vengeance may raise its arm against his life-disease may enfeeble he preternatural energy of his mind-the French Empire may be extended beyond the limits of an uniform municipal control, and the extremities may languish and wither, in consequence of their distance from the centre of Government-the unwieldy colossus may sink under its own weight.

But it is also to be recollected, that these chances and events may not occur. To place any fixed dependence on them, to make them a part of the basis of our hostile and political calculations, would argue a total absence of all statesman-like sagacity. The measures adopted by the allies should be founded upon very different data, from which chance need not be excluded; but among which it should not be permitted to enter as an element in the calculation. The object to be attained should be just and right; it should be precisely defined, and kept distinctly in view; and the means for its attainment should be such as, upon every reasonable and probable ground, are best calculated for the insurance of success. If powerful armies are to be vanquished, they are only to be subdued by armies rendered more powerful, if not by superior numbers, at least by efficiency and military zeal. If the adversary be formidable, from having communicated the same spirit and the same character to the multifarious troops under his command, uniformity of character and of spirit must be imparted to the allied forces, by which he is to be assailed. If unity and consistency of plan be inflexibly pursued by the enemy, it can only be frustrated by a persevering resistance, conducted with similar simplicity of operation. In this case, should success be the result, it will be secured without reliance on the uncertainties of chance, though the accidental intervention of this capricious agent may assist the execution of those measures, which have been adopted upon sound and rational principles.

Whatever may be the motives which determined the belligerents to agree to an armistice-whether they were mutually desirous of peace, or secretly hoped that their preparations during the interval might promise to each a decided advantage on a renewal of hostilities the course to be pursued by the allies should admit of no variation. Peace, secured on the basis of an effective balance of power, should be the sole object either of immediate negociation,

or of eventual war: if such a peace cannot be concluded by diplomatic adjustment, it must be conquered by force of arms. None other can be permanent. The magnitude of Buonaparte's military preparations, at this moment, points clearly to the means by which his propositions will be supported; and if those of the allies should be unaided by an equally warlike attitude, either a precarious and unsubstantial pacification will ensue, or hostilities will recommence under circumstances most unpropitious to the cause of the allies.

At this crisis, every eye is fixed on the conduct of the Cabinet of Vienna. To its decision, consequences of unlimited importance are attached. The determination of Austria may prove decisive, not only of the fate of other nations, but ultimately of her own. The great work of continental deliverance from the yoke of France, so auspiciously begun and prosecuted by Alexander, might now be perfected by the seasonable and magnanimous intervention of the Emperor of Austria. By aiding the allies, he would secure the stability of his own power, and might recover both his lost dignities and his lost possessions. By his junction with France, he would infallibly seal his own ultimate ruin.

Should the armistice lead to negociation, a general, and not a continental peace, should be its only object. The maritime powers, instead of manifesting a jealousy of the maritime supremacy of Great Britain, should zealously uphold those principles to which her naval grandeur is chiefly to be ascribed. If these principles were abandoned, the Maritime States of the Continent would be unbenefited by the sacrifice; whilst their firm and unshaken assertion, by maintaining the naval superiority of Great Britain, enables her effectually to oppose and chastise the ambition of France, and to provide, by this just and equitable exercise of power, for the greater security and independence of the Continent. If the maritime greatness of this country had been extinguished in the course of the revolutionary war, would there at this time have been one free and independent state in Europe? Would not the whole have lain prostrate at the feet of France? The obvious answer to this question is alone sufficient to demonstrate the narrowness of that jealousy with which States, which, besides, are rather military than naval, view the maritime pre-eminence of England, notwithstand

ing it is to that preponderance aloue, that they are, in a great measure, indebted for the means of opposing a successful resistance to French aggression.

Equally animated by a desire to conclude a permanent and honorable peace, the allies cannot manifest too much promptitude to bring to a happy termination the countless miseries of this protracted war. But if it be closed, without that indispensable guarantee for the continuance of peace, which is to be found only in the re-establishment of an effective balance of power, the sanguinary conflict will be renewed with aggravated violence and fury, and afflicted Europe will bleed afresh at every pore.

SUBSTANCE

OF THE

SPEECHES

OF

WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, ESQ.

ON THE CLAUSE

IN THE EAST-INDIA BILL

FOR PROMOTING

THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION

AND

MORAL IMPROVEMENT

OF

THE NATIVES OF THE BRITISH DOMINIONS

IN

INDIA,

On the 22d of JUNE, and the 1st and 12th of JULY, 1813.

PREFACE.

THE Writer of the following pages has been induced to publish them, partly by a wish that his sentiments on the important subject of them, and the premises which led him to the conclusions which he has formed, should not be misunderstood; and partly, he confesses, because he finds, with concern, that notwithstanding all the light which has been thrown on the moral state of the natives of India, many respectable and intelligent men still entertain very mistaken notions on that great question. It appeared to him best, to put together, in the form of one Speech, the substance of what was said on at least two different occasions. He is conscious that, owing to his not having been able, from various hindrances, to execute his task till long after the discussion, his recollection, even of what he himself said, has become imperfect, and therefore that his publication may be in some respect an inaccurate statement of what he actually uttered. In one or two instances he has intentionally enlarged on topics on which, in speaking, he was more concise. But the inaccuracies of his publication, he believes, are none of them important; and more especially, it is correct in that particular which he deems by far the most worthy of attention, and of which, therefore, he entreats the reader's most serious consideration-the extracts from various documents taken from the EastIndia Company's records, which have been laid before the House of Commons during the progress of the late Parliamentary Discussions. The subject itself he deems to be of a degree of importance which it transcends the powers of language to express; and he trusts that they, whose sentiments he has opposed, will forgive the warmth with which he has felt it his duty to condemn their opinions. He believes that they are actuated, no less than himself, by a sincere desire to promote the welfare of their country.