CHAPTER I. ON THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION PROPER TO ECONOMICS. SOCRATES-BACON-J. B. SAY—J. S. MILL. Bacon proclaims the Doctrine of the Continuity of Science. 1. WHEN the greatest Moral Philosopher of antiquity attempted to master the Physical Science of his day, he found that it was a mere chaos of confusion, a mass of baseless dogmatising and vain speculation. He called off his disciples in blank despair from such unprofitable labour, and bade them devote themselves to the study of Moral Science, which was within their comprehension, and to learn just so much of Natural Science as to know when to sow, and to reap, and to sail. Nay, he considered those who engaged in such objects of contemplation as wanting in good sense. He used to inquire whether such persons thought they already knew enough of human affairs before they proceeded to such subjects of meditation. He thought that men could never come to a satisfactory conclusion on such points, because those who most prided themselves on their knowledge were altogether at variance with each other. He asked whether those even who studied celestial phenomena, and discovered the laws which governed all things, fancied they would be able to produce, at their pleasure, wind, rain, changes of the seasons, as men who have learnt mechanical arts can produce what they want. As for himself, he would abandon all such vain speculations, which could never have any practical utility, and turn his attention entirely to moral and civil philosophy, and all things which concerned mankind. Thus Physical and Moral Science were utterly divorced in ancient times, and for twenty centuries it was supposed that there was no connection between them. 2. But our Bacon, greatly wiser-and for this he has never received the thousandth part of the credit that is due to him-had the marvellous sagacity to perceive that in Natural Science are to be found the types and standards of reasoning which are to guide us in Moral and Political Science. He inculcates the study of Physical Science, it is true, for its own sake, but not for its own sake only, but as the foundation of Moral Science. It is his transcendant merit to have perceived and proclaimed with the voice of a trumpet the grand doctrine of the continuity of the Sciences. And we must be the more earnest in defending the just title of Bacon to this glorious discovery, because the admirers of Auguste Comte have claimed for him the originality of the idea. But we shall shew abundantly that Bacon was the true discoverer of the doctrine. With Physical Science not in a very much better state than it was in the days of Socrates, Bacon not only did not discountenance it, but he had the miraculous sagacity to perceive that the way to true and certain reasoning in Moral Science lay through Physical Science. He complains bitterly of the mutual damage to the Sciences by their separation, and the neglect of Natural Philosophy as the great nursing mother of them all. "And it is a matter of common discourse of the chain of sciences, how they are linked together, insomuch as the Greeks, who had terms at will, have fitted it of a name of circle-learning. Nevertheless, I that hold it for a great impediment to the advancement and further invention of knowledge that particular arts and sciences have been disincorporated from general knowledge, do not understand one and the same thing, which Cicero's discourse and the note and conceit of the Grecians in their word circle-learning do intend. For I mean not that use which one science hath of another for ornament or help in practice, as the orator hath of knowledge of affections for moving, or as military science may have use of geometry for fortifications; but I mean it directly, of that use by way of supply of light and information, which the particulars and instances of one science do yield and present for the framing or correcting of the axioms of another science in their very truth and notions. And therefore that example of oculists and title lawyers doth come nearer to my conceit than the other two: for sciences distinguished have a dependence or universal knowledge to be augmented and rectified by the superior light thereof, as well as the parts and members of a science have upon the maxims of the same science, and the mutual light and consent which one part receiveth from another. . . . . And these are no allusions, but direct communities, the same delights of the mind being to be found not only in music, rhetoric, but in Moral Philosophy, policy, and other knowledges, and that obscure in the one which is more apparent in the other; yea, and that discovered in the one which is not found at all in the other; and so one science greatly aiding to the invention and augmentation of the other. And therefore with out this intercourse the axioms of the sciences will fall out to be neither full nor true." 1 2 3. Again, after shewing that one cause of the backward state of the sciences was the short period during which they had been studied, he says-"In the second place there presents itself that cause of great weight in every way, namely, that during those very ages in which the genius and learning of men have chiefly flourished, Natural Philosophy obtained the least part of human labour. And nevertheless this very thing ought to be held to be the great Mother of Sciences. For all arts and sciences if torn from this root, though perhaps they may be polished, and made fit for use, yet they will make no further progress. . . . . And the age during which Natural Philosophy was seen to flourish in Greece, was but a very brief interval of time, for both in the more ancient times, the seven who were called the wise men, all except Thales, applied themselves to Moral Philosophy and civil affairs, and in later times when Socrates drew down philosophy from heaven to earth, Moral Philosophy prevailed more and more, and turned the minds of men from the Philosophy of Nature." So again-"To this it is to be added that Natural Philosophy, even among those very men, who have nurtured it, has scarcely ever obtained the whole leisure and employment of any one, especially in these later times; except perhaps some instances of a monk in his cell, or a gentleman speculating in his country house. But the Philosophy of Nature has been made as it were a passage and a bridge to something else. And so this great Mother of the Sciences has been with wonderful indignity thrust down to the office of a handmaid. . . . . Meanwhile let no one expect much progress in the sciences (especially in the practical part of them) unless Natural Philosophy be applied to each individual science, and each particular science be referred again to Natural Philosophy. Hence it is that astronomy, optics, music, most of the mechanical arts, medicine itself, and--what one might more wonder at-MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, logical sciences have scarcely any depth, but only glide over the surface of a multitude of things, because, after these separate sciences have been once distributed and erected, they are no longer nourished by Natural Philosophy. Therefore it is not the least strange if sciences make no progress when they are torn from their roots." 3 1 Valerius Terminus, c. 8. 2 Nov. Org. bk. i. aph. 79. 4. So also " And here it may be repeated what was said above, about the application of Natural Philosophy, and that each separate science must be referred to that again, that the sciences may not be severed and cut off from the trunk. For without this little progress is to be hoped for."1 And again-"Some, too, may doubt rather than object, whether we speak of Natural Philosophy only, or that the other sciences, logic, ethics, politics, are also to be brought to perfection by the same method. But most assuredly we mean what we said to apply to them all; and as the common logic which acts by syllogism affects not only the natural, but all sciences, so also ours which proceeds by induction, embraces them all. For we form a history, and tables of discovery of anger, fear, shame, and the like, also of examples in Politics, so also of affections of the mind, &c." 2 So again "Let us now come to that knowledge to which the oracle of old leads us-namely, the knowledge of ourselves, upon which, as it touches us the more nearly, the more diligence is to be bestowed. This knowledge is for men, the aim and the object of all knowledges, but it is only a portion of Nature. And let this be laid down as a general rule, that all divisions of sciences be so understood and applied that they may rather mark and distinguish them, than separate and divide them, so that we may always avoid a break of continuity in the sciences. For the contrary mode has made each separate science barren, empty, and erroneous, since they were not nourished, supported, and corrected by the common fountain and aliment." 3" We have laid down that this is the function of Natural Philosophy, to be the common mother of the sciences." 4 5. It was, then, the matchless and undivided merit of Bacon to discover that the same great fundamental principles of reasoning govern all departments of human knowledge, and that general principles of Logic govern particular sciences with a higher authority than belong to these particular sciences. It has long been observed that the genius of the Platonic Philosophy is essentially Inductive. Only Plato applied the Inductive method to the ideas of the Moral world; Bacon in the first instance to those of the Physical world. But the genius of the Philosophy of each is identical. The sublime discovery of Bacon was that Physical Inductive Science must precede Moral Inductive Science: that Natural Science is the nursing mother of all science, and that in it are to be found the types and standards of reasoning to which all other reasoning is to be referred; that it is the raidaywyós to lead us to the study of Moral 1 Nov. Org. bk. i. aph. 107. 3 De Augmentis, lib. i. c. I. 2 Nov. Org. bk. i. aph. 127. De Augm. lib. iii. c. 4. Science. He proclaimed the union between Ideas and Reality, to which nothing earthly was comparable, which was the sole hope of attaining true science, and in consequence of the divorce between them, the whole fabric of human knowledge as then existing was like some magnificent structure without any foundations. 6. It has indeed been the fashion of some writers, lately, systematically to depreciate the merits of Bacon, and some almost seem to go the length of denying him any merit at all, because it cannot be shown that the Novum Organum had any direct influence on the progress of physical discovery. 'He made no discovery himself, and the progress of physical science would have been just as great if he had never written. Even if these assertions were true, it would not in the least diminish the lustre of that work. No one can fairly appreciate the merit of that work who is not well acquainted with the absurdity of the grounds upon which the established opinions of his day rested. Bacon saw through this, and discovered the weakness of the grounds of the current belief with a clearness and penetration truly surprising. One reason, perhaps, why he may not have received his due share of credit is, that he overrated the power of his Logic; and supposed that by its means discoveries could be made, so that almost all minds could be brought nearly to the same level, and make discoveries as equally as they could draw circles by compasses. That he entirely failed in this is true, and it is probable that his failure in that instance has had some effect in making his real merits less thought of than they deserve. But he failed in this instance by not observing his own rules. For he has laid down that the conceptions of a science are to be framed with exactly the same care as the axioms, or general principles. And he fell into exactly the same error himself as he charged upon the Aristotelians, namely, considering Logic as an instrument of discovery. Whereas the fundamental conception of Logic is not the science of discovering truth, but the science of judging whether or not certain alleged discoveries are true. Logic is the science of Judgment, and not an art of discovery, nor even an art of reasoning. The faculty of proposing notions, or ideas, or laws, or reasons, belongs to the Imagination or the Invention; but all these ideas, conceptions, or laws, must be submitted to the tribunal of the Reason, or Logic, before they can be finally admitted to be true. And it is the province of Logic to discover and apply the tests which any conception, or axiom, must satisfy before it can be admitted to be true. Cicero has described once, and for ever, the true function of Logic.-" In hâc arte, si modo est hæc ars, |