service ultimately reached such a degree of efficiency that thousands of troops have been transported seven thousand miles across the Pacific in sufficient comfort to have them ready for immediate field service on arrival.

With the signing of the protocol, it became necessary to reduce the forces, but as the Spanish army in Cuba was still intact, it was decided to proceed at once with the muster out of only 100,000 volunteers. The occupation of posts in Cuba to be evacuated by Spanish garrisons employed 50,000 troops. The question of withdrawing the volunteers from the Philippine Archipelago caused the War Department much concern. Peace once an accomplished official act, all volunteers would become entitled to discharge. The department concluded, therefore, to ask outright for a regular army of 100,000 men, and the House of Representatives passed a bill to that effect, but the minority in the Senate took up a line of speechmaking concerning the administration's Philippine policy and stifled the bill. To avoid an extra session, the minority was allowed to dictate a compromise of a temporary regular army and another force of volunteers. The muster out of the volunteers for the war with Spain was completed as rapidly as possible, having in mind the economy of the moment as well as protection from fraudulent claims for pensions in the future.

In the Philippines the army was confronted with many serious problems, the solution of which demanded a showing of well-organized force. The enlistment and transportation of volunteers to a scene of action ten thousand miles from their homes for a comparatively brief service, involved such an appalling expenditure of public funds that the President withheld his consent to the organization of the new regiments until conditions became so critical that the reënforcement could no longer be delayed. The excess of cost of this force of volunteers over what the cost would have been had regulars been employed, with the usual three years' enlistments, has been estimated by the various staff bureaus to be $16,374,009.04, quite an item even in these days of abounding prosperity. The new volunteer regiments were raised and commanded by regular officers, and were splendid organizations, but they were of necessity brought home and mustered out with an average of fifteen to eighteen months' service over sea, altogether a very expensive proceeding.

The exchange of troops in the Philippines to enable the volunteers who went out in the first expedition to come home, was effected during active insurrection which continued until a force of nearly 70,000 men was assembled in the Islands. The War Department has been subjected to much criticism concerning the conduct of the army while quelling the insurrection. While the Department has not come unscathed from the wordy conflict, the fact remains, if recent political events are correctly interpreted, that the army has never stood higher in the confidence and esteem of the people than now. Whatever motives may

have actuated the detractors of the army, it can only be regretted that the conduct of the Philippine campaigns has been made a matter of political controversy. In the years to come the names of the heroes of the swamp and jungle campaigns of the recent past will be found upon the pages of history with those of Yorktown, Molino del Rey, and the Wilderness.

It became evident that makeshift devices would no longer serve the purpose, and the Secretary of War presented the needs of the service in carefully prepared legislation, which, while not accomplishing everything desired, gave the Department a sufficient force to meet the urgent demands upon the army in Cuba, Porto Rico, the Philippines, Alaska, and at home. In addition to an increase of strength, the Department secured the long-contested-for three battalion organization for the infantry branch. The artillery was largely increased and merged into a corps which enabled the department to concentrate the defense of each harbor or district, including submarine adjuncts, under the control of the senior artillery officer.

The Secretary of War, after a careful study of the situation, with particular reference to the difficulties encountered at the outbreak of the war with Spain, urged and secured a change in the laws which had hitherto perpetuated the staff departments as close corporations by virtue of life appointments. A detail system was introduced which will gradually supersede the old method of permanent appointments.

The variegated character of the militia system in the past caused the entire force which volunteered in bodies at the outbreak of the war with Spain to be judged by the weakest and most inefficient organizations. This was unjust to many excellent regiments, but the penalty paid by them for the association may be considered very light if the knowledge gained by the country at large eventuates in the honest reformation of the whole system and the placing of the organized militia upon a basis of self-respecting efficiency. Even under the favorable legislation recently enacted, it will require a long time to perfect the details of the system which is intended to secure immediate and efficient service from the militia at the outbreak of war. Our forefathers dreamed of the militia as the bulwark of a nation, yet the system failed utterly in the War of 1812. The "Continentals" left an indelible impression on the pages of Revolutionary history. The Mexican war proved the value of United States Volunteers in contradistinction to militia, and the world never saw better armies than those composed of the volunteers of 1861 to 1865. The National Guard organizations were recognized in 1898, but no effort was made to call into service the "militia," as contemplated by the Constitution. In all proposed legislation for improving the militia many varying opinions are advanced as to interpretations of the Constitution. This does not obtain in regard to United States Volunteers, who, once mustered into the service, are on the same footing exactly as regulars,

except as to length of enlistment. At the outbreak of the war with Spain, Congress enacted that hereafter, in war, the army shall consist of the regular army and the volunteer army; in the former, enlistments are for three years, and in the latter for two years. This departure from the teachings of the Civil War was not called for by any emergency; an enlistment for "three years or the war" should be required of all volunteers, for, if this is not done, it makes it difficult to fill the ranks of old and valuable regular regiments where the three years' enlistment prevails. Ever since the spring of 1898 the officials of the War Department have discussed the confusion which arose at Tampa and elsewhere, and have constantly sought the best means of preventing a repetition of conditions which might lead to humiliation and temporary defeat in a war with an enterprising and audacious enemy. After mature consideration, the Secretary of War settled upon a plan for the establishment of a General Staff Corps, with a chief at its head who will be Chief of Staff for the whole army. Under this plan the misnamed office of Commanding General will disappear. It has ever been a delusion and a disappointment for the distinguished soldiers who have occupied it, with constant but fruitless efforts to invest the office with something more than a name. This is the final army reform of a general nature, to the accomplishment of which Secretary Root has devoted himself. It will be a fitting capstone to the long series of definite and comprehensive improvements secured in the War Department and army methods by the Secretary. The new scheme once in successful operation, all the business of the army will be brought under the advisory control of a selected and highly trained body of experts, who, working in harmony with all the bureau chiefs, should accomplish cooperation and achievement of the most satisfactory

character.

And now, with the advent of the third year of the new century, the great wave of prosperity which followed the close of the war with Spain, a not uncommon result of wars, has reached dimensions far beyond the expectations of the most optimistic of our public men. The extension of American commerce is following in the trail of war, and all our people are participating in its practical results. The conduct of our troops, and the frankness and honesty of our policies, in Cuba, the Philippines and China, has challenged the attention of the civilized world. American diplomacy, backed by our highly civilized and intelligent troops, has become a synonym for fair dealing and unswerving honesty. There is abundant cause for pride in the respect now entertained for the United States throughout the world, as evidenced by the treatment of our representatives. Resting under the ægis of the Constitution and an honest interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, there is no possibility of the military arm ever becoming a tool to subvert our own or the liberties of other people. Sophistry and concealment find no place in our treatment of other nations, and this country will fulfil its duties as a newly dis

covered world power with only such an army and navy as will prevent a decadence of the military art, and yet strong enough not to offer an invitation to attack.

SPEECH OF HON. ALBERT F. DAWSON ON NAVAL ADMINISTRATION 1

1

THE House being in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, and having under consideration the bill (H. R. 20471) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1909, and for other purposes —

Mr. Dawson said:

Mr. Chairman: We have heard the naval subject discussed here this afternoon from a scientific standpoint, a sentimental standpoint, and, I am almost tempted to add, from a hysterical standpoint. I would like to ask the committee at this hour to consider it from the business standpoint, and to direct attention to one of the most important questions in the whole naval service the question of naval administration.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a sentimental proposition; this is a great business proposition, involving as it does the expenditure of the $100,000,000 which we appropriate annually for this great arm of the national defense. Upon this problem of administration rests the question of whether these millions are expended economically and wisely or whether they shall be expended wastefully and extravagantly. But this question of naval administration, Mr. Chairman, is even more than a business proposition. It is a question which goes to the very root of the efficiency of the naval service itself; it has a most important bearing upon the efficiency of the material of the Navy; it is vital to whether or not we will have good guns, good ammunition and good ships; it is vital likewise to the personnel of the Navy, because on the question of administration depends the esprit de corps of the officers and men of the entire Navy.

It may be a matter of surprise to some Members of the House to know that the present administrative organization of the Navy Department is almost seventy years old. Is it any wonder, Mr. Chairman, with the tremendous advances that have been made, both in naval and in commercial matters, during these seventy years that the present administrative system in the Navy Department does not measure up to present-day business standards? I say, is it any wonder that this system of administration is outworn, out of date, and obsolete?

The present plan of administration in the Navy Department was

1 Congr. Record, Reported April 15, 1908.

adopted in 1842, and the law has been only slightly amended since. At that time, upon the recommendation of Secretary Upshur, Congress passed a law creating five bureaus in the Navy Department. Since that time three other bureaus have been added, with some rearrangement and readjustment of duties, and now we have in the Navy Department eight separate bureaus, as follows:

Navigation, having charge of the personnel and the movements of the fleet, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy.

Yards and Docks: The construction and maintenance of public works in navy yards and at naval stations.

Supplies and Accounts: Provisions, clothing, small stores, accounts, and pay of the Navy.

Medicine and Surgery: Its name explains its duties.

Construction and Repair: The ships' hulls, turrets, ammunition hoists, etc. Steam Engineering: Steam-propelling machinery of the ships.

Ordnance: Guns, ammunition, and parts of the electrical machinery on the ships.

Equipment: Equipment of ships, and supplying most of their electrical apparatus.

It should be remembered, Mr. Chairman, as we go along, that the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Bureau of Ordnance, and the Bureau of Equipment are the ones principally concerned in the construction and the repair of ships.

Under the law as it stands now it is provided that the orders of these chiefs of bureaus, pertaining to their respective duties, shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy, and "shall have full force and effect as such." Mark that. The orders of each chief of bureau shall have the full force and effect as though the orders had been issued by the Secretary of the Navy himself. In other words, instead of one head of Department we have under this old organization nine heads operating within one Department.

There is nothing in existing law which provides for any coöperation or any coördination among those several bureaus. Each is entirely independent, subject only to the Secretary himself. They all stand on an equal footing. Under the law each bureau may proceed in its own way according to the chief's idea of what is for the best interest of that bureau. The system is lacking in that one feature that is most essential for good administration and best results- there is no single controlling influence below the Secretary to correlate the work of the different bureaus. Thus responsibility is divided among eight different heads, which has the effect of there being practically no responsibility at all for the work as a whole. Secretary Moody, when he was at the head of that great Department, recognized and set forth in his annual report some of the defects of the system as he found them. What did he say?