derived from the contemplation of an act of sublime virtue. 97. Fifthly, the hopes and fears of a future life are themselves pleasures and pains of a high nature. When a sufficient foundation has been laid by a practical belief of religion, by thoughts of death, by the loss of friends, by corporeal pain, by worldly disappointments and afflictions, for the formation of strong associations of the pleasures of their hopes with duty, and the pains of these fears with sin, the repetition of these associations will at last make duty itself a pleasure, and convert sin into a pain, and give lustre and deformity to all their respective appellations. And these associations will gradually become so strong, that the express recollection of the hopes and fears of another world will vanish from the view of the mind. 98. Sixthly, all meditations upon God, and all the expressions of the feelings of our minds towards him, by degrees transfers all the perfection, greatness, and gloriousness of his natural attributes upon his moral ones, that is, upon moral rectitude. By these means we shall learn to be merciful, holy, and perfect, because God is so; and to love mercy, holiness, and perfection, where ever we see them. 99. Hence it appears that all the pleasures and pains of our nature, those of sensation, imagination, ambition, self-interest, sympathy, and theopathy, as far as they are consistent with each other, with the constitution of our minds, and with the course of the world, produce in us a moral sense, and lead to the love and approbation of virtue and to the fear and abhorrence of vice. This moral sense, therefore, carries its own authority with it, inasmuch as it is the sum total of all the rest, and the nltimate result from them. When it has advanced to considerable perfection, a person may be made to love and hate, merely because he ought; that is, the pleasures of moral beauty and rectitude, and the pains of moral deformity and unfitness, may be transferred and made to coalesce almost instantaneously. tory nerves by which muscular motion is effected, can be produced by the mind." To account for this fact, we infer that the mind possesses a power or capacity of influencing the motory nerves so as to produce muscular motion, which may be called the motive power.-Even supposing that the sensorial changes by which muscular motion is followed, whatever they may be, are of the same nature by external impressions; and admitting, what appears certain, that the associative power is the cause that ideas and sometimes that sensations produce motory changes of the sensorium, still we must infer the existence of a motive power, otherwise ideas and sensations could not be the exciting cause of muscular motion: in other words, whatever be the mental causes of muscular motion, that motion, if it begin from the mind, implies that the mind possesses the power of which we speak, separate from the cause of sensations, of ideas, and of the connections among them. Indeed it appears to be generally admitted, but is usually referred to the head of will. 101. A large class of the phenomena of muscular motion are explicable by the principle of association; and, as far as we perceive, they can be explained only by its laws. There are four classes of muscular motion; 1. Where it is produced by some foreign excitement of the muscular system, without the intervention of the mind, in which case it may be called involuntary; 2. Where it is produced by sensation with. out volition, or any other associated sensation, idea, or motion having been concerned in the connection between sensation and motion, in which case it is termed automatic in the Hartleyan nomenclature; 3. Where it follows that state of mind which we term will, directly, and without our perceiving the intervention of another idea, or of any sensation or motion, it may be termed voluntary in the highest sense of this word; 4. Where the motion has been voluntary, but is become automatic by the influence of the associative power, it is termed by Hartley, secondarily automatic. With the first of this class of motions, Mental Philosophy has little or nothing to do; as to the second, till more is known respecting the nature of those changes which take place in the sensorium, it can do little more than state the fact. The third and fourth afford farther illustrations of the doctrine of association, and we shall select from the Mental Principia such statements as will suffice to explain the progress of muscular motion from automatic to voluntary, and from voluntary to secondarily automatic. 102. The most simple instance of this progress is in the action of grasping. The fingers of young children bend upon almost everyimpression which is made on the palm of the hand, thus performing the action of grasp ing in the original automatic manner. After a sufficient repetition of the motions which concur in this action; the sensorial changes preceding them are strongly associated with different ideas, the most common of which probably are, those excited by the sight of a favourite plaything or other object which the child is used to grasp and hold in his hand. He ought therefore, according to the doctrine of association, to perform and repeat the action of grasping, upon having such a play-thing, &c. presented to his sight: and it is a known fact that children do so. By pursuing the same method of reasoning we may see how, after a sufficient repetition of the proper associations, the sound of the words grasp, take hold, &c. the sight of the nurse's hand in a state of contraction, the conception of a hand in that state, and innumerable other associated circumstances, that is, sensations, ideas, and motions, will produce the action of grasping, till, in consequence of the action of grasping being found to answer certain purposes which are wished for, that state of mind which we may call the will to grasp is generated, and sufficiently associated with the action to produce it instantaneously. It is therefore perfectly voluntary in this case: and by the innumerable repetitions of it in this perfectly voluntary state, it comes, at last, to obtain a sufficient connection with so many sensorial changes, either sensitive, ideal, or motory, that (whether or not they are so vivid or so countenanced by the state of mind as to excite the consciousness,) it follows them in the same manner as originally automatic actions do the corresponding sensations, that is, to be secondarily automatic. And in the same manner may all the actions performed with the hands be explained, all those which are very familiar in life passing from the original automatic state through the several degrees of voluntariness, till they become perfectly voluntary, and then repassing through the same degrees in an inverted order, till they become secondarily antomatic on many occasions, though still perfectly voluntary on some occasions, viz. whensoever an express act of the will is concerned. A more interesting though more complicated case is that of the employment of the organs of speech, for which we refer our readers to Hartley's Observations, vol i. p. 106, or Priestley's Abridgement, p. 33. 103. We may hence understand in what manner the first rudiments are laid of that faculty of imitation which is so observable in young children. They see the actions of their own hands, they hear themselves pronounce. Hence the impressions made by themselves on their own eyes and ears become associated circumstances, and consequently must, in due time, excite to the repetition of the actions. Hence like impressions made on their eyes and ears by others, will have the same effect; or in other words, they will learn to imitate the actions which they see, and the sounds which they hear. Imitation is a great source of the voluntary power, and makes all the several modes of walking, handling, and speaking, &c. conformable to those of the age and nation in which a person lives, and in particular to those of the persons with whom he converses. Besides the two sources of it just mentioned, it has many others. Some of these are the resemblance which children observe between their own bodies with all the functions of them, and those of others ; the pleasures which they experience in and by means of all imitative motions; the directions and encouragements given to them on this head; the high opinions which they form of the power and happiness of adults; and their consequent desire to resemble them in these, and in all their associated circumstances. Imitation begins in the several kinds of voluntary actions about the same time, and increases not only by the sources alledged, but also by the mutual influence of every instance of it over every other, so that the velocity of its growth is greatly accelerated for some time. It is of the highest consequence to children in their attainment of accomplishments, bodily and mental. And thus every thing to which mankind have a natural tendency, is learned much sooner in society than the mere natural tendency would produce it; and many things are learned so early, and fixed so deeply, as to appear parts of our nature, though they may be mere derivatives and acquisitions. OF THE SECONDARY POWERS OF THE MIND. 104. We did not set out with the hope of giving a complete outline of the most ex tensive subject of this article; but our readers will probably think us unnecessarily deficient if we say nothing respecting memory, conception, judgment, attention, ab. straction, imagination, and will, which in books on the philosophy of the human mind constitute so important a part; and though we think the operation of the associative power of such extent, that separate from mere sensation and retention this ever active principle will furnish a sufficient explanation of all the phenomena of intellect and affection, we agree with Mr. Stewart, that the common classification, having certainly some foundation in nature, should by no means be neglected. We shall accordingly, in the remainder of this article, and in those to which we shall now refer our readers, endeavour to give them such a view of the secondary faculties as may serve for the purposes which we originally proposed for Qurselves. See UNDERSTANDING, or Judg ment, in which, in connection with the article WORDS, we shall endeavour to lay before our readers a summary view of the highly important principles of Hartley, respecting those phenomena of the human mind which he classes under the head of understanding, or "that faculty by which we contemplate mere sensations and ideas, pursue truth, and assent to, or dissent from, propositions." The passions, affections, pleasures, and pains, are usually referred to the general head of will: respecting them we have already spoken at large. Of the other secondary powers of the mind, we shall here give a very short account, referring our readers to the " Elements of Dugald Stewart," (a work which we earnestly wish to see completed) for various sound and comprehensive views respecting them, mixed, we must confess, with several things in which we cannot agree, but which are so written as to delight even those whom they will not convince. We shall expect a most rapid progress of the Hartleyan philosophy, if the principles of it should ever be detailed in the imposing manner in which Mr. Stewart has given his to the public. MEMORY. 105. The memory is defined by Hartley to be that faculty by which traces of sensa tions and ideas recur, or are recalled, in the same order and proportion, accurately or nearly, in which they were once actually presented. The rudiments of memory are Jaid in the perpetual recurrency of the same impressions, or groups of impressions. These, by the operations of the retentive power, leave traces or relicts; and by the operation of the associative power, these are united in the order in which they were presented to the mind. Now, the single sensible impressions and small groups of them being few in comparison of all the large groups, they recur the most frequently, so as sooner to produce the elements of memory. 106. Suppose a person to have so far advanced in life as to have acquired all these elements; that is, that he has ideas of the common appearances and occurrences of life, under a considerable variety of subordinate circumstances, which readily recur to his mind by slight causes, he will be thus easily enabled to retrace other occurences; for these will consist either of the old impressions variously combined, or of new ones in some way or other connected with them. This may be exemplified and explained by the circumstance, that it is difficult to remember even well-known words which have no connection with each other; and still more so words which are neither familiar, nor formed according to familiar analogies; but that, on the other hand, per. sons acquainted with any branch of science or of art, very easily retain facts connected with it which were previously unknown.The recollection of ideas is also greatly aided by the connection of words, both with them and with the original impressions; for words being, from the constant use of language, familiar to persons of moderate mental culture, even in various combinations, they are easily retained, and most materially assist in producing the recurrence of the corresponding ideas. And thus, when a person is relating a past fact, the ideas in some cases suggest the words, and in others, the words suggest the ideas. Hence illiterate persons, other things being equal, do not remember nearly so well as others. Hence also the importance, contrary to the views of education which a few years ago were so fashionable, of teaching the young to remember words as well as things; for in most cases, as words serve as the bond of ideas, ideas will be loose and floating in the mind, unless connected with words. 107. The difference between ideas and sensations principally consists in the greater vividness and distinctness of the latter; but cases are known to occur, in which visual conceptions are so vivid and distinct, that they are mistaken for actual sensations, This is particularly the case when, in consequence of disease, the system is peculiarly susceptible of excitement; and sometimes when the mind is very much absorbed in contemplating its own ideas, so that the impressions from external objects produce lit tle effect upon it. It is a fertile source of those ideas respecting apparitions which are so prevalent among persons of physical sensibility, without that culture of the intellect, which would enable them to attend to their own thoughts and manner of thinking. Such lively recollections of past impressions may, however, be usually distinguished from sensations, by allowing the attention to relax, so that they may cease to be forcibly detained as objects of consciousness; when it will, in general, be easily perceived that the mind loses sight of them, whereas it can lose sight of impressions from external objects only by fixing the attention upon ideas, or by corporeal motion of some kind or other. These remarks might perhaps, with greater propriety, have been made under the head of imagination; because it is seldom that in such cases the vivid conceptions recur in the exact (or nearly exact) order of actual impression, which is the essential difference between the trains of imagination and those of memory: they are, however, referable to either class of phenomena. 109. Ideas of recollection differ from those of the imagination, principally in the readiness and strength of the associations; but partly, and in many cases almost en tirely, by the connection of the former with known and allowed facts, by various methods of reasoning appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of the case, and by recollecting that we had before considered them as recollections, &c. Great difficulty, however, often exists, especially in the minds of persons with vigorous conceptions, who have not been habitually careful to cultivate accuracy of perceptions, and in the relation of recollections, to know whether the trains of ideas presented by the associative power are to be referred to the memory or to the imagination. Such per sons seizing only the outline of a fact or series of occurrences, from habitual inattention to their sensations, are, from readiness of association, able to fill up the transcript, so as to make it appear plausible to themselves; and by once or twice detailing it without minute regard to accuracy except in those leading features, they give a vigour to the ideas and closeness to the association VOL. V. of them, which leads at last to the full con viction, that the whole is recollected. Cases of this sort are very frequent; and they often leave upon the minds of others, the belief, that such persons intentionally depart from truth, whereas sometimes the fact is, that part of their error arises from a desire to give the whole truth when they have only the materials for a portion of it in their minds. However the fault is one which should be carefully guarded against; particularly in the early part of life, by making young people of lively imaginations habitually attentive to the minute as well as the leading parts of their impressions.-All persons are at one time or other at a loss to know whether trains of vivid ideas, suc ceeding each other readily and rapidly, are ideas of recollection or of imagination, that is mere reveries: and the more they agitate the matter in their minds, the more does the reverie appear like a recollection. Persons of irritable nervous systems are more subject to such fallacies than others; and insane persons often impose upon themselves in this way, viz. by the vividness of their ideas and associations, produced by bodily causes. The same things often happens in dreams. 110. The vividness and readiness of recollected trains, is also one grand means of ascertaining the dates of facts; for as this diminishes, (other things being equal), in proportion to the period which has elapsed since the reception of the ideas, and the formation of the associations, if the vigour of these be diminished, we refer them to a more remote period in proportion to that diminution; and if by any cause it be kept up, the distance of time appears diminished. Thus it is, that if any interesting event, the death of a friend, for instance, have been often recollected and related, till we come to make oral or mental calculations, it appears to have happened but yesterday, as we term it. However, from this circumstance we are often apt to confound events, as to the order of time, referring them to more recent or remote periods, according to the strength and vigour of the ideas and associations, or the contrary. In general we judge of the period of events by associated circumstances, particularly by visible permanent memorials. And hence it hap pens that illiterate persons have often great difficulty in assigning periods to events with any tolerable accuracy. Our readers, when they take such things into account, and consider how difficult it must in most T cases be for illiterate persons who have frequently changed their employments, to refer such changes to any specific dates, will not feel unwilling to admit, that the presumption formed against the reputed murderers of Steele, in consequence of their incorrect statements as to their places of employntent four years before their trial, should have weighed very little in the decision against those unhappy men. 111. We distinguish a new place, person, &c. from one which we remember in a manner similar to that in which we distinguish between recollected ideas and those of imagination; by the greater vividness of the impression, and the strength and readiness of the associated circumstances. If we doubt whether we have before seen a person who is newly introduced to us, we try to recal some associated circumstance, such as the time and place where we may be supposed to have seen him; and if this prove erroneous, we immediately infer that our doubt arises from some resemblance which be has with some one whom we then or there saw, or with some one whose face is familiar to us. 112. The memory of children is imperfect, because the elementary rudiments of memory are not sufficiently fixed by the retentive power, nor their usual groups sufficiently formed in the mind. They are also imperfect in the use of those words and other symbols which so materially aid the recollection; and in particular they are found very deficient in arranging facts in the order of time, judging most frequently from the vividness of their recollections, and not having the use of those denotements of time, on which the memory principally de⚫ pends for accuracy in this branch of recol lection. In old persons, whatever be the part of the system on which the retentive power depends, that power is most materially diminished, as also the sensitive power, while the associative power has, in their habitual direction of it, been strengthened in its operations. Hence new impressions can scarcely be received, and seldom are retained; while the parts which are received and retained excite old trains of associations rather than continue those which were recently impressed. When old persons relate the incidents of their youth with great precision, it is rather owing to the recollection of many preceding recollections and relations, than to the recoflection of the thing itself. state of the brain. Concussions, and other disorders of the brain, and the use of spirituous liquors, impair it: and it is recovered by degrees as the causes which affected the brain are removed. In like manner dreams, which happen in a peculiar state of the brain, viz. during sleep, vanish as soon as vigilance, a different state, takes place; but if they be recollected immediately upon waking, and thus connected with a state of vigilance, they may be remembered. 114. When a person desires to recollect a thing that has escaped him, suppose the name of a visible object, he recals the visible idea, or some other associate, again and again by a voluntary power, and thus at last brings in the required association and idea. But if the desire be very great, it changes the state of the brain, and has an opposite effect, so that the desired idea does not recur till all has subsided, perhaps not even then. 115. The excellence of memory consists partly in its strength and accuracy of reten tion, partly in the readiness of recollection. The former principally depends on the strength and accuracy of perception in attention to our sensations, and partly upon the associative faculty; the latter depends entirely upon the strength and peculiar biases of the operations of that power. The intellectual faculties depend greatly upon the memory: hence though some persons may have strong memories with weak judgments, yet no man can have a strong judgment with a weak original power of retaining and remembering. Before we conclude our view of this faculty, we beg leave strongly to recommend to our younger readers, especially if they possess a philosophic cast of mind, an attentive perusal of the very useful and interesting chapter of Dugald Stewart on this subject, particularly those parts which relate to the improvement of the memory. CONCEPTION. 116. We have mentioned this as one of the secondary faculties of the mind, because it is considered as a distinct faculty by Mr. Stewart, whose authority we in many cases respect; and who we suppose has in this instance produced, in many of his admirers, a belief in the justness of his statements, which we think far from well founded. We shall have an opportunity of stating our 113. Memory depends greatly upon the opinion respecting it under the next head, |