as to be obliged to sign the treaty of Badajos; for he contended that it was merely our choosing to break the treaty of El-Arisch, that made it necessary for us to send to Egypt that army which had been destined for Portugal. He also considered we had acted an unfriendly part towards Portugal, in not allowing her, in 1797, to make as good a peace as she could for herself.

Lord Pelham objected to the production of papers to which we were no parties, and many of them confidential and not proper to be laid before the house.

Lord Grenville insisted, that this country had not forced Portugal into the war; on the contrary, had done all she could to prevent it, and keep her neutral. The British government had not insisted on her fulfilling any engagement to this country which stood in the way of her neutrality.

The marquis of Sligo said, that it most cetainly was not as an ally of England, but as an ally of Spain, that Portugal had engaged in the war the district she had lost in Europe was of very little consequence. The motion was

lost.

The same night, lord Minto called the attention of the house to the affairs of the Italian republic, and of the island of Elba. He took this opportunity, which was the first he had had (having been absent at Vienna) to express the astonishment and sorrow with which he had heard of the preliminaries, from which the definitive treaty but little differed. He then adverted to the first consul assuming the sovereignty of Italy, at a time when we were negotiating the peace. He considered even, that the circumstance of

changing the name of the state from Cisalpine to the Italian republic, seemed to show that he intended it, in time, to swallow up the whole of Italy. He considered this circumstance a sufficient ground for breaking off the treaty. After also stating the importance of the island of Elba, he moved an humble address to his majesty for all the papers relating to the proceedings of Lyons, and also the occupation of the Isle of Elba.

Lord Pelhain said, there could be no use in such a motion, as government were not in possession of the papers moved for. He admitted that the aggrandizement of France, during the negotiation, was a circumstance which, in other times and other circumstances, might be a ground of war. Whether it was necessarily so in the present circumstances was one of the points which would be discussed on the day that the definitive treaty should come before their consideration.

Lord Fitzwilliam asked, what representation ministers had made against this transaction when they heard of it?

Lord Hobart objected against this irregular mode of putting questions.

Lord Carysfort begged that the opinion delivered by the noble secretary of state might be remembered in that house, namely, that in other times, and under other circumstances, such conduct on the part of France would be a ground of war.

Lord Grenville reprobated the refusal to give an answer to a question that appeared to him so fair; he could perceive no objection to the question, whether any representation had been made or not?

Lord!

The last question connected with the definitive treaty, which called forth a debate, prior to the discussion of the treaty itself, was a motion for papers respecting East India affairs. This debate took place in the commons on the 12th.

Dr. Lawrence made his promised motion. He began by a historical account of the progress of our influence and establishments in the East Indies, where we first appeared merely in the character of merchants. Even in the memory of some persons present, our East India possessions had been looked upon as very subordinate in their value, and greater importance was attached to a barren rock, near Newfoundland, than to the cession of Madras, at the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. It is true, that our aggrandizement in that country was sanctioned by the example of France. The governor of Pondicherry first began the system of territorial acquisition, and we did the same thing merely in self defence. They obtained some grants in India. We also obtained grants from the highest authority in India; the Great Mogul, supreme sovereign of the country. The validity of these grants had been acknowledged by former France, in former treaties, which are not now renewed. By those treaties, France was prohibited from erecting any forts in Bengal, and had acknowledged the nabob of Arcot our ally, from whom we derived our grants in the Carnatic, while they re

nounced that family from which they derived their grants. All those advantages, he conceived, we had thrown away by onitting in the definitive treaty to renew the former treaties. By the same omission we were exposed to the Dutch claim of limiting our commerce in the eastern seas. He concluded by moving, that there should be laid before the house, an account of the acquisitions made, or pretended to be made, by his Christian majesty on the coasts of Coromondel and Orissa, from between the years 1748 and 1763.

Mr. Dundas laid it down as general maxim, that whether our claims were to be decided by negotiation or the sword, still when our rights are clear and indisputable, nothing should be done or said by us to bring them into doubt, and yet he was afraid that such motions as the present could have no other tendency. No doubts had ever before been entertained on this subject, and he did not like to see that which was clear in principle made doubtful in debate. After taking a very accurate view of the rise and progress of our East Indian power, he inferred that we held our possessions in that country by right of conquest, which right we reconciled to the inhabitants by the wise respect paid to their prejudices. Whatever allowances we were inclined to make to the prejudices of the natives, whatever regulations we might think advisable, still, with respect to every European power, we might say distinctly, we have gained the country by our arms, and by cur arms we will keep it." Ever since the treaty of 1763, which acknowledged our sovereignty in Bengal,

66

Bahar,

Bahar, and Orissa, France had not the least right to interfere in that country. We were de facto sovereigns of a considerable portion of India, whereas France does not now possess an inch of ground there, except in virtue of the definitive treaty. He considered that it was the best policy not to renew those treaties, as we held by a clearer title, that of conquest and power. If France was disposed to revive old claims upon India, it was not to be supposed a few scraps of paper laid on the table of that house would prevent her; but it never could be reasonably supposed that the country would relinquish its just rights in India, let who would set up claims against them. We never wanted either arguments or strength to resist French encroachments on our sovereignty in India. He could not, however, see the policy in starting difficulties which France had never started, and arguing upon points which had not yet been disputed. He admitted that he did not himself approve of all the articles of the peace, but yet he would be sorry to labour to convince the nation that it was a bad peace. As ministers would be absolutely without apology, if they surrendered the sovereignty we possess in India, he recommended to the learned gentleman to put his motions in his pocket.

Mr. T. Grenville replied at some length to Mr. Dundas. He argued on the importance of having our rights ascertained and acknowledged by treaty. As to our rights in India, so far from their being perfectly clear, France has constantly

disputed them. He therefore conceived it highly imprudent to cede the Cape and Cochin to Holland, the dependent ally of France, untill at least France should, by the renewal of former treaties, acquiesce in those rights, which although no member of that house could doubt that we were entitled to, yet it was important that France should acknowledge.

Lord Hawkesbury opposed the production of the papers moved, as not considering that any grounds had been laid for an inquiry. It was true France, or any other power, might advance what claims they pleased; but there never was a time when it was less likely that France should advance such claims than at present. As to our sovereignty in India, it had been often formally acknowledged by France, and was now undisputed.

Mr. Jones said a few words against the motion; and,

Lord Temple supported it; contending that this country would have derived material advantages from the renewal of the treaties. The motion was then negatived without a division, as were several other motions brought forward by Dr. Lawrence, for other papers respecting the claims of the French in India, and the treaties which had now been suffered to expire. This was the last debate in parliament on the points preliminary to the discussion of the merits of the definitive treaty, which, on the next day, called forth the most important debate in both houses, which had taken place during that session, or perhaps in any other.

CHAP.

THE

HE important and long expected debate on the definitive treaty took place, on the 13th of May, in both houses. In the house of lords, after some previous observations by lord Stanhope, who moved that strangers should withdraw, (while he endeavoured to impress upon his noble audience, the dangers that might in future arise from the French nation having taken under their patronage the American, Fulton, the inventor of the batteau plongeur, or diving boat*,)

Lord Grenville rose, in order to make a motion respecting the treaty which was now for the consideration of the house. He and his noble friends, had already frequently advanced arguments against the treaty, while those whose duty it was to defend it had remained silent. It had been his opinion that repeated opportunities should have been taken for discussing the treaty, before its merits were to have been

decided on. His majesty's ministers, however, thought otherwise,and had hitherto remained silent. It might be asked, what was the use of discussion now? Was it wished to overturn the treaty which had been concluded? He should be sorry to bring forward any motion if he could not answer those questions. Whatever disadvantages might result from this unfortunate treaty, yet it had been made by that power, to whom the constitution had given the right of making treaties which should bind the country; it had been ratified by his majesty; the great seal of the kingdom had been put to it; and it would be adding dishonour to our disasters if we should now recede from it, or not carry it into full effect. The faith of the country must at all events be preserved. The first proposition he should make to the house was, to declare to his majesty their opinion, that the public faith was pledged to the observance of the

peace;

peace; that it was an obligation on the country to preserve it inviolable. After such a declaration, what objection could there remain to a discussion? Why should he not be allowed to urge the house to set a mark on those impolitic and weak ministers who had negotiated such a treaty, and whose counsels had concluded it? It was not his wish to disturb the treaty now it was made, but only to lay before the house the dangerous tendency of its provisions, that future ministers might be warned against advising a measure so disadvantageous to the country. He wished also to point out the dangers which this treaty brought upon the country, in order that we might adopt a true courage, by preparing to meet them. He therefore intended now to propose, that an address should be laid before his majesty, expressive of the determination of that house to preserve inviolate the treaty, and then to represent to his majesty the state of the country, the dangers which threatened it, and the means of avoiding them; for this purpose, he must advert to the arguments which had been used against the preliminary treaties, and the events which had taken place since. had already stated to the house his objections to the preliminaries; but if the definitive treaty had been conformable to the preliminaries and the relative situation of France and Spain, and the rest of Europe had remained the same, he should not now have proposed any new measure; but he now found that the terms of the definitive treaty were infinitely more prejudicial than those of the preliminaries. It had been already stated, that in all negotiations for peace, the basis

He

was either the status quo ante bellum, or the state before the war; or else the uti possidetis, or the condition of the country after the war. Instead of our negotiators proceeding distinctly on either of those grounds, they had applied them both in the manner the most prejudicial that was possible to this country: they had applied the first principle to England, who was to give up all she had taken during the war to France; and they applied the last principle to France, by allowing her to remain in possession of all she had since acquired. The arrangement which was to have been desired was, that we should have diminished the power of France on the continent, in proportion to the sacrifices we made with respect to the colonies we had ceded. Ministers, however, appeared to have made no attempt at weakening the power of France on the continent; but by the concessions they had made, had given France the power of weakening us in our colonial possessions. The great lord Chatham had adopted a different principle, when he said, that every preliminary treaty should be as definitive as possible. In the interval between the preliminaries and the definitive treaty, we had allowed a naval armistice, during which the French government, in spite of our entreaties and our threats, sent to the West Indies a considerable armament, which obliged us also to send a much greater force there than ever we had done during the war. The first fruits of the peace were, that we were under the necessity of keeping up a fleet of thirty-five sail of the line in the West Indies. Whether the expedition to St. Domingo was likely to be ultimately advanta

tageous