much greater degrees hath it of moral Good or Evil. To which we ought to proportion our Inclination or Averfion.

There is in fome things fuch a natural Decency and Fitnefs, as doth render them moft agreeable to our Reason, and will be fufficient to recommend them to our Practice; abstracting from all confiderations of reward: As in loving those who are kind to us, and from whom we receive benefit: In compensating Good with Good, and not with Evil.

It is moft fuitable both to the Reafon and Intereft of Mankind, that every one should submit themselves to him, upon whom they depend for their Well-being, by doing fuch things as may render them acceptable to him.

It is a defirable thing for a Man to have the affiftance of others in his need and distress. And 'tis not reasonable for him to expect this from others, unless he himself be willing to fhew it to others.

Axiom 3. The rational Nature and the Perfection belonging to it being more noble than the Senfitive: Therefore Moral Good is to be preferred before Natural; and that which is Morally Evil is more to be hated and avoided, than that which is Natural.

Axiom 4. A prefent natural Good may be parted with upon a probable Expectation of a future Moral Good.

Axiom 5. A prefent natural Evil is to be endured for the probable avoiding of a future moral Evil.

CHAP.

CHA P. III.

Some Propofitions necessary to be premised for the removing of feveral Prejudices in debates about Religion.

BE

Efides what hath been already fuggefted concerning the first Foundations to be laid, in order to a Discourse about Natural Religion, I fhall in the next place offer to Confideration thefe Seven following Propo fitions, as being very proper to prevent or obviate the Cavils of fceptical captious

Men.

1. Such things as in themselves are equally true and certain, may not yet be capable of the fame kind or degree of Evidence as to us. As for Inftance, That there was fuch a Man as King Henry the Eighth ; that there are fuch Places as America, or China. I say, these things may in themselves be equally true and certain with thofe other Matters, That we now fee, and are awake; That the three Angles in a Triangle are equal to two right ones. Though for the First of these we have only the Teftimony of others, and human Tradition; whereas for the other we have fenfitive Proof, and mathematical Demonstration. And the reafon is, because all C 2 Truths

I.

2.

Ariftot.

Truths are in themselves equal, according to that ordinary Maxim, Veritas non recipit magis & minus. And therefore nothing can be more irrational than for a Man to doubt of, or deny the Truth of any thing, because it cannot be made out by fuch kind of Proofs of which the Nature of fuch a thing is not capable. A Man may as well deny there is any fuch thing as Light or Colour, because he cannot hear it; or Sound, because he cannot fee it, as to deny the truth of other things because they cannot be made out by sensitive or demonftrative Proofs. The kinds of Probation for several things being as much disproportioned, as the objects of the feveral Senfes are to one another.

2. Things of feveral kinds may admit and Eth.lib. 1.require feveral forts of proofs, all which may cap. 3. be good in their kind. The Philosopher hath lib. 1.cap. long ago told us, that according to the divers

ult.

Nature of things, fo muft the Evidences for them be; and that it is an Argument of an undifciplin'd Wit, not to acknowledge this. He that is rational and judicious will expect no other kind of Arguments in any cafe than the subject-matter will bear. How incongruous would it be for a Mathematician to perfuade with Eloquence, to ufe all imaginable Infinuations and Entreaties, that he might prevail with his hearers to believe that three and three make fix? It would be altogether as vain and improper in matters belonging to an

Orator

in Sym

bol. 25.

Orator to pretend to ftrict Demonstration. All things are not capable of the fame kind of Evidence. Though the Conclufions in Mathematicks, by reafon of the abftracted nature of those Sciences, may be demonstrated by the clearest and most unquestionable way of Probation to our Reafon; yet it is not rational to expect the like Proof, in fuch other matters as are not of the like nature. This he himself applies to Moral things, which being not of such simple abftracted Natures, but depending upon mixed circumftances, are not therefore capable of fuch kind of demonstrative Proofs. 'Tis a Saying of Jambli-Protrept. cus, That Demonftrations are not to be expected in matters concerning God and divine things. Nor is this any greater prejudice to the certainty of fuch things, than it is that God is invifible. And thus likewise it is, for the fame reason, with many particular Conclufions in Natural Philofophy. And as for matters of Fact, concerning Times, Places, Perfons, Actions, which depend upon Story and the relation of others, these things are not capable of being proved by fuch fcientifical Principles as the others are. Now no fober Man can deny but that feveral things in Moral and in Natural Philofophy are in themselves as abfolutely and as certainly true, and as firmly believed by us, as any Mathematical Principle or Conclufion can be. From whence I infer this, That it is not, ought not

3.

to be, any prejudice to the Truth or Certain-
ty
of any thing, that it is not to be made out
by fuch kind of Proofs, of which the na-
ture of that thing is not capable, provided it
be capable of fatisfactory Proofs of another
kind.

3. When a thing is capable of good proof in any kind, Men ought to rest fatisfy'd in the beft evidence for it, which that kind of things will bear, and beyond which better could not be expected, fuppofing it were true. They ought not to expect either fenfible proof, or Demonstration for fuch Matters as are not capable of fuch Proofs, fuppofing them to be true: Because otherwise nothing must be affented to and believed, but that which hath the highest Evidence: All other things being to be looked upon as uncertain and doubt. ful, and wholly excluded from all poffibility of being known. And at this rate, Men must believe nothing at all in Story; because fuch things cannot be demonftrated; and 'tis poffible that the reft of Mankind might have combined together to impofe upon them by thefe Relations, And how abhorrent fuch Sceptical Principles muft needs be to common Reason, I need not fay. Those who will pretend fuch kind of grounds for their disbelief of any thing, will never be able to perfuade others, that the true Caufe why they do not give their affent, is; because they have no reafon for it; but because they have

no