If the above is true, the Government of the Czar need not hope to derive much assistance from their navy in any immediate war with the Turks. However strong the Russian navy might be in the Baltic or in the Mediterranean, so long as the Ottomans hold the Dardanelles it could have little, if any, influence on a campaign in Bulgaria and Roumelia. This fact appears to have been forgotten by many, who have recently discussed this question, the naval force in the Black Sea is the important point, and as long as this is practically limited to two gunboats, as at present, the Russians would be at an enormous disadvantage. As before explained, the command of the Euxine would be useful to them for two reasons, first for the supply of their army, and secondly in order to turn the lines, which are about twenty miles to the north of Constantinople, and which, if properly fortified, would from the land side be practically impregnable.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS POSSESSED BY EACH COMBATANT

IN THE EVENT OF WAR.

Divergence of Views on the Subject-To ensure success a large force required by Russia-Probable Russian system of invasion---Time required by the various Corps to reach the Danube and Schumla -Lines of defence to be occupied by the Turks-Line of the Danube-Schumla -The Balkans-Selimno Pass-Flanking column by Servia-Time required to reach Adrianople-Probable date when Constantinople would be threatened—Alternative plan of operations -Difficulties of railway transport-Importance of Schumla-Description of the position of the Chekmedgès-of that on the Dardanelles-of the position in Asia Minor-Opportunity lost by Russia in 1876-Concluding remarks.

HAVING reviewed the armed strength of the two possible combatants, Russia and Turkey, it now remains for us to consider the chances which they will respectively have in any contest that may ensue, either now or hereafter. If, at the present moment, the opinions of those best able to form a judgment on this question were collected, probably we should find an enormous divergence of views. Some are convinced the Russians have nothing whatever before them but a triumphal march on Constantinople— there may perhaps be a few skirmishes, an insignificant siege, and possibly a considerable action, but the result of

none of these, they say, can be doubtful.' The Turks have never been able to stand against the Russians in the open field, and their fortresses, not being fitted to resist modern artillery, are now worse than useless, as they only serve to paralyse a number of troops that would be far more useful in the open field. Another party, on the contrary, and in England perhaps they are in the majority, profess the greatest confidence in the Turks. They say that in previous wars the Ottoman empire has held her own, and so it will again; they point to the condition of the Russian army at the peace of Adrianople, and to Omar Pacha's successes on the Danube in 1854; they lay stress on the fact that at the present time the Muscovites have not got command of the sea, and declare that consequently a large invading army would starve, while a small one would be defeated. Probably, the truth lies between these two extremes, and in any case it can only be a matter of conjecture not of certainty. Let us examine the grounds on which a correct opinion may be based.

It appears that the actual result of any campaign between these two powers-leaving Austria entirely out of the question-depends

1st. On the condition of the Russian army.

2nd. On the condition of the Turkish army.

3rd. On the state of the Turkish fortresses.

At the present time, on all these points information is but meagre and by no means trustworthy. It has been shown hat the Russian railways are very badly organised, and in

no way fitted for the transport of troops; also that the army is now in a transition state, and that, while one system has been disarranged, the other has not yet had time to get into working order. These circumstances alone are quite sufficient to account for reports that have come from Bessarabia regarding the great difficulty experienced by the Russian authorities in mobilising and in transporting their forces to the frontier; the strength of the corps there from all accounts is considerably below the nominal establishment on a war footing, and hence the numbers of the force prepared to cross the Pruth very probably are short of the 210,000 men supposed to be assembled. This of course is a most serious consideration. We have seen that the failure of Diebitsch to reach Constantinople in 1829 was entirely owing to the insufficiency of the force under his command for the task it had to perform, and it is absolutely essential to ensure success in the invasion of Turkey that a Russian army should be sufficiently strong to mask Rustchuk, Silistria, and Schumla, as Strasburg, Metz, and the other French fortresses were masked in 1870, and still to have the power of marching upon Constantinople. General Fadéeff, in his Opinion on the Eastern Question,' estimates that if 250,000 men reach the Danube, 150,000 will attain Constantinople, whether the Maritime Powers oppose or not, the only obstacle to this arrangement being Austria. We have pre-supposed the neutrality of this Power and will consider her political and strategic position elsewhere.

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It therefore would appear that if General Fadéeff's opinion is correct, as indeed seems likely, the nominal strength of the Russian army at present mobilised, namely, 210,000 men, is barely sufficient, even if Roumania affords a contingent, which is doubtful, and Servia adds the remnant of her beaten army, which is certain. Supposing an invading army of a strength inferior to the necessary minimum of 250,000 were to proceed to occupy Bulgaria, unless the Ottoman army is in a far worse state than usually represented, and unless the various frontier fortresses are practically useless, the invaders would have to act like Romanzoff, Potemkin, and Suwarrow in former days, and to sit down before all the fortified places halting until these were reduced; this would more especially be necessary, inasmuch as the command of the sea is lost, and the only means of supplying the army under such circumstances is by rail and road; hence the communications must be made secure. The Turkish railways are so constituted as to be of little use for an invading army in the passage of the Balkans, and in all probability the rolling stock would have been removed. This would be a most serious matter, as the gauge is different from that of the Russian railways, although the same as that of Roumania, and there would be no time to make carriages or trucks. Thus country waggons and carts would be the principal means of transport; of such conveyances, from all accounts, there are plenty in Bulgaria and Roumelia, but the difficulty of supplying an army of more than

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