The

General Geismar, numbering about 10,000 men, had been compelled to remain on the defensive, and in fact had experienced some difficulty in retaining its position. Pachas of Widdin and Rustchuk, the latter afterwards well known as Kuchuk Hamed, were men of considerable energy and daring. The former succeeded in collecting about 10,000 men, and the latter 8,000, and with these they commenced a series of desultory attacks on the Russians by means of the têtes-de-pont Kalafat and Giurgevo opposite Widdin and Rustchuk respectively. At first Kuchuk Hamed was the most active and made two rather formidable sorties on June 2nd and July 3rd from Giurgevo. These, however, were repulsed without much trouble and for a short time General Geismar was unmolested. Receiving information, however, from Greek spies that the Pacha of Widdin was meditating a raid, he moved up to Golenz near Kalafat, so as to watch and check the enemy's movements. From this point he was forced to retreat to the entrenched camp of Tchovoza behind the Schyll half way to Crajova on August 18th, having been attacked by superior numbers.

The Turks then overran Lesser Wallachia, carried off great stores of provisions that had been prepared for the Russian army, and did much mischief. After this they returned to Widdin, but made another sortie on August 27th, which forced General Geismar to retreat to Crajova, while the country was again ravaged. Nothing further occurred until September 24th, when the Seraskier of

Widdin, with a force of about 26,000 men and thirty guns, issued from Kalafat, marched round the right flank of the Russian force which was entrenched as before at Tchovoza, and threatened their communications.

The danger was imminent. General Geismar had only about 5,000 men on the spot, while his adversaries had, according to some authors, nearly five times that number, irregulars though they were; his own communications were in the greatest danger, and those of the main army were seriously threatened; the only hope of safety lay in a vigorous offensive, and this he adopted. In place of marching direct at the Ottoman army, who, according to their custom, had entrenched themselves, he marched on their communications with Widdin; the result was a serious cavalry encounter on September 27th, which concluded in a manner by no means decisively favourable to the Russians: both armies retained their positions at nightfall and prepared for the final and decisive struggle on the following day. For this struggle, however, General Geismar with the enormous odds against him could not afford to wait, he was indeed in a critical position, retreat was impossible, and a battle on equal terms was almost synonymous with defeat. Nothing remained but a night attack, and this he executed with the most perfect success. Orientals are notoriously careless in their outpost duty at night, the Turks have ever been negligent even beyond other Orientals; trusting to this the Muscovite commander caused his artillery to redouble its fire just before sunset

as if to cover his retreat. He then waited till the enemy had had sufficient time to settle down to repose, and, dividing his force into eight columns, advanced to attack their camp. The attacking columns first came on the camp of the irregular cavalry, who without a single vedette fell an easy prey to the surprise-the vizier fled on a mule, his lieutenant on foot. The Turkish infantry, however, having had some notice of their danger, showed more steadiness, and for some time the fortunes of the day, or rather of the night, hung in the balance. At last the village caught fire and the rout of the Ottomans was complete; it was a 'sauve-qui-peut,' nothing was saved. At two o'clock in the morning General Geismar was master of the smoking ruins of Bojeles-chti, which was the name of the village, and of the trophies it contained. Among the latter were arms for 10,000 men, twenty-four standards, 424 waggons, and last, but not least, a letter from the Sultan giving orders for the complete destruction of General Geismar's corps.

After this signal defeat the Turks gave no more trouble in Wallachia-their demoralisation was complete, so much so that on October 25th, without being attacked, they evacuated the important tête-de-pont of Kalafat, which was immediately occupied by the Russians and fortified towards Widdin. During the winter the tête-depont of Nicopolis was also taken. Both of these were important captures for the operations of the ensuing campaign. During the winter there were a few minor

operations on the Danube, but these belong to the war of the following year.

After the siege of Silistria had been raised, and Wittgenstein had retreated from before Schumla, it may be said that the campaign of 1828 was ended; both combatants returned to their winter quarters to reorganise their shattered armies. The Russians were disposed as follows::General Roth at Varna with the principal part of the 6th and 7th Corps; also occupying Pravadi, &c.

The Guard Corps in Bessarabia.

The 2nd and 3rd Corps in Moldavia and Wallachia. It is stated that of more than 100,000 Muscovites that crossed the Pruth barely 60,000 were alive at the end of October. In truth, the losses of the campaign were great and the results were small.

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CHAPTER IV.

REMARKS ON CAMPAIGN OF 1828 IN EUROPE.

Campaign commenced too late-Russian force too weak-Army should have marched on Varna-Diversion to Schumla a mistake—Strategy of the Turks-Tardiness of Grand Vizier-Results of campaign in Bulgaria-General Geismar and his operations.

IN reviewing the events of the 1828 campaign in Europe we have the great advantage of possessing the criticisms of Count von Moltke, written at a time when his opinions were probably just as valuable as at present, but from the fact that the writer was comparatively unknown, were but little read or noticed. Count Moltke, at that time a captain, was attached to the head-quarters of the Russian army, and served with it through the campaign. Hence his remarks are deserving of special attention, not only from the subsequent reputation acquired by their author, but because he had special opportunities of personally seeing and judging of the operations which he thus criticises. Other authors have also added their observations, and, although but few have written much on these wars, and still fewer have attempted to draw practical deductions from them, nevertheless, if only as a

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