and decides in favour of suicide.(") Hamlet, on the other hand, after considering the various evils of life, and the facility of putting an end to them by suicide, begins to reflect on the uncertainty of the relief which would be derived from a plunge into a new and unknown state of being, and concludes that "Tis better to endure the ills we have, Than fly to others that we know not of. § 6 In all human conduct, but particularly in political affairs, the alternative courses to which our choice is practically limited are often only three in number-that is to say, two extremes and a mean. We may take either the road which branches off to the right, or that which turns away to the left, or we may follow that which runs in a middle course between the two. Certain slight deviations from these main roads may be practicable, but in general it is along one of these great lines that our way must lead. For example, a law, or regulation, or treaty, may either be upheld in its integrity, or it may be altogether repealed and rescinded, or it may undergo modification. Aristotle has founded his ethical theory upon the principle, that virtuous conduct is a mean between vicious extremes; (2) for example, that courage is a mean between foolhardiness and cowardice-liberality, between parsimoniousness and profuseness, and so on. This mode of viewing conduct cannot be extended universally to political practice, inasmuch as an extreme course may, in certain cases, be the right one. For instance, the choice lying between entire inaction, or a petty war, or a military effort in which all the national resources are exhausted, the latter may be the wisest course. Or, again, if some extension of political rights is demanded by a popular party, and the choice lying between an absolute refusal, a partial concession, and an entire concession, (11) Soph. Aj. 457-80. (12) • Virtus est medium vitiorum, et utrinque reductum.' the latter course may offer the most reasonable prospect of a permanent settlement of the question. But although, in politics, it cannot be affirmed that the middle course is the virtuous one, yet it is often the only course which can be adopted with safety. Even in cases where, if they are abstractedly considered, and with reference to general tendencies, an extreme course would be preferable, existing habits and interests, and the state of public opinion, render some temperament—some intermediate course-expedient. Hence the prevalence of compromises in politics, by which each contending party abates something of its pretensions, and acquiesces in an arrangement less favourable to itself than that which it claims, but less unfavourable than that claimed by the other party. Thus, if two nations have a question of disputed boundary, they may settle the dispute by agreeing to an intermediate line, which gives each country less than it claims, but more than it would have if the full claim of the other side were admitted. So, if two rival interests contend about a rate of duty, one wishing for a high rate, and another for a total abolition, the matter may be compromised by fixing a moderate rate. (13) Compromises are inadmissible where a principle is to be maintained, and where a partial concession cannot be made without surrendering the entire question at issue between the parties. Thus, it might happen that the non-assertion of a national right, even for a time, would be construed as its abandonment. The choice of the via media, though it is often highly salutary, must be made with discretion; for sometimes success is only to be found in one or other of the extremes, and an attempt to partake of the advantages of both, ends in a failure to obtain the benefits of either. Machiavel is particularly earnest in cautioning rulers against the adoption of a middle course between government by fear and government by kindness. (1) (13) Extremes are to be disclaimed,' is a maxim laid down in Hamilton's Parliamentary Logic, p. 14. In general, the disclaimer of extremes conveys an impression of moderation and fairness, and is acceptable to the majority of a large and mixed assembly. (14) See Discorsi, ii. 23; iii. 40. He says that the true mode of governing is either to render your subjects incapable of injuring you, or to exercise your power in such a manner, that they are not likely to desire a change of governors. He appeals to the practice of the Romans in support of this maxim, who, he says, never followed the other pernicious rule of action, but always, when they annexed a state to their empire, destroyed its power of resistance, or placed it in a position which left no motive for rebellion. (15) And he contrasts this wise practice with the error of the Samnites, who, having enclosed the Roman army in the Caudine pass, compelled them to walk under the yoke, but allowed them to escape with their lives, contrary to the advice of the aged Pontius, who recommended that they should either be released without harm, or be all put to death; whereas the middle course actually chosen left them with undiminished power of injury, but added a galling sense of disgrace. (1) A similar remark applies to the policy which has been sometimes pursued with respect to the enforcement of religious opinions by the state. Heretical opinions may be crushed and extinguished by consistent severity, as was done by the Italian and Spanish governments in the sixteenth, and to a considerable extent by Louis XIV. in the seventeenth, century. On the other hand, the government may abstain altogether from dictating in religious matters to its subjects-in which case, it avoids all the evils of religious discord which do not arise spontaneously between members of the different sects. But (15) He cites the following remarks of L. Furius Camillus, the consul, (335 B.C.) respecting the treatment of Latium: Dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus consilii fecerunt, ut, sit Latium deinde, an non sit, in vestrâ manu posuerint. Itaque pacem vobis, quod ad Latinos attinet, parare in perpetuum, vel sæviendo, vel ignoscendo, potestis. Vultis crudeliter consulere in deditos victosque? licet delere omne Latium, vastas inde solitudines facere, unde sociali egregio exercitu per multa bella magnaque sæpe usi estis. Vultis exemplo majorum augere rem Romanam, victos in civitatem accipiendo? materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat. Certe id firmissimum longe imperium est, quo obedientes gaudent.-Livy, viii. 13. was: (16) The comment of Herennius Pontius upon this middle course Ista quidem sententia ea est, quæ neque amicos parat, neque inimicos tollit. Servate modo, quos ignominiâ irritaveritis. Ea est Romana gens, quæ victa quiescere nequeat.'-ix. 3. the intermediate course of moderate legal pressure (which was that adopted by England towards Ireland after the revolution of 1688) neither extirpates heterodoxy, nor conciliates the support of the heterodox sects. It subjects the member of a proscribed creed to a teasing and vexatious regimen, but neither drives him out of the country, nor brings him over to the religion of the government. Machiavel's maxim, however, is not of very extensive application, for political alternatives do not often consist of two definite and clearly-marked lines. In general, political differences are differences of degree; and, hence, the dominion of compromise over the region of politics is very extensive. A government often finds, or ought to find, itself in the position of an impartial arbitrator between the conflicting claims of rival bodies and interests among the people. Having considered and weighed the merits of their several pretensions, it attempts, by mediating between them, to bring them to a common understanding, and to effect such an arrangement as shall reconcile the general interest of the community with a partial satisfaction of the opposing interests. Where the conflict takes the form of an attack upon an institution, which one section of the community considers as advantageous to itself, the government may compromise the matter by modifying the institution, without going to the length of its entire abolition. In the management of private affairs, compromise likewise often has a place, as, when two persons dispute about a right of property, they may settle the matter by dividing the subject of dispute, according to some proportion to be agreed upon. It is, however, less often applicable in private than in public affairs; because a person, in deciding upon the choice of a profession or trade, upon marriage, upon the education of children, and the like, is not called upon to shape his course with reference to classes of men, and contending bodies in the state, but has merely to decide between alternative courses in reference to his own circumstances. §7 In chusing between several alternatives, men in general prefer that which promises the most open and traversable course to the attainment of their object. They rather avoid obstacles by turning the flank of the position, than attack them in front, and endeavour to beat them down. Hence, in taking a retrospective view of the history of a community, we are reminded of a river, which is constantly moving onwards; its winding though progressive course being determined to the right or left by the impediments which resist the pressure of the current. § 8 The choice between alternative courses in politics, and the preference of that which seems to be the most advantageous, is often influenced by a calculation of the probable conduct of another party, who is acting in an adverse sense. Hence political action, especially when independent states are concerned, has often been compared to a game of chess. The move of each player depends on his calculation as to the next move of his antagonist. In politics, however, as in chess, it is seldom possible to anticipate the precise move which an opposing party will make in a certain contingency. The nearest approach to a sure prediction which can be made is, to reduce his choice to a limited number of foreseen alternatives. By our move, we perform a practical abscissio infiniti—we cut off our antagonist from all possible courses except a certain small number, and we await with confidence his adoption of one of those courses. We know that, unless he throws away the game, he must make one out of a few moves; but which of these he will prefer, we are uncertain until his choice is made. Thus, if two governments are negotiating about a claim which one makes upon the other, and that which makes the claim puts in an ultimatum, it knows, in taking this step, that the other government must either submit absolutely, or incur the chance of war. It may, however, be quite unable to form even a probable conjecture which of these two courses the other government is likely to adopt. When the Emperor Alexander refused to negotiate with Napoleon after the French army had entered Moscow, he knew that Napoleon must chuse between three alternatives; 1, either to advance further into Russia in pursuit of the Russian army; or, 2, to occupy VOL. II. Y |