I

rior objects, and when disappointed and forrowful,
retains still a noble mixture of delight in the fubject
of it, and is amiable to those who contemplate it,
when it is in the most perfect degree directed to-
wards the most perfect object, must be confidered
as a principal ingredient neceffary to beatitude.

When the reafon of our love to a perfon is his
physical perfections, it is esteem; when the rea-
fon of it is his favours, or fome relation to our-
felves, which is a durable fource of favours, it
is gratitude; to delight in his happinefs, is benevo-
lence; and that love which has for its special object
and reason his moral perfections, is approbation or
complacence; though this laft term is fometimes
taken in a larger fenfe: and all these contribute to
that love which confifts in defire of enjoying, of ha-
ving the view, prefence and fociety, and favour of
a lovely object.

A just love is when the reafon of it is true, or when the object is really endued with those perfections, or causes and reafons of love, which are fupposed to be in it.

Experience fhows, that approbation heightens benevolence; and therefore the want of it naturally leffens it; and the greater the physical perfections of an object are, if they be joined with moral deformity, they make the object the more odious, and its prefence and fociety the more unpleasant.

When we contemplate objects of unequal perfection and lovelinefs, it is juft to have unequal love to them, or to love them in proportion to their loveliness, and to give the preference to the high

eft.

We may conceive feveral orders of juftice in love and affection, according to the feveral orders of the objects of affection. The highest justice we are capable of, is to have a juft affection or to give just preference to the higheft perfection: where there are many objects of affection equally lovely, to love 3 E 2

them

them equally; and confequently to have more love to many of them, or to a greater number, than to a lefs; because whatever reason there is in one of them, or any finaller number, to make us love them, there is ftill more reafon for love in a greater number of them.

We cannot be happy in any company, not even in our own, without love and approbation; the more complacence, approbation, and esteem, the more benevolence. Infinite happiness can want no degree of any thing neceffary to the higheft appro bation and love of the fubject of it. These things are neceffarily connected together: A being of infinite perfection, of infinite efteem, love, and complacency in himfelf, which is infinite love, and infinite juflice and truth.

We cannot conceive the Supreme Being, either, as infinitely perfect, or just, or happy, without an infinite love and preference of himself above all other things; which is one way of conceiving with due reverence divine effential holiness.

No other being can be perfect, juft, or happy, without the fame morai perfection, holiness, or preferring and loving God above all things; and, as was fhown before, what we love, or what we love chiefly, we muft chiefly delight in contemplating it, in rejoicing in its happiness, or we must chiefly delight in loving it.

All actions flow from the moral difpofition of the agent, or his will and inclination. An agent intinitely lovely, can do nothing but what is moft lovely, and nothing but what is a juft reafon for the greateft love to himfelf. He cannot appear unlike himfelf. Creatures can fee nothing but his works, and their own; and if perfectly lovely actions cannot be a temptation, a reafon, or excufe, for defpifing the agent, then all want of holiness in a being capable of it is inexcufable.

We cannot be holy, without approving and loving

that

that moral difpofition in ourselves, and all others; yea, the more holy a being is, the more it loves and approves of it where-ever it is; and the fame reafon that is for love of holiness, is for want of love, that is, for averfion and hatred of the contrary difpofition.

If holiness be the highest justice, ungodliness is the highest injuftice; and if the highest degree of it be hateful, any degree of it, in any perfon, at any time, must be fo proportionably.

What appears unjust to us, we think hateful always when we think on it, or fee it; what is hateful at one time, is fo always; and the way to remove that hatred is, to remove the object, or to hinder it from appearing to us at all, to forget it.

Whatever be faid of punishment of fin, it is certain, that the knowledge and hatred of fin, fuppofing it to exift, is effential to God. It is not an arbitrary thing, but effential, that he fees it all, fees it always, cannot forget it, and therefore always hates it; and if, as was obferved before, a finite fuperior degree of holinefs is an infallible caufe of a fuperior hatred of fin, the greateft holiness muft caufe the greatest hatred of it. It is a moral difpofition, and muft incline to manifeft itself in a manner worthy of the fubject of it, and fuitable to the object. All hatred inclines to manifeft itself, and juft hatred inclines to manifeft itself in a manner becoming the being who has that hatred. Reafon tells us, that the way becoming a fovereign, or governor, is punishment; and as one of the leaft manifeftations of hatred is with-holding manifeftations of favour, or all benefits, that itfelf, in the prefent cafe, would be mifery.

It is an effential perfection in God, both to give always the greatest reafon to creatures to love him, that is, to act always in that manner that is most worthy of his own approbation, and theirs, or to be holy and happy, and to manifeft the greatest hatred of fin after it is committed. Thus vindictive

justice

juftice is but a different view of infinite holiness and goodness, the most lovely moral perfections in the world. It is effential to God to approve and love this holiness and juftice; and in order to holinefs in us, that is, in order to be happy, and to be juft, it is necessary to approve of it likewise.

We can have no juft or reasonable joy, without both loving God, and confequently loving and approving of his vindictive justice; and, on the other hand, we can have no reasonable joy, without expecting God's love and favour to us; and therefore it is neceffary we know his righteoufnefs manifefted in the remiffion of fins;-without which, we can neither truly love him, nor expect his love; that is, we cannot be happy, without knowing that he favours us in a just and holy way.

No facrifice of a mere creature in the room of multitudes, can be a manifestation of the greatest effential eternal hatred of fin, or the greatest motive of an eternal law against it. It is not fufficient to have any knowledge of the harmony of vindictive justice, and of mercy in our redemption, but fuch a knowledge as fhall acquiefce, approve, and adore, that juftice, and delight in contemplation of it, as perfectly amiable, and to believe, that we had no reafon to defpife God, and God no reason in us to love us; for if we believe it was just to give us no favour, all that is given is free.

We can conceive no divine excellency more amiable, than the beauty of infinite holiness, or juftice and mercy; no manifeftation of them comparable to this; excepting the beatific vision itself, we can conceive no contemplation of divine glory fo excellent in itself, fo fuitable to us and a fuitable impreffion of it (which ftill admits of degrees) must increafe the joy of the beatific vifion itfelf; for the more love we have to an intelligent being, the more delight we have in viewing its excellency and happinefs.

God

God manifested in the flesh is an object which contains both the brightness of the glory of the creator, and the brightness of the glory of the creation. The three feveral orders of excellency and beauty fpoken of before, are here joined together in the nearest union; abfolutely fupreme or divine glory, fupreme created intellectual glory, and fupreme vifible or material glory. His human nature has the beauties of the intellectual and material univerfe u<nited in it.

Our prefent joy or happiness in this life is proportionable to our knowledge and love of God in Chrift. That knowledge and love admits of degrees. It is just to be always making progress in tit: one of the most manifest and most neceffary means of heightening it is this, to be reflecting on our moral imperfections, fins, and corruptions, to be making progrefs in the knowledge of them, which is a very easy study, if we were fincerely inclined to it, fince the materials lie fo near us.

Senfe of need makes a favour precious; and fenfe of unworthiness heightens gratitude to God, which is an effential ingredient of the greatest joy, prefent

or future.

It is impoffible to love God, without hating ourfelves; because it is impoffible to love holiness, without hating the contrary difpofition.

Reflection on our phyfical perfections or faculties, is useful; but it is in order to fee the goodness of the author of them, and the evil of thofe moral imperfections that have abufed them.

But in a state of complete happiness, the mind must be free of moral imperfections. For the inward reflection and contemplation of deformity in ourselves, is inconsistent with fullness of joy. But a just mind cannot reflect on its own perfections, though it must be confcious, and reflect on them, other wife than as derived from the original and ef

fential