.- -Next, he abandons the inextension of Perceived Figures; but we do not find him avow any change from the Mind's inextension; On the contrary, all his reasonings uphold that doctrine. But here the instant he quitted the regions of Idealism, and set foot upon the firm ground of real Extension, he must have discerned the absolute necessity to deny that perceived Figure can be in an inextended Mind. In this case it matters not what were the intermediate steps which led Dr. Reid to find a new account of the fact of perception, suitable to this evident necessity. I never doubt that they arose naturally, and ended in persuasion; but they cannot affect the evidence, which is here most complete, because he assigns the reason of his change. And here let us observe, he does not, as would become an inductive Philosopher, assign an error of fact as the cause; but says, he embraced the whole of Berkeley's system; "till, finding other consequences to follow from it, which gave me more uneasiness than the want of a material world, it came into my mind, more than forty years ago, to put the question, &c.”Thus we find, the old state of the fact stood its ground with him, and no new one was thought of upon its own evidence; but only, a new account occurred after "finding consequences." This candid explanation leaves us nothing to desire; and even the first half of it leaves no doubt. I now trust that the influence of preconceived opinion, in both the Theories, is made evident; and it will be agreed that any assumption under such influence is highly an object of investigation, before it be received. This calls us to the true ground of search; for it becomes manifest, that no system can be proposed but what must rest upon the fact or process itself of Perception. The Essay on External Perception' which concludes this subject will appear in a future number. |