The Danube below the Iron Gates, except where it is divided by islands into several arms, is nowhere under 900 paces in breadth and in many places it is more than double that width. In places it is as much as seventy or eighty feet deep, but at many points it is far shallower. Below Pesth, where a suspension bridge has been constructed, the mighty river is only crossed by one single bridge of boats, that at Peterwardein. Of the massive bridge built by Trajan at Gladova nothing now remains but the piers and a sort of tower on the Wallachian shore. At Tultscha the river is diagonally crossed by a sandbank which leaves a navigable channel only fourteen or fifteen feet deep. At this point a bridge on piles might be thrown across the main channel if the approach on the left bank were not rendered impossible by extensive marshes and islands overgrown with reeds. Everywhere else the passage of the river could only be effected by means of boats or pontoons. Although the fall of the Danube is not nearly so great below the Iron Gates, the current on an average does not even then run less than two and a-half miles an hour.

We next come to the line of the Balkans; these mountains are of no very great height, varying from 500 to 3,000 feet; they run east and west, parallel to the Danube, and have hitherto been considered formidable as obstacles, more from the few and bad roads that traverse them than from any difficulties which they themselves. present. The passes are clearly marked on the map, and

are now much about the same as they were in 1828, only considerably better and more practicable for artillery. From the fact that the Russians commanded the sea, the western passes were not taken into account in this campaign, although probably in the next war they will be turned to account. Moltke names the following roads as being alone practicable for troops at the time of which he writes:

1. From Tirnova to Kasanlik-an easy pass which might be forced without much difficulty.

2. From Tirnova by Demirkapu to Slivno.

3. From Tirnova to Osman-Basari, thence by Kasan to Selmeid-and to Karnabat.

4. From Schumla by Tshalikarak and Dobroli to Karnabat.

5. From Kosludja to Pravadi or Jenikoi to Aidos.

6. From Varna along the coast by Burghas and Missivri.

For an army pivoting on the sea, as the Russians in 1828 and 1829, routes 4, 5, and 6 are the most important, and these might be easily barred by an army at Aidos, who could engage each column singly as it issued from the passes. In addition to these recognised and known roads there are also a number of paths or sheep-walks by which infantry can be easily conducted across the mountains It cannot therefore be said that the Balkans, if undefended, would offer a serious obstacle to an invading army, any more than the mountains of Bohemia in 1866, or the

Vosges in 1870 hindered the advance of the Prussians.. In fact the real strength of the Balkans lies in the position of the entrenched camps of Varna and Schumla in front of them. As remarked by Moltke, so long as both or even one of these strongholds can be retained passing the Balkans will always be a hazardous undertaking.'

We come lastly to the positions of Kuchuk Chekmedgè and Büjuk Chekmedgè before spoken of. As these lines were neither attacked nor defended in 1828 and 1829, it is scarcely necessary here to allude to them, but as they will inevitably exercise a great influence in any future war where Constantinople is in danger, in another chapter they will be described in detail.

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CHAPTER III.

THE CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE OF 1828.

Reasons why operations were delayed--Method of Russian advancePassage of Danube-Siege of Brailow-Peculiarities of Turkish defence of fortresses - Advance of Russians towards Varna Strategy of Turks-Schumla-Siege of Varna-Attempts at relief -Fall of Varna-Contests before Schumla--Retreat of Russians to the Danube-Operations of 6th Corps in Wallachia-Siege of Silistria.

THE Turkish Government had issued its Hatti-sheriff, amounting practically to a declaration of war, on December 18th, 1827; but no reply was made by the Czar until April of the following year, and neither the Pruth nor the Danube were crossed until May 7th and June 8th respectively. It is somewhat difficult to account for this delay in commencing the campaign. Moltke speaks of it ‘as a great sacrifice made to political at the expense of military expediency.' It seems, however, that political causes scarcely afford a sufficient explanation. It was all important to the Russians to hasten the commencement of hostilities, not only because every day of respite granted to the Turks enabled them to reorganise their army, to strengthen their fortresses, and to mature their various

preparations for defence, but there was another important reason for having a winter's campaign. During the month of January the Danube might be crossed on the ice without difficulty, and the country roads, which in rainy weather soon become impassable for heavy traffic and artillery, would, in a frozen condition, be admirable lines of communication. It cannot, moreover, be said that Europe was more hostilely inclined in December than in May; Austria was, if anything, more inclined to oppose a Russian invasion of Turkey in the latter than in the former month, and in both the remainder of Europe. was equally passive and indifferent. We must therefore look to other than political causes for an explanation of the time of year when the campaign commenced in 1828. In all probability the great distances which have to be traversed by Russian troops in order to effect a concentration on the southern frontier, and the consequent time always required to carry out a mobilisation of their army, may be regarded as the first cause of the delay; and the second will probably be found in the stormy character of the Black Sea during the winter months. As Wittgenstein's army was almost entirely dependent for its supplies on water transport, it was far more important that the sea should be calm and the winds favourable than that the Danube should be frozen and the country roads hard.

The Russian army when it commenced operations was divided into three corps, to which the following duties.