"nêtes gens.Ainfi Homere "atteint au vari but de l'Art, "quand il reprefente les objets "avec grace, force et vivacité. "Le fage et fçavant Pouffin auroit "peint le Guefelin et Boufcicaut "fimples et couverts de fer, pen"dant que Mignard auroit peint "les Courtifans du dernier fiécle "avec des fraifes ou des colets "montez ou avec des canons, des "plumes, de la broderie et des "cheveux frifez. Il faut obferver "le vrai et peindre d'après Na"ture." Reflexions sur la Critique par Monsieur De la Motte, p. 82.

Plato however speaks of Hefiod and Homer as having framed those fables of the Gods which are found in their writings,

66

ferve, that both Herodotus and Plato placed Hefiod in the order of words before Homer; from whence one would be inclined to think that they confidered Hefiod fomewhat prior in time to Homer.

The ingenious author of the Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer, obferves upon the paffage I have cited from Herodotus, "What he fays of Hefiod and "Homer muft be true in one or "other of these refpects, that either "they brought their entire System "immediately from Egypt and "published it in Greece, till then ignorant of religion and rites ;

or that without other affistance "than their own wits, they con"trived it wholly themselves; but

they are both equally incredi"ble." Vid. p. 98, lft Edition.

σε ούτοι δε εισι οι ποιησαντες θεοσε γονίην ελλησι, καὶ τοισι θεοισι τας επωνυμίας δοντες, καὶ τιμας τε καὶ τέχνας διελοντές, καὶ ειδέα αυτών σημηναντες. These are the persons who have made a Theogony for the Greeks, and have given additions to the Names of the Gods, and have distributed to them their respective honours and employ ments, and have declared their forms or appearances.

Where by the way I would ob

The reafon affigned for this affertion, and the refinement upon it, are directly contrary not only to the words of Herodotus, but alfo of Plato, which I have cited above: and indeed I do not fee with what pretence of juftice Plato could expel them from his republic, but on fuppofition that they were the inventors of fuch fables as he finds fault with,

The truth of the matter with refpect to the Gods in the most ancient heathen world feems to be this : thole perfons who had diftinguifhed themfelves by doing fome acts of public utility, or were endued with fome extraordinary perfections of mind or body, were thought to become immortal after this life, and to refide, fome in the regions above, others on the earth and in the fea, and others in theinfernal regions, with diftinct powers and offices affigned them: although they were become immor

tal,

Cicero fpeaks of the origin of the Gods in the light I have reprefented it above in his Tufculan Difputations, Lib. 1. cap. 12. "To"tum prope cœlum nonne humano genere completum eft? Si έσ vero fcrutari vetera, et ex his ea quæ Scriptores Græciæ prodi❝derunt eruere coner, ipfi illi, "majorum gentium Di qui habentur, hinc a nobis profecti in cœ"lum reperientur."

Such were the wild and extravagant notions of the old heathen world concerning the Gods, when Hefiod and Homer arofe; who in conformity to fuch notions framed fables of the Gods, and introduced them into their poems; for which they were afterwards cenfured by the more enlightened philofophers. Our British Homer, Milton, has in like manner built upon the common received notions among Chriftians, of angels and devils, those beautiful fables which adorn his poem; and has this advantage over the Grecian Homer, that not the moft rigid philofopher or divine have made the leaft objection

to them.

Terrarumque velis curam : et te maximus orbis "Auctorem frugum, tempeflatumque potentem

Accipiat, cingens materna tempora myrto.

"An Deus immenfi venias maris, ac tua nautæ

"Numina fola colant: tibi ferviat ultima Thule,

"Teque fibi generum Tethys emat omnibus undis."

Even fo grave an hiftorian as Tacitus does not fcruple to use the expreffion Divus Auguftus.

As to the expreffion of arre ανδρώντε θεώντε, which is applied by Homer to Jupiter, it is very certain that the word marng was frequently used to fignify superior or supreme*: and the word pater in Latin, padre in Italian, and pére in French, are used in the fame fenfe. It will occur to every one's thoughts what a pompous title is given in our own language to the venerable heads of the church:

and

and no wonder that the rude and ignorant heathens fhould adore fuch as had been illuftrious, after their death, when we are taught to bend the knee to those right reverend prelates whilft living.

Essays on the Importance of an inquiry into the human Mind.

TH

HE fabric of the human mind is curious and wonderful, as well as that of the human body. The faculties of the one are with no lefs wisdom adapted to their feveral ends than the organs of the other. Nay, it is reafonable to think, that as the mind is a nobler work and of a higher order than the body, even more of the wisdom and skill of the Divine Architect had been employed in its ftructure; it is therefore a fubject highly worthy of enquiry on its own account, but ftill more worthy on account of the extenfive influence which the knowledge of it hath over every other branch of science.

In the arts and fciences, which have leaft connection with the mind, its faculties are the engines which we must employ, and the better we understand their nature and use, their defects and disorders, the more fkilfully we fhall apply them, and with the greater fuccefs. But in the nobleft arts the mind is alfo the fubject upon which we operate. The painter, the poet, the actor, the orator, the moralift, and the statesman, attempt to operate upon the mind in different ways and for different ends; and they fucceed, according as they touch properly the ftrings of the

human frame. Nor can their feve ral arts ever stand on a folid foundation, or rife to the dignity of fcience, until they are built on the principles of the human conftitution.

Wife men now agree, or ought to agree in this, that there is but one way to the knowledge of nature's works, the way of obfervation and experiment. By our conftitution, we have a strong propenfity to trace particular facts and obfervations to general rules, and to apply fuch general rules to account for other effects, or to direct us in the production of them. This procedure of the understanding is familiar to every human creature in the common affairs of life, and it is the only one by which any real difcovery in philofophy can be made.

The man who firft difcovered that cold freezes water, and that heat turns it into vapour, proceeded on the fame general principles, and in the fame method, by which Newton difcovered the law of gravitation, and the properties of light. His Regulæ Philofophandi are maxims of common fenfe, and are practifed every day in common life; and he who philofophifes by other rules, either concerning the material fyftem, or concerning the mind, miftakes his aim.

Conjectures and theories are the creatures of men, and will always be found very unlike the creatures of God. If we would know the works of God, we muft confult ourfelves with attention and humility, without daring to add any thing of our's to what they declare. A juft interpretation of nature is the only found and orthodox philofophy; whatever we add of our own is apocryphal and of no authority.

All

All our curious theories of the formation of the earth, of the generation of animals, of the origin of natural and moral evil, fo far as they go beyond a juft induction from facts, are vanity and folly, no less than the Vortices of Defcartes, or the Archæus of Paracelfus. Perhaps the philofophy of the mind hath been no lefs adulterated by theories than that of the immaterial fyftem. The theory of ideas is indeed very antient, and hath been very univerfally received; but, as neither of thefe titles can give it authenticity, they ought not to fcreen it from a free and candid examination; efpecially in this age, when it hath produced a fyftem of scepticism, that feems to triumph over all fcience, and even over the dictates of common fenfe.

All that we know of the body is owing to anatomical diffection and obfervation; and it must be by an anatomy of the mind, that we can discover its powers and principles.

But it must be acknowledged, that this kind of anatomy is much more difficult than the other; and therefore it needs not seem strange, that mankind have made lefs progrefs in it. To attend accurately to the operations of our minds, and make man the object of thought, is no easy matter even to the contemplative, and to the bulk of mankind is next to impoffible.

An anatomift, who hath happy opportunities, may have access to examine, with his own eyes, and with equal accuracy, bodies of all the different ages, fexes, and conditions; fo that what is defective, obfcure, or preternatural in one,

may be difcerned clearly, and in its moft perfect ftate, in another. But the anatomift of the mind cannot have the fame advantage; it is his own mind only that he can examine with any degree of accuracy and diftin&tness. This is the only subject he can look into; he may, from outward figns, collect the cperations of other minds ; ' but thefe figns are for the most part ambiguous, and must be interpreted by what he perceives within himself.

So that if a philofopher could delineate to us, diftinctly and methodically, all the operations of the thinking principle within him, which no man was ever able to do, this would be only the anatomy of one particular fubject; which would be both deficient and erroteous, if applied to human na◄ nure in general: for a little reflection may fatisfy us, that the difference of minds is greater than that of any other beings, which we confider as of the fame species.

Of the various powers and faculties we poffefs, there are fome which nature feems both to have planted and reared, fo as to have left nothing to human industry. Such are the powers which we have in common with the brutes, and which are neceffary to the prefervation of the individual, or the continuance of the kind. There are other powers of which nature hath only planted the feeds in our minds, but hath left the rearing of them to human culture. It is by the proper culture of these that we are capable of all those improvements in intellectuals, in tafte, and in morals, which exalt and dignify human nature; while, on the other hand, the neglect or perverfion

perverfion of them makes its degeneracy and corruption.

The two-legged animal that eats of nature's dainties what his tafte and appetite craves, and fatisfies his thirst at the crystal fountain, who propagates his kind as occafion and luft prompt, repels injuries, and takes alternate labour and repofe, is, like a tree in the foreft, purely of nature's growth. But this fame favage hath within him the feeds of the logician, the man of tafte and breeding, the orator, the statesman, the man of virtue, and the faint; which feeds, though planted in his mind by nature, yet, through want of culture and exercife, must lie for ever buried, and be hardly perceivable by himself or others.

The lowest degree of focial life will bring to light fome of thofe principles which lay hid in the favage ftate; and, according to his training, and company, and manner of life, fome of them, either by their native vigour, or by the force of culture, will thrive and grow up to great perfection; others will be ftrangely perverted from their natural form, and others checked, or perhaps quite eradicated.

This makes human nature fo various and multiform in the individuals that partake of it, that, in point of morals and intellectual endowments, it fills up all that gap which we conceive to be between brutes and devils below, and the celeftial orders above; and fuch a prodigious diverfity of minds muft make it extremely difficult to difcover the common principles of the fpecies.

The language of philofophers, with regard to the original facul

ties of the mind, is fo adapted to the prevailing fyftem, that it cannot fit any other; like a coat that fits the man for whom it was made, and fhews him to advan tage, which yet will fit very aukward upon one of a different make, although perhaps as handfome and as well proportioned. It is hardly poffible to make any innova tion in our philofophy concerning the mind and its operations, without ufing new words and phrases, or giving a different meaning to thofe that are received; a liberty which, even when neceffary, creates prejudice and mifconftruction, and which must wait the fanction of time to authorise it. For innovation in language, like thofe in religion and government, are always fufpected and difliked by the many, till ufe hath made them familiar, and prefcription hath given them a title.

If the original perceptions and notions of the mind were to make their appearance fingle and unmixed, as we firft received them from the hand of nature, one accuftomed to reflection would have lefs difficulty in tracing them; but before we are capable of reflection, they are fo mixed, compounded, and decompounded, by habits, affociations, and abftractions, that it is hard to know what they were originally. The mind may in this respect be compared to an apothecary or chemift, whofe materials indeed are furnished by nature; but for the purposes of his art, he mixes, compounds, diffolves, evaporates, and fublimes them, till they put on a quite different appearance; fo that it were very difficult to know what they were at first, and much

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