They likewise treat the circumstances a, a', a" in the precedent as material, and reject the others as immaterial. The other party deal in a corresponding manner with B, B′, B" and b, b', b". The two parties then severally compare A, A′, A′′ with a, a', a", and B, B', B' with b, b', b", and allege that the parallelism of each precedent with the case in hand is established. In order to impugn the applicability of his antagonist's precedent, the former party may then argue that B, B′, B', the circumstances, in the proposed case, treated by the other side as material, are in fact immaterial, and that therefore the precedent has no weight; or, secondly, they may argue that d, d', d', the circumstances in the precedent treated by the other side as immaterial, are in fact material, and therefore that the precedent is inapplicable. Corresponding objections may be made by the latter party to the other precedent. Thus, if one nation receives an affront from another nation, a question may arise, in political debate, as to the policy of resenting the affront, or of leaving it unnoticed. Precedents in favour of each of the two opposite courses may be alleged by the contending parties. There may be valid precedents for resenting a national affront, and valid precedents

for acquiescence without retaliation. Each of these may present

certain points of resemblance with the particular case of affront under consideration. It will be for those who argue and decide the question to judge which of the rival analogies is the strongest. In like manner, if there be a question whether a certain expense shall be defrayed by a local tax, or out of the taxes of the general government, rival precedents may be adduced in favour of both courses. Each of the precedents cited on both sides may have a certain affinity with the case under discussion. There may be some circumstances, in the particular expense to be incurred, which resemble circumstances in some expenses defrayed by local taxation-there may be other circumstances in it which resemble circumstances in some expenses defrayed by national taxation. The nicety of the practical judgment consists in determining which of these two sets of circumstances preponderate. Thus Machiavel, in examining the question, whether a nation which expects to be invaded should await the attack at

home, or should anticipate the enemy by an aggressive movement, adduces opposite examples of the success both of defensive and offensive tactics under the supposed circumstances-as the successful attack of Scipio upon Carthage on the one hand, and the unsuccessful attack of the Neapolitans upon Charles VIII., in Romagna, on the other.(1)

The scrutiny of the different items of fact upon which the applicability of the rival precedents, and the balancing of the opposite considerations with one another, singly and in the aggregate, depend, is often a delicate and difficult process, requiring rare mental qualifications for its proper performance. In the comparison of the several analogies-in the dissection, illustration, and rejection of the various attempted parallels-all the resources of an acute, dexterous, experienced, and well-informed reasoner—of a mind equally prompt in discerning resemblances and differences -may be tasked to the utmost, even if there is perfect freedom from bias, and a strong desire to decide rightly. On the other hand, it is the business of the advocate, and of the sophistical partizan, to advert merely to those precedents which support his own view of the case, and to withdraw attention from the precedents on the other side; and moreover, to insist merely on the points of resemblance in his own precedents, and to be silent as to the points of difference. In this way he contributes, so far as he is able, to the practical error which consists in the misapplication of a good precedent.

Another variety of the same form of practical error is when a good model is injudiciously copied—when an institution, desirable under the circumstances in which it exists, is assumed to be desirable under a different set of circumstances, and is therefore propagated by imitation. The most frequent example of this error is to be found in the government of dependencies, whether they be newly-established colonies, politically dependent upon the mother-country, or newly-conquered provinces. In either case, the imperial government is apt to introduce its own institutions into the dependency, simply because they are its

(14) Disc. ii. 12.

institutions, and with little or no reference to the different medium in which they will, when so introduced, have to act. It may be led into this error sometimes by a belief, that the propagation of its laws and institutions will increase its power-sometimes by the facility of the operation, and an ignorance of the circumstances which cause the institution to be unsuited to the dependent community.(") Thus, when Athens introduced democracy, Sparta oligarchy, into its dependent states, each believed that, in multiplying copies of its own constitution, it was taking a step which tended to consolidate its own power. (1) On the other hand, the permanent settlement in Bengal was made by Lord Cornwallis with excellent intentions to the province, but with an imperfect knowledge of the probable consequences of his own measure.

own.

The desire of multiplying copies of an admired real model is, further, the source of the system of political propagandism in independent states. Sometimes this desire is interested, as in the case of Athens and Sparta, just mentioned: a nation seeks to impose its own form of government upon other nations for the purpose of increasing its own political influence, through the sympathy and support of governments similarly constituted to its At other times, the desire is disinterested—it is the fruit of a political fanaticism, which strives to force upon reluctant nations an institution which the propagandist considers beneficial, and to make them prosperous and happy in spite of their own prejudices. The struggles of the revolutionary government of France to diffuse its principles over Europe, and to introduce republican governments in foreign countries, were owing to a mixture of these motives. Disinterested political propagandism has not only borrowed its name, but has taken its rise, in great measure, from the system of religious propagandism established by the church of Rome, and partially adopted by the protestant churches. The principles of unity of faith and of unity of church government were easily transferred to politics. Looking to this

(15) See Bentham, Traités sur la Législation, tom. iii. p. 329; ed. 1802. (16) οἱ μὲν ̓Αθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους KATEλVOV.-Aristot. Pol. v. 7.

venerated example, the professors of the same political creed easily adopted the notion that it was their duty to propagate, not only their speculative opinions, but also the form of government which they held to be best. And as the church of Rome, whenever it was able, propagated both its creed and spiritual government by force, so it was natural that the members of a political party should resort to similar means for propagating their peculiar doctrines and their temporal government-that proselytes should be obtained by coercion where persuasion did not avail, and that a political fanaticism should be created, not less fervid, unreasoning and intolerant, than the religious fanaticism of the Roman church of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

8 6 The last cause of erroneous political practice which we are called on to notice is when the facts of the case to which the action relates are imperfectly ascertained, and, in consequence, the minor premise of the practical syllogism is incorrectly laid down. The inaccuracy of one of the premises necessarily taints the conclusion; and, moreover, as the argument is constructed (in the manner already explained) by adapting the major to the minor premise, the inaccuracy of the latter is likely to entail a corresponding change in the former.

The methods of observation by which political facts are ascertained, and the defects to which these methods are subject, have been fully considered in a former part of this treatise. (7) Here, therefore, we need only recapitulate briefly the principal sources of error in the determination of facts. It may happen, for example, that on account of the distance at which the scene of action lies, the facts of the case have not been communicated fully to the government before the practical decision is made. There may likewise have been neglect in transmitting information, or the information transmitted may be erroneous or scanty. Besides, with whatever rapidity, punctuality and completeness, information may be transmitted to the seat of government, it is impossible that facts occurring at a distance should be known to the government at the time of their occurrence; hence, as Tur(17) Ch. v.

VOL. II.

C C

got has justly remarked, it is necessary in politics to predict the present. A decision on a practical question is almost always made upon facts which were prior in time to the moment of decision, and there is therefore an interval between the last known event and the moment of action, which must be filled up by conjecture.

In addition to the errors of fact arising from imperfect investigation, or defective communications, are those which are produced by intentional deceit. Every legislative body, every executive government, every person acting in an official capacity, is liable to be imposed on by false representations, made for the purpose of influencing their practical decision. Documents may be forged, false intelligence may be transmitted, false rumours may be put in circulation, for the purpose of misleading the government, and inducing it to take a step, which, being founded on falsehood, cannot fail to be erroneous.

Now in every case where the facts are misconceived, and the minor premise, expressive of these facts, is erroneously formed, this error (as we have already remarked) must react upon the major premise, inasmuch as the major premise is fitted to the minor. When the facts of a case requiring a practical decision have been laid down, the next step is to frame the maxim under which it is to be placed, so that, in the process of logical invention, the major depends on the minor premise; in other words, the principle of the argument depends upon the facts of the case. Hence, if the case is incorrectly stated, the principle or rule of conduct is in general incorrectly assumed, so that the entire argument is vitiated; and in order to set it right, both premises must be amended. The minor premise must be corrected, by substituting the true for the false statement of fact—the major premise must be modified, in order to bring it into conformity with the amended minor premise.

Thus, if it be alleged that a certain legislative measure has failed, inasmuch as it has produced a certain effect, and that it ought, on this account, to be repealed or amended, it may turn out, on closer inquiry into the facts, that the supposed effect does not exist at all-or that, if it exists, it is due to a different