Infidelity in its Various Causes.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL CAUSE.

Causes of Infidelity ethical rather than intellectual-The Will has much to do with it-Moral evidence not irresistible-Existence of God does not admit of demonstration-Remark of Dr. Arnold— Pantheism and naturalism traced to aversion of heart-Sufficiency of Christian evidences-Jewish unbelief originated in a moral cause-Speculative and practical Infidelity have same originBible account of the matter.

It is evident that unbelief, generally speaking, can originate in only one of two sources; either in a deficiency of evidence, or, in a state of mind and heart on which the clearest and strongest evidence has no power. The causes of infidelity, we are persuaded, are more ethical than intellectual. And this persuasion is greatly strengthened by the perusal of some of the productions of our modern infidel writers. "Nothing can be more contemptible," says Professor Garbett, "than the argumentative resources of modern Modern Philosophical Infidelity, p. 5.

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infidelity. It does not reason, it only postulates; it dreams and it dogmatizes. Nor can it claim invention." This witness is true. Indeed, we venture to assert, that the general strain of argument brought to bear against Christianity by its modern assailants, would not be tolerated for a moment within the prov ince of purely literary criticism. The strong determination to withstand everything in the shape of reasonable evidence, contrast very much with the feeble argumentation by which many of the truths of religion are set aside. Be it atheism or pantheism, naturalism or spiritualism, indifferentism or formalism, the will has much to do with it. Moral evidence is the appropriate proof of moral truth. All moral evidence is cumulative; but, however strong it may be, it is never irresistible. An indocile reason can ward it off.

The existence of God, for example, does not admit of demonstrative, but of moral certainty. And, though supported by a vastly preponderating amount of proof, room is left for the cavils of a strongly-prejudiced unbelief. The argument from design is one of great power, and though it does not of itself lead us to the High and Holy One, it points us very clearly thither. But the ground is by no means free from difficulties. Faith, supported by the immensely overbalancing amount of clear evidence, triumphs over these, whereas the unbelieving heart yields to them. Still stronger is the testimony to this primal truth given by our own inward consciousness-a testimony that outweighs all atheistical assumptions and arguments; but, in spite of it, man can befool himself, and say in his heart,

there is no God. The disrelish of the truth that God is, strengthens itself in the comparatively small residue of phenomena that seems to conflict with it, and there repels the conviction arising from the irrefragable proof on the other side. Dr. Arnold, reasoning on the supposition that the intellectual difficulties are balanced, remarks: "here is the moral fault of unbelief, that a man can bear to make so great a moral sacrifice, as is implied in renouncing God. He makes the greatest moral sacrifice to obtain partial satisfaction to his intellect: a believer ensures the greatest moral pefection, with partial satisfaction to his intellect also; entire satisfaction to the intellect is, and can be, obtained by neither."1 The choice in such a

case, must be resolved into the inclination, or the wish to have it that there is no God. But matters are not really so balanced. The difficulties greatly preponderate on the side of unbelief. And for a man to accept of the proposition that God is not, with the mass of monstrosities and difficulties that attend it, and thereby renounce the affirmative proposition that God is, a proposition so well substantiated, and for which there is an intellectual necessity,-indicates very plainly the leanings of the heart. Lord Bacon says: "none deny there is a God, but those for whom it maketh that there was no God.

The personality of the Divine Being irrespective of its being interwoven with the language of the Bible, and imparting to it a burning energy, is much more rational than the pantheistic doctrine. It does not Dr Arnolds Life and Correspondence.

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admit, however, of strict demonstration. We may argue very conclusively in favor of it, from our own personality, and maintain that, since personality is a perfection, God must possess it in the highest degree, otherwise he would be inferior to ourselves; and not only so, but we could conceive of God as a more glorious being than he really is, which is an absurdity. We may strengthen our proof by the consideration that men in general feel, in the most solemn and affecting moments of their lives, that God is a real person. And to this we may add, that, without the idea of a personal God, "we cannot really explain the origin or the order of the universe; and that it is a mere assumption to assert, that personality is in its very nature finite-since it is the finiteness of man's attributes, and that alone, which gives the finiteness to his personality." But the heart can repel all this proof; and bring to its aid, if not the force of argument, the language of the mystic and the principles of a dreaming philosophy. The reluctance to think of God as a living Person, holy, just, and good, and with whom we have to do, is greater than the incapacity. It is in the delirium of self-adoration, in the swellings of a pride-intoxicated heart, that men break loose from a sense of responsibility, ignore the existence of the Personal Creator and Judge, and yield to the temptation-ye shall be as gods. No one can read the rhapsodies of such a man as Emerson, without perceiving that the state of the heart,-a heart puffed up with the delusive notion of its own divinity,

1 Smith's Relations of Faith and Philosophy, p. 13.