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in its mechanifm excelling that of beafts -fuch as would deprive man's breaft of focial affections, exempt him from all apprehenfions of a deity, and confine his hopes to his prefent existence, are not the perfens whom any thing here faid propofes to affect. They are not, I mean, directly applied to in this work; but even their benefit it may be faid confequentially to intend, as it would certainly contribute thereto, could it properly operate on those whofe advantage is its immediate aim.

We have been told, by very good judges of human nature, how engaging virtue would be, if it came under the notice of fenfe. And what is a right practice, but virtue made, in fome measure, the object of our fenfe? What is a man ever acting reafonably, but, if I may so speak, imperfonated virtue--Virtue in a visible shape, brought into view, prefenting itself to the fight, and through the fight as much affecting the mind, as it could be affected by any elegance of form, by any of the beauties of colouring or proportion.

The notions most dishonourable to the deity, and to the human species, are often, I faípect, first taken up, and always, certainly, confirmed by remarking how they act whofe fpeculations exprefs the greatest ho

Lour towards both.

When the strongest fenfe of an all-powerful and wife, a molt holy and juft Governor of the world, is profeffed by thofe who fhew not the leaft concern to please him —When reason, choice, civil obligations, a future recompence, have for their advocates fuch as are governed by humour, pailion, appetite; or who deny themfelves no prefent pleasure or advantage, for any thing that an hereafter promifes; it naturally leads others, firft, to think it of little moment which fide is taken on thefe points, and then, to take that which suits the manners of them who, in their declarations, are its warmest oppofers.

connected with what regards them, it is by no means a flight confirmation of the truth of a doctrine, That the perfuafion thereof is of the utmoft confequence to our present well-being. And thus the great advan tages that are in this life derivable from the belief of a future retribution--that are here the proper fruits of fuch a belief, may be confidered as evidencing how well it is founded--how reasonably it is entertained. On this it may be of fome ufe more largely to infift.

What engagements correfpond to the conviction that the ftate in which we now are is but the paffage to a better, is confidered in the last of these effays: and that, when fo engaged, we are acting the part befitting our nature and our fituation, feems manifeit both on account of the approbation it has from our calmeft hours, our most ferious deliberation and freeft judgment, and likewife on account of the teftimony it receives even from them who act a quite contrary one. What they conform not to, they applaud; they acknowledge their failures to be fuch; they admire the worth, which they cannot bring themselves to cultivate.

If we look into the writers who fuppofed all the pleasures of man to be thofe of his body, and all his views limited to his prefent exiftence; we find them, in the rule of life they gave, deferting the neceffary confequences of their fuppofition, and prefcribing a morality utterly inconfiftent with it. Even when they taught that what was good or evil was to be determined by our feeling only--that right or wrong was according to the pleafure or pain that would enfue to us during the continuance of our prefent frame, fince after its diffolution we have nothing to hope or fear; their practical directions were, however, that we ought to be strictly juft, feverely abftinent, true to our friendships, steady in the pursuit of honour and virtue, attentive to the public welfare, and willing to part with our lives its defence.

Whereas, were the apprehenfions that do juffice to a fuperintending providence--in an immaterial principle in man-his liberty-his duties in fociety--his hopes at his diffolution, to be univerfally evidenced by a fuitable practice; the great and manifest advantage arifing from them would be capable of fuppreffing every doubt of their truth, would prevent the entrance of any, or would foon remove it.

As, indeed, all that we are capable of kwing in our present state, appears either immediately to regard its wants, or to be

Such they admitted man ought to befuch they exhorted him to be, and, therefore, when they would allow him to act only upon motives utterly incongruous to his being this perfon, it followed either that there were wrongly affigned, or that a conduct was required from him unfuitable to his nature.

That his obligations were rightly ftated was on all hands agreed. The mistake was in the inducements alledged for discharging

them.

them. Nothing was more improbable than
his fulfilling the duties this Scheme appointed
him, if he was determined by it in judging
of the confequences of his actions
what good or hurt they would do him
-what happiness or mifery would be

their refult.

While the Epicureans admitted juftice to be preferable to injuftice--a public fpirit, to private selfish views; while they acknowledged it more fitting that we should facrifice life to the good of our country, than preferve it by deferting the common welfare; they muft, I think, be regarded as authorifing a preference of the principles which will make man juft and publicfpirited, to those which will difpofe him to be unjuft, and wholly attentive to his own little interefts.

Let us fee, then, what will be the practical confequences of adopting or rejecting the Epicurean tenet of our having nothing to hope for beyond the grave.

The value we set on life is fhewn by what we do to preserve it, and what we fuffer rather than part with it. We fupport ourselves by the hardest labour, the fevereft drudgery, and we think death a much greater evil, than to ftruggle for years with difeafe and pain, defpairing of cure, and even of any long intervals of eafe. Such, ordinarily, is our love of life. And this defire to keep it cannot but be greatly increased, when we are induced to think that once loft it is fo for ever. To be without all hope of again enjoying the bleffing we thus highly prize, muit naturally difincline us to hazard it, and indispose us for what will endanger its continuance. He who is perfuaded that corporeal pleasure is all he has to expect, and that it is confined to his present existence, muft, if he acts agreeably to fuch a perfuafion, be wholly intent on the purfuit of that pleasure, and dread nothing more than its coming to an end, or being interrupted. Hence, if his term of life would be shorter, or any greater diftrefs would accrue to him by adhering to truth and justice, than by departing from them -if he were to be at prefent more a lofer by affifting his friend, than by forfaking him if he could promise himself a larger share of fenfual gratifications from betraying his country, than from ferving it faithfully, he would be falfe and unjuft, he would be perfidious to his friend, and a traitor to his country. All thofe sentiments and actions that express an entire attach

ment to the delights of fenfe, and the ftrongeft reluctance to forego them, are strictly in character when we look not beyond them --when we acknowledge not any higher fatisfactions, and behold these as expiring with us, and fure never to be again tafted.

Whereas the profpect of a returning life, and of enjoyments in it far fuperior to any we now experience, or promise ourselves, has a necessary tendency to leffen our folicitude about the existence here appointed us. We cannot well be reconciled to the lofs of our being, but are eafily fo to its change; and death confidered as only its change, as the paffage from a lefs to a more defirable ftate, will, certainly, have the terror of its appearance much abated. The conviction that there is a greater good in reserve for us than any pleasure which earth can afford, and that there is something far more to be feared by us than any pain we can now be made to fuffer, will, in proportion to its ftrength, render us indifferent to the delights and conveniencies of our abode on earth, and difpofe us to qualify ourselves for obtaining that greater good, and avoiding that fo much more to be dreaded evil, in these confiderations of life and death, of happiness and mifery, virtue has its proper fupport. We are by them brought to judge rightly of the part becoming us, and to adhere to it immoveably: they furnish fufficient inducements to avoid falfehood and injustice, of whatever immediate advantage we may be thereby deprived--they encourage us to ferve our friends and country with the utmost fidelity, notwithstanding all the inconveniencies that can be fupposed to attend it

they are, indeed, proper incitements to prefer the public welfare to our own fafety, while they reprefent to us how much our gain thereby would overbalance our lofs.

Brutes in our end and expectations, how can we be otherwife in our pursuits? But if the reasoning principle in us be an incorruptible one, and its right or wrong application in his embodied state affect the whole of our future exiftence; we have, in that apprehenfion, the most powerful motive to act throughout in conformity to our rational nature, or, which is the fame thing in other words, never to fwerve from virtueto defpife alike danger and pleafure when ftanding in competition with our duty.

Thus, when Socrates, in Plato's Phado, has proved the immortality of our soul, he

con

confiders it as a neceffary confequence of the belief thereof, "That we fhould be em"ployed in the culture of our minds "in fuch care of them as fhall not only " regard that term, to which we give the " name of life, but the whole which fol«lows it――in making ourselves as wife " and good as may be, fince on it our fafe"ty entirely depends, the foul carrying " hence nothing with it, but its good or "bad actions, its virtues or vices, and thefe " conftituting its happiness or misery to all "eternity."

So, when the elder Scipio is introduced by Tully, apprifing the younger, "That what is called our life, may be more "properly ftyled our death--that we "truly live, when we are freed from the "fetters of our body;" he proceeds to obferve, how much it then concerned him "to be juft--to promote the public wel"fare--to make true glory his aim, doing what is right without regard to any advantage it will now yield him, "defpifing popular opinion, adhering to "virtue for its real worth." And the youth thus inftructed, profeffes, "That af"ter fach information into what ftate he "is to pafs, he would not be wanting to himself: unmindful he had not been of "his ancestor's worth, but to copy it "should now be his more efpecial care, "fince encouraged thereto by fo great a "reward."

Lucan, reprefenting the inhabitants of this part of Europe as perfuaded that the foul furvived the diffolution of the body, congratulates them, indeed, only on the happiness they enjoyed in an opinion that freed them from the most tormenting of all fears, the dread of death--that made them act with fo much bravery and intrepidity. But when he admits a contempt of death to be the proper effect of this opiin, he must be confidered as allowing it all that practical influence which as naturally refults from it, as fuch an indifference to life doth, and has the fame connexion with it.

If, therefore, the perfuafion that death renders us utterly infenfible, be a perfuafion that unmans us quite--that difpofes to a courfe of action moft unworthy of us -that is extremely prejudicial to fociety, and tends, in every way, to our own greateft hurt or debafement, we may well fuppole it an erroneous one; fince it is in the highest degree improbable, that there fhould be any truth in a notion the reception of

which fo far operates to the prejudice of mankind-fo neceffarily contributes to introduce a general diforder.

On the other hand, if, from the conviction that there is a recompence for us beyond the grave, we derive fentiments most becoming us--if from it the worthieft actions proceed--if it be the fource of the greatest both private and public good if with it be connected the due dif charge of our duty in the feveral relations in which we are placed--if it alone can lead us to perfect our nature, and can furnifh our ftate with fatisfactory enjoyments; there may feem fufficient grounds to conclude that there is fuch a recompence; the perfuafion thereof, thus affecting us; may well appear moft reasonably entertained.

When all thofe principles, of whofe truth we have the greatest certainty, conduct us to happiness, it is natural to think that the influence of any principle upon our happiness should be no improper teft of its truth.

If there be no furer token of a right practice, than its tendency to promote the common good, can we but judge that to be a right opinion, which has undeniably, in an eminent degree, fuch a tendency?

When the difficulties that, under a general corruption, attend our adherence to virtue, are only to be furmounted by the profpect of a future reward; one knows not how to believe that the proper inducement to our acting a part fo becoming us

fo much our praife, fhould be no other than a chimerical view, a romantic and utterly vain expectation.

When error is manifeftly the caufe of whatever ill we do or fuffer, it is extremely improbable, that to an erroneous notion we muft ftand indebted for the best use of life, and its most folid fatisfactions.

But it may be asked--where does this opinion produce thefe boafted effects? Among them who profefs it their firmest belief that there is a future recompence, how few do we find better men for it-more regular in their manners, or more ufeful to the world, than they would have been without any fuch perfuafion?

How far any truth fhall operate upon us -how far it thall influence us, depends upon our application of it, upon our attention to it. Experience furnishes the utmost certainty of a vaft variety of particulars highly interefting our prefent welfare, which yet we overlook, we give ourfelves little or no concern about, tho' we thereby make ourselves

L

the

the levereft fufferers; and may be almost as fure as we can be of any thing, that our unconcernedness about them must be attended with confequences thus fatal to us. The feveral rules which regard the lengthening of life-the prefervation of health-the enjoyment of cafe, tho' they carry with them the cleareft evidence of their importance, how very little weight have they with the generality of mankind--how unheeded are they when oppofing an eager appetite, a strong inclination! while yet thefe rules are acknowledged to remain as true, as worthy of our notice, as certain in their falutary effects when obferved, as if all that practical regard to which they are entitled, was paid them; and we may be as justly thought endowed with a capacity of difcovering thofe effects in order to their profiting us, as if they univerfally took place.

What benefit was intended in qualifying us for the difcernment of any truth, is by no means to be inferred from what ordinarily enfues to us when difcerning it. A juft inference as to this can only be made from regarding the dictates of reason upon fuch a truth being difcerned by us; or, what ufe of its difcernment reafon directs us to make. When we are lefs wicked than very bad principles prompt us to be, which is often the cafe; thefe are, nevertheless, full as blameable as they would be if we were to act confiftently with them. That they are not purfued, is, as to them, quite an accidental point; in reafon and nature they fhould be; and therefore are fitly chargeable with all the confequences that acting according to them would produce.

So, on the other hand, tho' it must be confeffed, that, with the beit principles, our courfe of life is, frequently, very faulty; the objection muft lye not to the nature or kind of their influence, but to a weakness

of it, which is our crime, and not their de fects. We will not let them act upon us; as they are qualified to do. Their worth is to be eftimated by the worth they are fuited to produce. And it would be full as abfurd, when we will not mind our way, to deny that the light can be of any help to us in feeing it; as to deny the ferviceableness of any principle, because we fail in its application.

Nor is it, indeed, only our unhappiness that we are inattentive to what the belief of a future recompence requires from us; religion itself, is, alas! every where abused to the obftructing the proper effects of this belief. I mean, that whatever religion is any where profeffed, fome or other rite or doctrine of it does favour, as in Paganism and Mohammedifm; or is fo conftrued, as in Judaifm and Christianity, that it is made to favour a departure from the practice which fuits the perfuafion of a future reward. The reproach that belonged to the Jews in our Saviour's time, they have, as far as appears, deferved ever fince; that by their fcrupulous regard to the leffer points of their law, they think they make amends for the groffeft neglect of its most important precepts. And with respect to us Chriftians, whence is it, that there is fo little virtue among us-that we are throughout fo corrupt, but from taking fanctuary for our crimes in our very religion,

from perverting its most holy inftitutions and doctrines to be our full fecurity whatsoever are our vices †?

Thus, we are either of a church in which we can be abfolved of all our fins; or we are of the number of the elect, and cannot commit any; or the merits of Chrift atone for our not having the merit even of honesty and fincerity; or a right faith makes amends for our mott corrupt practice‡.

Sir Ifaac Newton having observed, That the prophecies concerning Chrift's first coming were for setting up the Chriftian religion, adds, which all nations have fince corrupted, &c. Obferv. upon the Proph. of Dan.&.

p. 252.

The general and great defect in those that profefs the Chriftian faith is, that they hope for life eternal, without performing thofe conditions, whereupon it is promifed in the Gofpe', namely, repentance and reformation.-They will truft to a fruiti ft, liefs faith, or to fome penances, and fatisfactions, and commitations made with God, doing what he hath not required instead of what he hath commanded. No perfuations thall prevail to move and excite them to do this, no reasons, arguments, or demonstration, no net the exprefs words of God, that it is neceffary to be done; or to forbear to cenfure them as Enemies to the Grace of God, who do with clear and exprefs Scripture fhew the abfolute neceflity of it. Occtram's demons, p. 166, 167.

I heartily with, that by public authority it were fo ordered, that no man should ever preach or print this doctrine, That Faith alone juftifies, unless he joins this together with it, That univerfal obedience is neceffary to falvation. Chill gworth's Relig. of Prot. p. 362.

By our zeal in our opinions we grow cool in our piety and practical duties. Epift. Dedicat, prefixed to the Difccnfo of Libry of Proph

We

We have prayers, facraments, fafts, that are never thought of to improve us in virtue, but to fupply the want of it--to quiet our confciences under the most culFable gratification of our lufts.

How the belief of a future recompence fhould, in reafon, affect our practice-what its proper and natural influence is, folely concerns the prefent argument. It feems enough, in the cafe before us, that no one can be confiftent with himself, but, if he has any hopes of happiness in another world, his conduct will be regular, becoming, rational: and, that where we find thefe hopes entertained on mature confideration, jufly reafoned upon, duly attended to, there we, certainly, find great purity of morals, a ftrict regard to the part befitting a reasonable creature, and every other advantage afcribed to them. If I cannot be allowed to infer from hence that they are well founded, they have ftill for their fupport all thofe arguments in favour of a final retribution, with which I have not at all meddled, nor in the leaft weakened by any thing I may have lefs pertinently obferved. The fubject of the third of the following effays led me to the remarks here made; and to me they appear not immaterial. I cannot, indeed, bring myself to think but that the hopes which induce me to act most agreeably to my Creator's will, he has formed me to entertain; and will not let me be difappointed in them.

Of one thing I am fure, that they who fuffer the perfuafion of a future happiness to operate, as it ought, on their practice, conftantly experience their practice adding ftrength to their perfuafion; the better they become by their belief, the more confirmed they become in it. This is a great deal to fay on its behalf. What weightier recommendation to our affent can any doctrine have, than that, as it tends to improve us in virtue, fo the more virtuous we are, the more firmly we affent to it; or, the better judges we are of truth, the fuller affurance we have of its truth?

§ 148. On the Employment of Time.

ESSAY THE FIRST.

Ture demam intelliges, quid faciendum tibi, quid vi1 anatam fit, cum didiceris quid nature tuce debeas.

SEN. Ep. 121. Amazing! that a creature, fo warm in "the parfait of her pleafures, fhould never caff one thought towards her happiness." -A reflection this, made indeed by a comic writer, but not unworthy the moft ferious.

To be intent on pleasure, yet negligent of happiness, is to be careful for what will cafe us a few moments of our life, and yet, without any regard to what will distress us for many years of it.

When I ftudy my happiness, I confult the fatisfaction of the whole continuance of my being-I endeavour, that throughout it I may fuffer as little, and enjoy myfelf as much, as my nature and fituation will admit. Happiness is lafting pleafure; its purfuit is, really, that of pleasure, with as Imall an allay as poffible of pain. We can not, therefore, provide for our happiness, without taking our share of pleasure; tho,' as is every where but too evident, our eagernefs after Pleafure may plunge us into the mifery we are unable to fupport.

Nothing, indeed, is more fpecious than the general term Pleafure. It carries with it the idea of fomething which must be permitted us by our Maker; fince we know not how to fuppofe him forbidding us to tafte what he has difpofed us to relish. His having formed us to receive pleasure, is our licence to take it. This I will admit to be true, under proper refstrictions.

It is true, that from our nature and conftitution we may collect wherein we act agreeably to our Creator's will, and wherein we act contrary to it: but the mischief is, we commonly mistake our nature, we mifcal it; we call that it which is but a part of it, or the corruption of it; and we thence make conclufions, by which when we govern our practice, we foon find ourfelves in great difficulties and diftrefs..

For inftance, we call our paffions our nature; then infer, that, in gratifying them, we follow nature; and, being thus convinced that their gratification must be quite lawful, we allow ourfelves in it, and are undone by it. Whereas, the body is as much the man, as his paffions are his nature; a part of it, indeed, they are, but the lowest part; and which, if more regarded than the higher and nobler, it must be as fatal to us, as to be guided rather by what is agreeable to our appetite, than conducive to our health. Of this more hereafter.

The call of nature being the favourite topic of all the men of pleafure-of all who act the most in contradiction to nature, I will confine the whole of the following effay to the confideration of it, fo far as it relates to the employment of our time; and thew how our time fhould be employed, if we have a juft regard to our na ture-if what it requires be confulted by us. L 2

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