117 $ 1 WE CHAPTER XVII. ON HYPOTHESES IN POLITICS. E have already had occasion to examine at length the nature of hypothetical reasoning in politics, and the manner in which hypothetical causes and hypothetical effects, both general and special, are determined. Hypotheses, however, are so important in politics, and their use is so extensive, that it will be convenient to take a connected view of their different forms, as applicable to our subject. The hypotheses which we have already considered are of four kinds, and these four classes appear to comprehend all the hypotheses which require notice with reference to politics. They are 1. Hypotheses relative to a special case of circumstantial 2.-Hypotheses relative to a special case of past events, made Each of these classes of hypotheses has been separately explained, with more or less fulness, in previous chapters;(') but it will be desirable, for the further elucidation of the subject, to bring them under a combined view. An hypothesis is a proposition which is not affirmed to be true, but is assumed merely for the purpose of deducing from it certain consequences.(2) Thus, in attempting to account for (1) Above, ch. ix. § 13; ch. xi.; ch. xii. §§ 2, 3; ch. xiii.; ch. xv. (2) On hypotheses in general, see Mill's Syst. of Logic, b. iii. c. 14. For Aristotle's conception of hypothesis, see Analyt. Post. i. 2, § 14; i. 10, §7-11: also, Polit. iv. 5 and 11. any set of facts, whose occurrence is proved by adequate evidence, we may suppose the existence of a certain cause, by which those facts would be accounted for; and if, after trying various hypotheses, we arrive at one by which all the facts are satisfactorily explained, the supposition may be received as a reality. This is the mode of reasoning (illustrated above) in cases of circumstantial evidence, where the conclusiveness of the proof depends on the closeness with which the hypothesis fits the circumstances. If a number of apparently discordant particulars are at once explained and reconciled by a single supposition, we may reasonably infer that the supposed cause is the true cause. The agreement of the two in numerous minute points carries with it conviction; just as if, on putting together two pieces of torn writing, or broken wood, we find the extremities exactly tally, we do not doubt that they had previously formed parts of one whole. The same is the process by which the historian, or literary critic, investigates circumstances when the cause is to be found. Thus, we have the hypothesis of Wolf with respect to the origin of the Homeric poems; the hypothesis of Niebuhr, with respect to the derivation of portions of the early Roman history from ballads or epic poems; the hypotheses of Eichhorn, Marsh, and others, with respect to the origin of the text of the four gospels; the hypothesis of Horace Walpole with respect to the character of Richard the Third, and various hypotheses with respect to the Man in the Iron Mask. So there are hypotheses, in literary history, as to the authorship of certain works, as the Aristotelian Economics, the treatise De Imitatione Christi, the Letters of Junius. In each of these cases a supposition is made, the truth of which is tried by combining it with all the circumstances of the case. A hypothesis may further be made, for the purpose of trying what would have been the course of events if certain circumstances had been different from what they actually were. Thus, we may inquire what would have happened if Alexander the Great had turned his arms against the Romans; or if the English had prevailed over their colonists in the American War of Independence; or if Mr. Pitt had carried his intended measures with respect to the Roman-catholics at the time of the Irish Union. So, in examining any complex case of causation, we may consider what would have happened if some circumstance which was present had been absent. For example, if the establishment of a commonwealth in England is attributed to the execution of Charles I., we may ask whether it might not have been equally established, if the king had been kept in prison or driven into exile. So, again, if a low state of prices is attributed to a combination of various circumstances, we may try to determine their relative influence, by supposing any one to be absent, and computing the probable result which the remaining elements would have produced. These hypotheses relate to past facts, and are made for the purpose of determining real causation. All hypotheses which are made for practical purposes relate to the future, and therefore they do not attempt to determine actual facts. They are, however, framed with reference to a special case, and are equally concerned in the determination of a true sequence of events. Whenever a person is about to take any political step, or to judge of any political measure proposed by others, he frames to himself certain hypotheses as to the probable consequences which would arise from such measure, in different contingencies. Not only, however, are the consequences which he thus anticipates hypothetical, but the measure itself which is in question is of the same nature. Every project of a law, every legislative draft or bill, every proposal for a treaty, every plan of finance, is a hypothesis. It is an assumption made for the convenience of reasoning, the probable consequences of which are then examined, upon the supposition that it is to be carried into effect. The manner in which this conjectural inquiry is conducted, and the hypothetical effects of a hypothetical scheme are deduced, has been traced in a former chapter. (3) The essence of such a hypothetical inquiry is, that it is circumscribed within definite (3) Above, ch. xiii. § 2. bounds; that it is a practical problem, involving the application of a given plan to a specific community, under determinate circumstances. A practical hypothesis of this sort is analogous to a tale of fiction, which is a hypothetical structure, built upon a conventional hypothetical foundation. The groundwork of the fiction may be assumed according to the taste or choice of the authorit may be placed in Paradise or in Hell; in Europe or in Asia; among the Greek deities, or in the hall of Odin; in fairy-land; in the region of the gnomes and sylphs; amidst magicians and sorcerers; in Lilliput or Brobdignag; in a desert island or a crowded city; among savage tribes, in the middle ages, or in a modern civilized society. When, however, the choice has once been made when the conventional circumstances in which the actors of the piece are to move have once been established between the author and the reader, the compact must be adhered to, and the fundamental hypothesis of the fiction must not be violated. The author of a fictitious composition is thus analogous to the inquirer who works out the imaginary consequences of a legislative proposal: in either case, there is a hypothetical substratum, upon which a certain hypothetical superstructure is raised. Lastly, hypotheses may be made in politics, which have reference to no special circumstances either of the past or of the future, but which are quite general in their nature, and are independent of any local or temporary circumscription. Such, for example, are all theories of an ideal state, or of any model or pattern system of political institutions. An ideal state is a supposed arrangement of a political society in a certain form, the arrangement being such, that any community might be conceived as capable of being cast into that mould. All theories of the best possible institutions are, in fact, hypothetical means, conducing to certain ends, but limited by no special conditions of time, place, or person.(*) All theories of general causation admit of being stated, with (4) Below, ch. xxii. § 3. reference to the future, in a hypothetical form. In truth, this is the proper mode of expressing such a law of causation. Instead of predicting absolutely that A will produce B, it is sufficient to say, that whenever A happens B will follow. Thus, the sentence of Burke, in his Thoughts on the French Revolution— 'Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels on principle' is the hypothetical assertion of a general law of causation, namely, that if subjects systematically resist legal power, rulers will exercise that power in a harsh manner, upon grounds of expediency. In like manner, it may be affirmed that, if certain maxims of international conduct were observed, and if independent nations abstained from certain acts towards each other, wars would cease, and a perpetual peace would prevail. Perpetual peace is a hypothetical state of things, which might exist if the conditions necessary for its existence were fulfilled; and those conditions are possible, though improbable. § 2 It is of the essence of hypotheses, whatever may be the nature of the subject, that they are to a certain extent arbitrary, and that they may be varied at pleasure; that different hypotheses may be started by different persons, or that one hypothesis may be substituted for another.(5) Thus, in arguing upon a case of circumstantial evidence, where the problem is to find a common cause which will explain all the appearances, rival hypotheses may be propounded. In the trial of a prisoner, for example, the hypothesis advanced on the part of the prosecution is, that his commission of the crime charged explains all the facts; whereas, his defence rests on the alleged inconsistency of some of the appearances with this supposition. Historical controversies upon the effect of evidence likewise, for the most part, consist in the attack and defence of rival hypotheses. Again, in hypotheses made for practical purposes, the same process is of perpetual occurrence: all counter-proposi (5) When a person in argument varies the hypothesis upon which his reasoning rests without notice, he is said to shift his ground.' Arguers often shift their ground unfairly in practical discussion, in order to obviate objections made to their hypothetical propositions. |