were inseparably connected with the existence of our naval power, precluded minute investigation; and if we add to these causes the difficulty of the subject, and its remoteness from the usual studies and pursuits of the greater part of mankind; we shall not be surprised at the apathy and indifference with which this important discussion was generally received. But it is the province of the historian, not only to detail facts as they arise, but to place before his readers their causes, their relations, and their probable consequences. Separate this duty from his labours, and he becomes the useful annalist indeed, but forfeits all claim to the name and dignity of a writer of history. Impressed with these considerations we shall beg the indulgence of our readers, while we consider at some length the articles of this convention: a convention which at once abrogates what has always been considered and acted upon as the received public law of Europe; and establishes an entire new code for the future regulation of the maritime affairs of all civilized nations. Nor can the disquisition be considered as unimportant, when every Englishman recollects that by the consequences of this important transaction it is to be decided, what rank we shall hereafter retain among the European powers.

The origin of the inadmissible and unreasonable pretensions of the Baltic states, to interfere with and cripple our maritime regulations and commerce, may be found in the weak and temporizing policy, which Great Britain had pursued towards them in the latter years of our contest with America. The fence of 1783 made no provision

for the reassumption of those rights which had been wrested from us by the armed neutrality of 1780. But the principles of which we complained had gradually fallen into disuse, and were renounced by the prac tice of almost every power who had been a party to that confederacy. By Russia in her war with Turkey in 1787; by Sweden in her war with the former power in 1789; by all the powers of Europe with which we were in amity during the last war, in their respective treaties with us; by Denmark and Sweden in their instructions issued in 1793, and in their treaty with each other in 1794; and by Prussia in her treaty with America in 1799. This universal change of sentiment secured to us uninterruptedly for many years the exercise of our rights, and which would have, perhaps, remained for ages undisturbed, had not the caprice and ill-founded anger and disgust the late emperor of Russia conceived towards us again revived the pretensions of the neutral powers with increased eagerness and the most hostile manifestations. A new convention was now formed between the Northern Powers upon the basis of the old, and Great Britain found that, unless she could, by equal promptitude and vigour, meet the necessity of the case, and bring these questions to a final and distinct settlement, her sun of glory had set for ever!

In the magnanimity of the monarch, the decision of the administration, and the public spirit of the people, the British empire soon saw its resources commensurate with the dangers which menaced it: fleets were set on foot; the command given to officers of tried

ability

ability and experience, and in an incredibly short time, from the 7th of November 1800, when the embargo was laid on all the English ships in the ports of Russia, the Baltic powers had incurred the heavy penalty of their temerity; their colonies were conquered; their commerce annihilated; the defences of their own ports destroyed; their commodities accumulated at home for want of purchasers; their revenues reduced by the total stagnation of trade; mutual jealousy and want of confidence existing between each other; and, in fine, the battle of Copenhagen fought! At this crisis, the death of the emperor Paul opened a door, not only for a cessation of hostile measures, but for negotiation and alliance, and the present convention was set on foot.

Under such auspicious circumstances it might reasonably be expected that we should establish, on a fixed and permanent basis, the principle for which we had combated; and that the contest which we had so gloriously maintained, and terminated, should be followed up by an arrangement so precise and certain in its terms, as should admit hereafter no possibility of evasion or abuse; and that it should form, to use the words of a great statesman, "the charter of our future strength," and "the warrant of assurance of the undisturbed enjoyment of rights essential to our naval power." How far the treaty in question has accomplished these objects, we shall, with as much brevity as consists with clearness, examine.

The convention*, as now laid before parliament, was made with

Russia alone, certainly the most powerful member of the northern confederacy: the fact of the accession of Sweden and Denmark to it ministers confidently stated. Yet assuredly it was without example, and extremely inconvenient for parliament to be called pon to consider an arrangement, before it was possible that its extent and operation could be known, or how far it would affect the essential interests of the British empire; for until it should be seen what were the precise terms of that accession, one material point of difference might be left without a possibility of explanation or adjustment; because the interpretation of an article of what was contraband, was yet in dispute between the British government and Sweden! Nor was this all, the same uncertainty belonged to the convention itself; for on the face of it there appeared, that there were many explanations still to be entered upon at St. Petersburgh on some of its most material points: so that parliament was called upon to sanction a treaty, upon the precise terms of which they could not be distinctly informed! For this unprecedented eagerness on the part of ministers in bringing the treaty in this crude and immature form before parliament, we can only account, by supposing that it was too tempting an opportunity to acquire popularity, not to be embraced at the expense of all former usage, and the severe animadversions it brought upon them.

Of the five distinct points to which this treaty † may be reduced, we shall first observe on that which establishes the rule under which

E 4

+ See convention ibid. the

the belligerent refuses to neutrals the liberty of carrying on, during the war, those parts of the enemy's trade, from which they are excluded in time of peace, and which has usually been applied to the coasting and colonial trade of France. One of the articles of the armed neutrality in 1780, claimed the right of carrying on unmolested these branches of French commerce, although prohibited in time of peace: this unjust pretension, aimed at our naval dominion, was renewed by the hostile convention of 1800, nearly in the following words? "That neutral ships may navigate freely from post to post, and upon the coasts of the belligerent powers.' The present convention adopts very nearly the same terms; by it, "neutral ships are permitted to navigate freely to the ports and upon the coasts of the belligerent powers:" and in the next section of this article, it is added, that "the effects embarked on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war, and of enemy's property." By the first of these clauses the hostile claim of the northern league is completely recognized, as far as relates to the coasting trade; by the latter it as clearly concedes to the neutral powers the right in time of war to carry on the whole colonial trade of France, under the pretence of its being their acquired property. Thus have we surrendered for ever, without reserve or compensation, the whole of this long admitted claim, its principle, and its practice. We have given by it to our enemy, any future contest, all the resources of commerce; and we have deprived the valour and energy of our navy, of the just reward which it

in

now derives from its most valuable captures!

On the second of the general principles of the convention, that which is opposed to the absurd and unjust pretension, viz. that

free ships make free goods," there is in this treaty a proper recognition of the long established public law of Europe on that head.

The third, which applies to " contraband of war," lays down a principle the most fatal that could possi bly be devised to our future maritime dominion; by it" all ambiguity or misunderstanding as to what ought to be considered as "contraband of war," is declared. Nor is this declaration the concession of any special privilege to the contracting parties, but the recognition of a preexistent right, which as such cannot be refused to any other independent state. In the enumeration of such articles, cannons and firelocks, helmets and swords, saddles and bridles, are carefully set down, with others of a nature appropriate to a war by land; but iron and timber, pitch and tar, masts, hemp, sail-cloth and cordage, are by it not only declared not to be contraband, but not even to be naval stores! So that so soon as our present commercial treaty shall have expired with America, must, in our renewal of it, abide by that rule of public law, which we have ourselves proclaimed: in similar circumstances shall we find ousrselves situated with Holland, with Spain, with Portugal, with Prussia, in short with every maritime power of Europe not a party to this convention.

we

Blockaded ports is the next subject which this treaty embraces on this head we shall not go into the exami,

nation

nation of what is the precise nature of a blockade by sea, always an intricate and difficult subject; but there is ground sufficient to call in question the justice and policy of the whole stipulation on this head. From the words of the article, the blockade is understood to last so long only, as that there shall be evident danger of entering, and to be raised as often as that danger ceases, even for the shortest interval. In this light, declaration of blockade, or of its having ceased, heretofore the assurance required of the existence of such a measure, is abrogated; there must, under this new code, be the actual presence at all times, and at all seasons, of the blockading squadron to constitute a blockade, contrary to the very nature of naval operations, which necessarily depend on the variations of the weather, and which must occasionally compel absence from the port, frequently to such a distance as that no evident danger can exist in entering it. Nor can any neutral ship hereafter be detained, bound to such port, if met with at a distance from it, because by this regulation it is made impossible that the officer of the belligerent can know that the blockade does at that moment subsist, and because the fact of its existence can alone justify the detention.

The "right of search," the last material principle of the convention, and which might, had the code of naval law, which Great Britain has hitherto asserted on this point, been steadily maintained, have cured in its operation many of the gross and dangerous deficiencies we have already pointed out in the preceding articles. But unfortunately in this instance, as in the others, we have

to record the magnanimous concessions which we have made, not only of our own rights, but the rights of all Europe, in the moment of triumph and of victory; not as a peace-offering to a powerful and grasping enemy, but to a prince, our ally, whose moderation and friendship to us were equally conspicuous; and who could not possibly gain to his own dominions, at least in the present posture of affairs, any commercial or maritime advantages from the sacrifices we have made, proportioned to their extent and consequence. The right of visiting ships under neutral convoy is indeed, by the words of this article, established; but we have so limited and circumscribed it in the operation, as to render it completely invalid and nugatory. As the law will now stand the suspicion must precede the inquiry, and no detention can take place unless the officer be already in possession of evident facts, establishing the violation of neutrality. How this mode of visiting and detaining neutral ships can be reduced to practice, with any sort of advantage to Great Britain, it is difficult to point out. If the papers of the ship detained be regular (and it would be strange indeed if they were not), the ship itself is not to be visited; but if some valid motive of suspicion should exist," then the officer may make further search. Unless indeed it be understood that the framer of this article on our part wished to sanction, under the ambiguity of phrase, the power of eluding the whole object of the stipulation, what valid object of suspicion can arise in the mind of an officer, respecting a ship whose name he never heard before, whose

crew

crew and cargo he has never seen, nor is permitted to see, unless the papers are bunglingly fabricated? What judge can he be, or what conjecture can he make, at that distance, of what concealed articles the ship may carry? Can he in such a situation acquire the details which the information of some or all of the crew might furnish him; or can he, from the papers, decide whether the ship be victualled and stored as they indicate?

Thus have we entered minutely into the component parts of this celebrated convention. To the whole of the treaty it must be objected, that whatever might be the circumstances which induced us to conclude it in the present manner and form, with one or more powers of Europe, we should have guarded, by the most explicit declarations, against the possibility of our special engagements being converted into general rules, applicable to all other countries: and this for the obvious reason, that we were now limiting our ancient rights by express stipulations. The reverse of this policy has, however, been unfortunately pursued. We have by the words of the treaty declared, that the stipulations to which we have now acceded "shall be regarded as permanent, and shall

serve as a constant rule to the con tracting powers, in matters of commerce and navigation."

Nor should it be forgotten that this treaty, in the modern spirit of innovation, has unsettled the basis of the public law of Europe, venerable for its antiquity, respectable for its equity, and above all valuable for the stability of its principles.

This was the first great measure of Mr. Addington's administration which could fairly be said to come before the public.

The preliminaries of the peace with France were, in their own nature, too loose and undefined, to serve as data by which the political wisdom of him and his colleagues were to be determined on by the public. The convention with Russia stood in a very different predicament. It was the mature and perfected result of many months negotiation: for the reasons we have already given, a minute consideration of its merits and defects was hardly given to it in any quarter; all its demerits were overlooked or were swallowed up in the vortex of delight and rapture at the termination of the war; and the "convention" and the "preliminaries" went hand in hand in the triumphant progress of Mr. Adding ton's administration.

CHAP