disease only died out in the following March from want of more victims. 'Only two transports went to Burgass at all, one in December with 300 convalescents, and one in May with 170 sick. They were escorted by 300 or 400 men in good health; all the rest had perished. Of the 6,000 who stayed behind in Adrianople 5,200 died. 'The number of deaths per cent. was as follows: 1829 In the regimental hospitals. In the hospitals Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. ... ... 9.3 10.7 10.0 11.1 14.3 18.8 27.3 19.6 20.4 25.6 28.2 56.6 41.1 33.7 34.6 42.0 45.6 39.1 'On an average, therefore, there died in 1828-In the field regimental hospitals, 5 per cent. In the hospitals, 19.2 per cent. And in 1829-In the field regimental hospitals, 14.6 per cent. 'During the following months the mortality rose from one-third to two-fifths, and even to one-half. The number of sick continued to increase in the small army at Adrianople, and the deaths during the last five months of the year were at least as numerous as during the five previous months. We know that 5,200 men more died out of the number left behind there. If to all these we add the deaths which took place in the field hospitals, and the number of those killed in battle, we shall probably fall far short of the truth if we reckon the loss sustained by the Russians during their last campaign at 60,000 men. 6 This estimate, no doubt, includes part of the great body of non-combatants and of the small reinforcements which followed the main body from Sizeboli to Adrianople. We may, however, assume that not more than 10,000 or 15,000 combatants returned home across the Pruth, and that the Russian army was almost wholly destroyed during the second campaign. 'Such an extraordinary state of health or rather sickness could not have been foreseen; it far exceeded all calculation, and it is difficult to form a conception of an army engaged in offensive operations of which the larger half is lying sick in the hospitals. The blame which has been cast upon the higher branches of military administration in this respect appears to us unjust; it was manifestly impossible in such a country to carry the means and appliances for nursing and curing 40,000 sick, or to enforce during a campaign the quarantine regulations necessary in a time of plague. But such a state of things as that which we have just described must not be left out of our calculations in forming an opinion as to the performances of an army and its leaders.' On reading the account of these horrors, the feeling naturally arises, What must have been the talent and determination of the general who was undeterred by them and still led his army on! As General Diebitsch was such a hero, the following description of him, given by Lord Albemarle in his Fifty Years of my Life,' may prove interesting; being derived from personal observation, it is undoubtedly authentic. He gives, as an extract from his diary: 6 'Field-Marshal Diebitsch is a little fat plethoriclooking man, scarcely five foot high, with a large head, long black hair, and a complexion of the deepest scarlet, and a countenance indicative of a certain irritability of temper, which has earned for him from the troops, in addition to his proud title of Yabalanski, or crosser of the Balkans, that of Smawar, or tea-kettle.' CHAPTER VII. THE CAMPAIGN IN ASIA IN 1828. State of affairs in Asia in winter of 1827-28-Attitude of PersiaRussian preparations for invasion of Asia Minor-Resources at her disposal-Alternative methods of attack-Preparations of Turks— Commencement of campaign - Fall of Kars - Outbreak of the plague-Capture of Akhaltsikh-Defeat of Seraskier-Capture of other fortresses-Conclusion of campaign-Remarks. THE campaign in Asia in 1828, although not on so large a scale as that in Europe, was far more successful and decisive in its conclusion. Just as the war conducted by Marshal Wittgenstein, his lieutenants, and his opponents, was little else than a succession of strategic misconceptions and tactical blunders, so that waged by General Paskewitch, the Russian commander-in-chief in Asia, was a striking example of how small means and insignificant opportunities, if turned to proper account, may produce brilliant results. In The seat of the Asiatic campaign in 1828 was the tract of land between the Caspian and the Euxine. the previous year Russia had been engaged in a successful war with Persia, and had forced the latter power to conclude peace. The Shah, however, on the publication of the Turkish Hatti-scheriff in December 1827, refused to ratify the treaty which he had previously signed, in hopes that, in view of the impending war with Turkey, he might obtain better terms. Orders were consequently sent from St. Petersburg to Count Paskewitch to prosecute a winter campaign against Persia with all vigour. He therefore advanced in the snow as far as the range named Kaftan-ku, and thereby so struck terror into the heart of the Persian court that, almost without a shot having been fired, they sent envoys to sue for peace. The treaty of Turkman-chai, signed on February 10th, 1829, was the result-by it Russia acquired the Khanates of Erivan and Nak-nihchevan, the fortress of Abbas-Abad, a large indemnity, and the sole right to maintain vessels of war in the Caspian Sea. The conclusion of this treaty was a great advantage to Russia, since not only was a certain enemy thereby neutralised, but also a large tract of territory was acquired, which formed a valuable base of operations for the coming campaign. Although the frontier of Asia Minor after the conquest of the Caucasus by Russia had no natural defensive boundaries, and with their usual apathy the Turks had almost entirely neglected the fortifications of all the frontier fortresses, nevertheless the invasion of Asiatic Turkey presented many difficulties and many dangers. In the first place the distances to march were enormous, and neither the resources of the country nor the quality of the roads were such as to permit a force of any size to |