sea were won by us. Nevertheless, our commerce did undoubtedly suffer, partly because we were not strong enough to protect it from so many enemies as were united against us, and partly because such forces as we had were badly distributed by an incompetent administration:—

'On the other side of the Channel commercial interests come before everything else, and war is only felt when those interests are affected. This being so, if the damage done is considerable, the English people imperiously demands a pacific solution, and the crown and the ministers bend before its will. If, on the other hand, commerce continues to flourish, public opinion attaches little importance to the war, and the government is free to continue it. Shipowners, merchants, manufacturers in reality, if not in appearance-are the masters of England. On their opinion alone war or peace depends. Consequently, in every war with England the object ought to be to strike at her commerce. (P. 414.)

This is not the first time that this has been said by a Frenchman. Indeed, the doctrine is at least two hundred years old. We admit at once that if our commerce were ruined we should have to stop fighting. The proposition is self-evident, and applies, with proper limitations, to every belligerent, has always applied, and will continue to apply till wars shall cease. It is equivalent to maintaining that, if you could only get hold of all your enemy's resources, he would not be able to fight any longer. The history of war shows that where there is anything like equality in two parties in conflict, this is impracticable. In such circumstances, if there is exhaustion it is felt on both sides. The history of naval warfare shows more than this. A plan of campaign against England based on destruction of her commerce has always failed. Captain Mahan has devoted a considerable part of his great works on sea-power to demonstrations of the futility of campaigns of the kind.

...

'Such a mode of war,' he says, 'is inconclusive, worrying but not deadly. . . . Where the revenues and industry of a country can be concentrated in a few treasure-ships, like the flota of Spanish galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut by a stroke; but when its wealth is scattered in thousands of going and coming ships, when the roots of the system spread far and wide and strike deep, it can stand many a cruel shock and lose many a goodly bough without the life being touched.' He has examined in detail the effects of commerce-destroying on our resources, and has established by statistics not likely to be refuted that they were small. He found that, where proper arrangements were made for the defence of our trade, the losses by capture amounted to but 1 per cent. on

'the property insured, being less than those by the dangers ' of the sea.'

When a thing is said often enough some people are pretty sure to believe that it is true. We have no desire to disabuse our French neighbours of a belief in which their volunteer strategists find so much comfort, but we do think it well to make it clear to our own people that timidity in relation to our maritime trade in war has no proper justification. Captain Chevalier appeals to two cases of our being compelled to make peace by the inroads made on our maritime commerce. Speaking of the war which followed on William III.'s accession, he says that our mercantile marine suffered great losses, and that-though the king was disinclined to peace-the complaints of the merchants and shipowners were so strongly urged that he had to agree to the treaty of Ryswick in 1697. The conclusion is based on a misreading of history. Macaulay, who gave full credit to Jean Bart and Duguay-Trouin for their activity as commerce-destroyers, lets us know the true reason of the distress which unquestionably did prevail in England. It was the state of the currency, the evils due to which were aggravated by bad seasons. When the currency is found to be insufficient we get indirect evidence of a tendency in trade to increase, not to diminish. The period was one when business operations on a large scale were becoming common. Great sums for the purposes of the war on the Continent were drawn from a currency already too limited to meet the new requirements, and there naturally followed stringency and distress. Macaulay's view is that the material wealth of England, indeed, had not been very seriously impaired by the drain which the war had caused; but she was 'suffering severely from the defective state of that instru'ment by which her material wealth was distributed.' He remarks: Compared with France, indeed, England might 'well be considered prosperous.'

The second case appealed to by Captain Chevalier is that of the war of American Independence, in which, he says, our commerce was seriously injured; and he specifies among the causes obliging us to make peace in 1783, the losses suffered by our merchants and shipowners. In the war in question our maritime trade did suffer greatly. That has never been denied. Nevertheless it is the fact that in no maritime war that we have waged with her did France so little make commerce-destroying a leading characteristic of her strategy. Only by military command of the sea,' says

Mahan, by prolonged control of the strategic centres of 6 commerce, can such an attack be fatal.' Our naval force was not large enough to assure to us this command; and such as that force was, the government of the day distributed it badly. All this is but one among many proofs that the command of the sea and, consequently, a strong navy are essential to our national existence.

We were never stronger on the sea than we were during the war which began in 1803 and ended with the fall of Napoleon I. Never was our commerce more formidably attacked than during the last years of that great contest. The French had practically abandoned attempts to bring about engagements on a large scale, and carried on a vigorous guerre de course. In the years 1813 and 1814 their commerce-destroyers were powerfully reinforced by those of the Americans, with whom we had got into a war. The mere loss of the American market-the United States ports being, of course, closed to us during the hostilities-must have had an injurious effect on our shipping. Adding this to the results of our enemies' activity, we should expect to find that the shipping figures had shrunk seriously. They did not shrink, but, as a matter of fact, increased. On the other hand, the results were disastrous to our opponents. In 1811 there were 24,106 British ships measuring 2,474,774 tons. In 1814-the returns for 1812 and 1813 were accidentally destroyed when the Custom House was burnedthe figures rose to 24,418 for the ships and 2,616,965 for the tonnage. There was, indeed, an invariable annual increase from 1805 to 1815. We had a great trade: we had also a navy strong enough to defend it against its many enemies.

Captain Chevalier is, after all, but a disciple of the Prince de Joinville. In the celebrated pamphlet, Notes sur ' l'Etat des Forces Navales de la France,' published in 1844, his Royal Highness asserted that to make war against England with certainty it was only necessary for the French to attack 'two things equally vulnerable-the confidence of the English people in their insular position, and their 'maritime commerce.' Let us see how our present author proposes to effect this. He first lays down as a principle that the country which goes to war with England should not have a continental war on its hands at the same time. This may indicate an oblique glance at alliances; but he does not specify any. The next thing is that every expeditionary force ought to be got together with the greatest secrecy, and the starting and course of the ships so arranged

that they may arrive at the point where they are to act without serious risk of being intercepted on the way. This makes us think of the instructions-already referred togiven to d'Estaing and of the proposal of Admiral Lalande. We may not assume that the plan suggested will not be put into execution.

Our commerce ought, of course, to be attacked; butexcept with that object-the weaker navy should engage only in offensive operations which can be carried out quickly and finished before an English force can reach the spot. This is merely the method of warfare by surprise. We may look to a naval historian to tell us when such a method ever succeeded in a conflict waged on a great scale, as one between two first-class powers must of necessity be. It is, we learn, especially necessary that the French Ports of 'Refuge'—a curious phrase indicating a strategy anything but bold-and colonies should be put in a state to offer effective resistance to assailants by both sea and land. This, perhaps, explains the recent strengthening of the garrison of Madagascar, and suggests the supposition that Captain Chevalier's views are shared by persons in a position to give effect to them.

6

If this be so, his views on ship-of-war design merit special attention. If,' he says, we wish the French fleet to make 'a good show on the field of battle, it is clearly necessary that the armour-clads forming it should be equal to the 'strongest armour-clad in any foreign navy.' What this can mean, except dissatisfaction with the design of most existing French battleships, is not easy to discover. That it does mean it seems probable. We were told in Brassey's 'Naval Annual' for last year that foreign contractors were copying more closely the English type of battleship, and it will be interesting to see if future French ships of the class are to approach in displacement-tonnage the newer battleships of our own navy. Captain Chevalier argues in favour of cruisers of great size. He may not wish to copy exactly our Powerful,' but there is no doubt that he wishes French cruisers to be equal in force to the largest ships of the 'same type belonging to the enemy.' As regards submarine boats he suspends judgement.

Summarised, his opinions are that the French fleet should not seek for occasions to fight pitched battles, that squadrons should be kept in readiness to go to places where we should least expect their arrival, and that our commerce should be actively and vigorously harassed. The idea seems to be to

keep us in a constant state of apprehension-not of real invasion, but of moderately serious attacks on our territory both at home and beyond sea. It is hoped by this to keep our navy so fully employed in preparing to ward off the attacks just mentioned, that it will be unable to give sufficient attention to the defence of our ocean commerce, which, therefore, will suffer so greatly that we shall be compelled to give in. The general principle advocated, we can see, is to make war without fighting. We are satisfied that it will not be difficult to disconcert strategy of this kind. With forces sufficient to give us the command of the sea, and intelligent direction at the seat of government a condition which it is necessary to emphasise-we may look in the face, and without shrinking, the possibilities of the future.