from practical example or precedent, and it only remains for us to consider the relation which it bears to theory and to general precepts.

; the

As we have seen, there are two modes of political practice; one, in which the judgment is guided by a general maxim other, in which the argument is from a singular, through an universal but unexpressed proposition, to a singular. The main difference between the Dogmatic, or doctrinal politician, and the Empiricist, or practical man, is, that the former states his principle, but omits the facts on which it is founded; while the latter states his precedent, and suppresses his principle.

Archbishop Whately, in exposing the inconsistencies of those who condemn the study of political economy, has remarked that all persons who discuss and decide questions relating to national wealth are, in fact, though not in name, political economists. The objectors to political economy, when they discuss subjects included within the limits of this science, would thus assume the very character of which they themselves disapprove. (1) There is, however, this material difference between persons who discuss a practical question upon grounds of political economy, and those who discuss it upon grounds of common sense and simple experience. The former have certain principles, a certain rationale, or system of doctrine, to which they refer as their ultimate criterion and guide: the latter refer only to certain facts, or a certain practice, by which they profess to be determined. It is true that the latter must, in reality, assume certain general propositions by which the two sets of facts are connected; but these are not distinctly expressed-they are not reduced into a dogmatic form, and they must be first stated by the antagonist as premises involved in the practical man's argument, before their truth can be examined. The practical man, in short, who discusses a question of political economy by a reference to precedents and individual cases, may be a political economist, but he is not a theorist. He is not a political economist, in the sense in which

(51) Lectures on Political Economy, lect. 3, p. 73-5.

Adam Smith and Say are political economists: he does not lay down universal scientific propositions on the subject.

However difficult and liable to error may be the process of applying political theory to practice, as described in the previous chapter, yet, if it be properly performed, the logical result is much clearer to the understanding than in the argument from one case to another. The reason of this comparative obscurity

is, that in the argument from example or precedent, the principle upon which the inference rests is usually suppressed. The reasoning is much more perspicuous when the general principle is stated first, the particular case is placed under it, and the conclusion is then drawn. In order to argue from one case to another, it is necessary to reject from each the circumstances immaterial to the matter in hand, and to compare those in which they agree. In complex cases, this process is often extremely difficult. Much sagacity and knowledge of the subject are required, in order to discriminate between material and immaterial facts-to reject enough, but not more than enough. For if immaterial facts are retained, the comparison becomes obscure and uncertain; if material facts are rejected, it becomes fallacious. This process, which, in the argument from precedent, must often be performed mentally, though it may be easy and sure to the experienced practician, perplexes the tiro. Hence, students of the law have great difficulty in collecting legal rules from cases, though they are soon able to apply a rule of law, laid down in general terms, to a particular case of practice.

It happens not unfrequently that a politician professes a belief in certain theoretical principles, and even recommends them to others, while he in fact governs his conduct by precedents involving principles wholly inconsistent with those which he proclaims. A remarkable example of this species of inconsistency is often furnished by discussions upon laws for the relief of the poor principles are in general broadly laid down by advocates for a liberal system of relief, which would lead to a division of all property among the working classes. The same persons, however, when they proceed to frame a practical measure, or to

administer an existing law, adopt restrictions, founded upon precedent, wholly inconsistent with their own doctrines. The citizens of a free state, who maintain the institution of slavery-as the Athenians and Romans in antiquity, and the Americans of the present day-are in a similar position. They lay down certain doctrines with respect to liberty, equality of rights, and legal protection, to which they make no express exception, and to which they constantly appeal in their own behalf; but in exercising their power over their slaves, they follow the established practice of the country, which is altogether at variance with the other set of doctrines.(52) Every religious sect, again, invokes the principle of toleration for itself, but it is often intolerant in practice towards other sects.

When a person is in the habit of laying down certain doctrines, which he either neglects in his practice altogether, or else applies them only to a certain class of cases, or to a certain class of the community, while, with regard to other cases and the rest of the community, he is guided by existing practice and precedent, it often happens that, after a time, he becomes conscious of his inconsistency, and that he then attempts either to correct his principles by his practice, or his practice by his principles. If, upon consideration of his practice, he finds that it involves principles sounder than those which he enounces in theory, he reforms his theory according to the indications of his practice. This process is of perpetual occurrence while a theory is still in an immature state. The practitioners in the subject to which it relates are constantly able to verify the maxims derived from

(52) Rien n'est si commun que de rencontrer, dans tous les pays, des hommes qui ont deux doctrines opposées : l'une, qui leur sert à combattre l'oppression qu'ils supportent; l'autre, qui leur sert à justifier l'oppression qu'ils exercent. C'est là l'histoire de toutes les révolutions. On forme la théorie quand on est opprimé; mais c'est quand on est vainqueur qu'on établit la pratique.'-Comte, Traité de Législation, liv. v. ch. 11, note. Compare liv. v. ch. 19, where the inconsistency between the maxims of freemen for themselves and for their slaves is pursued in detail. Compare Arist. Pol. vi. 3: ἀεὶ γὰρ ζητοῦσι τὸ ἴσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἱ ἥττους, οἱ δὲ κρατ τοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσι. Ib. vii. 2, ἀλλ ̓ ἐοίκασιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν δεσποτικὴν πολιτικὴν οἴεσθαι εἶναι, καὶ ὅπερ αὑτοῖς ἕκαστοι οὔ φασιν εἶναι δίκαιον οὐδὲ συμφέρον, τοῦτ ̓ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀσκοῦντες αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρ' αὑτοῖς τὸ δικαίως ἄρχειν ζητοῦσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους οὐδὲν μέλει τῶν δικαίων.

the theory, and to subject them to the requisite corrections. Theories substantially true, but partially false, are in this manner purified and confirmed by the results of experience. The practice re-acts upon the theory-the art improves the science.

On the other hand, a person who has proclaimed certain principles, which, though sound, he applies partially, having one rule for himself and one rule for others, may, after a time, be shamed into consistency, and may thus remove the contradictions of his practice by applying to it a uniform theory. A slaveowner, who extols the blessings of liberty, and insists on the rights of freemen, may at last consent to a measure for the emancipation of slaves: the member of a religious sect, which inculcates a respect for conscientious opinion and private judgment, may at last extend to other sects the toleration which he claims for his own.

Whenever either of the processes just described takes place, it is likely that the course adopted will be moderate, and removed from either extreme. Whether a person mends his theory by his practice, or his practice by his theory, he will probably move with slowness and deliberation, and he will be more or less held back by the opinions and habits which he is abandoning. Hence, he may profit by the lessons derived from the perception of his own errors, and may attain the golden mean between the rash theorist and the blind empiricist.

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CHAPTER XXII.

ON IDEAL MODELS IN POLITICS.

HAVING, in the preceding chapter, examined the use

and application of real models in political practice, we proceed to the consideration of those models which are ideal and not real; which are created by the imagination of an inventor, and have not, as yet, any actual existence.

The process of imitating an ideal model does not differ essentially from that of imitating a real model; but the two sorts of models are essentially different. A real model is something which has had, or still has, an actual existence, and which we strive to copy as nearly as our own powers, and the circumstances of the case, will admit. Such is the character of a virtuous man, or the style of an eminent writer or artist. There may be models of existing machines, instruments, tools, and other productions of the useful arts. Certain specimens of domesticated animals, and of cultivated varieties of flowers and fruits, may likewise be used as models for propagation. In politics, existing governments, institutions, or laws, of acknowledged excellence, may be copied in other countries. There may, again, be model schools, model regiments, model ships, model prisons, model farms, and other matters of human management, which serve for the imitation and guidance of persons placed at the head of similar establishments. An ideal model is a type of hypothetical perfection, which is described in words, or represented by signs, but has never obtained a real existence, not even in the shape of an experimental specimen. In the material arts, an idea can often be represented by its author in an actual model, for purposes of trial; such is the case with tools, and also with machinery, unless it be upon a large scale. But in political affairs, an idea of perfection must always remain an idea, until it is adopted by the practical politician. This necessity is created by the causes

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