Foundations of thofe Duties of Religion which we owe to him. According as a Man, apprehends God to be, fo muft his Efteem be of him, and his Demeanour towards him,

And whereas these great and neceffary Points, of fo much influence to Religion, have been usually treated of by others either too largely, by the inferting of several things lefs pertinent; or too obfcurely, by offering fuch Proofs concerning them as are less intelligible, or intermixing the Difcourfes about them with fuch Niceties as are neither very eafy to be folved, nor material for Men to know: I fhall therefore in this place endeavour to avoid both these Inconveniencies, by treating concerning each of them with all imaginable brevity and plainness: Obferving this Method,

First, I fhall endeavour to explain and defcribe what is meant by each Attribute; and then prove, that these Attributes, fo explained, muft belong to the Natural Notion of God. Which I fhall make out, both by the consent of the wifeft Heathens, exprefs'd by their declar'd Opinions, and by their general Practice fuitable thereunto: And from

the Nature of the things themfelves; their Congruity to the Principles of Reason, and the Abfurdities that will follow upon the de

nial of them.

Thofe

Thofe are called Incommunicable Attributes, which are proper to God alone, and not communicated to any Creature.

The First of thefe I have proposed to treat of, is his Abfolute Simplicity. By which I mean his Freedom from all kind of compofition or mixture, either of Principles or of Parts: And that this doth belong to the Natural Notion of the Deity, may be evident,

1. From Teftimony of the Heathen Philofophers, who do generally acknowledge him to be the FirftCaufe, and the moft Simple Being, and do frequently ftile him mens pura, & fincera fegregata ab omni concretione mortali, &c. And not only Scripture, but the very Heathen likewife do exprefs this Attribute by the Similitude of Light, amongst all vifible things the moft pure and fimple.

2. From Natural Reafon, by which it will appear, that God cannot be compounded of any Principles; because the Principles and Ingredients, which concur to the making of any thing, must be antecedent to that thing. And if the Divine Nature were compounded, it would follow that there must be fomething in Nature before him. Which is inconfiftent with his being the firft Caufe.

And here I shall take occafion to speak fomewhat concerning the Spirituality of the Divine Nature, as having some Affinity with this, though it be none of the incommunicable Attributes.

I know it hath been faid, with Confidence enough, that the Notion of a Spirit, or Immaterial Subftance, doth imply a Contradi&tion ; and that their is an utter Impossibility of any other Being befides Matter. But tho' this hath been faid, yet was it never proved, nor can it be, till either a Man be able to evince, that the Notion of the word Subftance, according to the moft general use of it (which gives Signification to Words) doth neceffarily imply Corporeity, than which nothing can be more falfe; or unless a Man fhall pretend to the certain Knowledge and Comprehenfion of all things that are or may be, than which nothing can be more

vain.

What the Pofitive Notion of a Spirit is, is not fo neceffary to enquire after, or determine. 'Tis fufficient, that we conceive of it by way of Negation: namely, that it is a Powerful Intelligent Being that is not Matter, without Figure or Parts, not capable of Rarefaction or Condensation, not vifible to our Bodily Eyes, and therefore not to be represented by any kind of fenfible Image: Not fubject to thofe neceffary Laws of Matter, which cannot move unless it be moved, and cannot but move when impelled by another. I fay, it may be sufficient in our apprehending the Spirituality of God, to remove all Corporeity and Figure in our Concepti

ons of him.

Now

Now that this Attribute doth belong to the Divine Nature, may be made evident both by Testimony and by Reason.

1. It hath been generally owned by the wisest and most learnedHeathens: PythagoDeira Dei, ras is often cited for this; by whom (faith cap. II. Lactantius) God was wont to be ftiled Incorporalis Mens, an Incorporeal Mind; and by Plato frequently ασώματος, Without a Body; by other Grecian Philofophers vs ngoμonds, the Mind that made the World: Plutarch ftiles him weisov eos, a separated Form, not mixed with Matter, without any thing in him that is paffible.

Tufcul.Qu.

lib.

I.

The Latin Philofophers do frequently give him the Attribute of mens divina, mens pura & fincera, mens foluta, & libera, fegregata ab omni concretione mortali.

2. By Reason. That Spirituality is a Perfection, and therefore to be afcribed unto God; or rather, that Corporeity is an Imperfection, and therefore to be removed from him, may appear from hence: Because the fuppofing of him to be Matter is inconfiftent with divers of his other most Effential Perfections: As,

1. His Immenfity. If we do suppose these two reasonable Poftulata: 1. That there are fome other things in the World befides God: And, 2. That two Bodies cannot be both at the fame Time in the fame Place. From whence it will follow, that whatever any

other

other Body or Matter is, from thence God must be excluded; and fo many Chasms or Breaches muft there be in the Divine Nature.

2. His Knowledge and Wifdom. It being not imaginable, how mere Matter should be able to comprehend, much less to contrive all that Variety of things in the World, paft, prefent, and to come.

3. His Liberty and Freedom, and confequently with his Goodness. That Action not being properly good, which is not done freely and out of choice. Now the Laws of Matter are necessary; there can be no ávnéσlov, or arbitrary Principle, in mere Matter. And it is worth Obfervation, how this very Argument puzzled Epicurus and his Followers, as is reprefented by Lucretius. If all material things move by neceffary Laws, and the parts of Matter be naturally fo difpos'd, that they do not move unless they be moved, and cannot but move when prefs'd upon by other parts that are in motion; whence comes that Liberty which we may by an inward Senfation perceive to be within us?

Unde eft hæc inquam fatis avolsa

voluntas?

To which he gives so wild and irrational an Anfwer, from the motion of declining Atoms,

as