Russia expends upon naval operations in a war with Great Britain and France, the better for herself.

It is often assumed that their privations vill make this war unpopular among the subjects of the Czar. But what evidence have we of this? Is the possession of Constantinople an object of national or merely of imperial ambition in Russia? Allusion has been made as the assassination of the Emperor Paul in 1801. But there is no parallel between that crisis and the present. Paul was believed to be insane and unfit to govern. He had deeply offended his nobles by a sudden alliance with the revolutionary government of France, and by various acts of atrocious tyranny. Nor were there then the facilities for overland trade, by means of which Russian produce now finds its way into foreign ports in spite of "effective blockades." "There are," says the Economist of the 20th inst., "great differences of opinion as to the injury done governments by the stoppage of trade, but it is evident from the case of the Finns, that this mode of carrying on the war exasperates the suffering individuals, and very often makes them transfer their indignation from their own government to the government which is the immediate cause of their annoyance." This remark is perhaps entitled to the more weight, as that journal appeared during last year to favor stringent restrictions upon Russian commerce. It has indeed been admitted on all sides, that the blockades and captures of 1854 effected little towards such an impoverishment of the resources of Russia as could seriously embarrass the Czar in the prosecution of the war. Quite opposite conclusions have been drawn as to our policy during its

continuance.

There are three courses which may be taken, should it be thought expedient to alter the regulations in force under the orders in council of last spring. First, the Government may revive the right to capture enemy's property in neutral vessels. The objections to this course need not be repeated; but it may be here remarked in reference to the restrictions in force last year, that the more effectually they are carried out, the more nearly they approach to the ancient system, and tend to produce the evils to our trade and our relations with neutral states, on account of which that system was abandoned. And the wider the surface over which we extend our endeavours to suppress the commerce of the enemy, the greater the distraction and dissipation of our naval power.

A second course which the Government has been called upon to take is, to stop the overland Russian trade by a blockade of the PRUSSIAN ports. That so monstrous a proposition, so flagrant a violation of international law should be entertained for a moment, affords a melancholy example how one false principle leads to another, and how completely the passions kindled by war blind our perceptions of our true interests, and of the limits of our power. Could the Czar's invasion of the principalities be excused upon a more shameless pretext? Should we diminish the proportion of his power and resources to ours, by arraying on his side the armies and resources of Prussia? Is it an object of British policy that the armies of France should march to the Rhine? Or can any one suppose that a blockade of the Prussian ports would prevent the produce of

Russia from finding its way by the railway and the Elbe to our own? There is still a third course which we may take. This is to assimilate maritime warfare to hostilities on land; to abandon the right of capturing private property other than contraband of war, holding it equally sacred in the ships of our enemy's subjects as in their fields and houses, and to blockade only in the case of a maritime siege, or in order to intercept supplies manifestly intended for military and naval use; i. e. in fact, to establish only military as distinguished from commercial blockades.

In order to carry out this system, it would not be necessary to permit the merchant-ships of Russia to enter our ports without restraint. Direct trade beteen Russia and British ports might be deemed inexpedient, even if commercial intercourse through neutral ports, or under other restrictions as to the place and manner of communication, should be permitted.

It is commonly supposed that a state of war is essentially inconsistent with commercial intercourse of any kind. But does any one suppose it to be contrary to the nature of war, for British subjects to buy Russian commodities in the Crimea, and to give the subjects of the Czar a handsome profit on what they sell? As to maritime commerce being inconsistent with maritime war, that is the question at issue. Persons may found their notions of war upon the usages of the ancient Greeks, who put to death the crews of the merchant-ships of their enemies; or upon the state of civilization and of political and military science in the latter half of the nineteenth century of the Christian era. The orders in council of last spring legalised indirect trade with the enemy's subjects, which appeared to Lord Stowell utterly inconsistent with the legal theory of war. Yet even Lord Stowell admitted that "there may be occasions on which commercial intercourse, which is a partial suspension of war, may be highly expedient."—The Hoop, 1 Rob. 196. And in Lord Stowell's time, direct trade between France and England was frequently licensed by the governments of both countries, in the midst of the most furious hostilities. But special licences to particular traders are open to many objections. They create monopolies, occasion many frauds, and do not secure the licensed merchant from capture by the enemy's cruisers, but only by those of his own country and its allies.

Much confusion of ideas has arisen from the application of the term enemy to the whole population of a hostile state, as, for example, in the old maxim that "enemy's ships make enemy's goods." A use of words originating in actual facts and customs becomes often in after times an abuse of words, which tends to perpetuate facts and customs that would otherwise be repudiated with horror. To treat all the subjects of the enemy as enemies would be to abandon all distinction between combatants and non-combatants, would make the war of civilized nations that of savages, and would legalize the barbarity of the Russian soldiers in putting their wounded prisoners to death, on the ground of military expediency, as our soldiers are fewer and more valuable than theirs, and they lose by an exchange of prisoners.

There was formerly a valid reason for excluding an enemy's sub

jects from all communication with our own, viz. that information might be obtained which the enemy might turn to political or military account. But it is idle to talk of excluding information by such means, in the days of the electric telegraph and the press of 1855.

It has, however, been argued that merchant-ships may be used by the enemy as transports and munitions of war, and are, therefore, properly subject to confiscation as contraband of war. It is very desirable that the doctrine of contraband of war should be defined by international convention. But even according to the stringent rules of our maritime courts in the last war, it is not the possibility of a future use of a thing for hostile purposes, but its obvious and immediate destination that makes it contraband. Otherwise every commercial commodity would be liable to be treated, on all occasions, as contraband of war; for there is not one which human ingenuity or necessity might not, under some circumstances, turn to account for offensive or defensive purposes, or for assisting an attacking or resisting force.

It need not be supposed that Great Britain would stand alone in an endeavour to abolish the capture of private property at sea. The last message to Congress of the President of the United States affirms that the states "will readily meet the leading powers of Europe on this broad ground;" and so long ago as 1785, Franklin declared that the United States offered "to conclude in all their treaties with other powers, an article solemnly engaging that in case of a war, unarmed merchant-ships on both sides shall pursue their voyage unmolested." And hitherto every other European state has shown more disposition than Great Britain to soften the laws of maritime war.

It is indeed but natural that other states should seize every opportunity of securing their commerce against our superior naval power. Yet surely the British islands, dependent for their resources upon commerce, and with unfortified harbours all round their coasts, could have few better defences against the contingencies of war, than a rule of international law that the merchant-vessels and unresisting towns should be safe from plunder. It is true, our fleets seem sufficient to protect our shores and trade from Russian hostility; but is it wise to found our views of international policy upon our present position with regard to Russia? Are hostilities with the United States and the use of swift American privateers out of the question? Could no change in the employment of the French navy result from the death of the present emperor, or the course of political events? What effect would another American non-intercourse act have upon the position of Great Britain? And what laws of maritime war would be for our interests in a contest in which we should be neutral, and France, Russia, and America belligerents? But the maxims of political wisdom are not called into the councils of belligerent nations. The tactics which seem fittest in an angry hour are adopted as the basis of permanent legislation for national interests and international rights. We are tempted by every prospect of inflicting injury on an enemy's country, without regard either to the immediate or ultimate consequences

to ourselves, and without reference to the sentiments and rights of neutral states. If we could utterly destroy the foreign trade of Russia, we should turn friends into furious enemies, we should inflict permanent injury upon our own commerce and maritime power, and we should do more to render the present and every future war, however just, unpopular in this country, than any amount of suffering we could entail would do in Russia. The gradual impoverishment of some of the Russian provinces would be felt by ourselves, on the return of peace, in the loss of customers and materials for our trade; but it is not the course by which to reduce speedily and effectually the military power of the Czar. His naval power, it is said, must be crippled by the suppression of the maritime commerce of his empire. His naval power may be much more promptly suppressed by more direct means. And the facts of this war have amply verified the observation of a statistician many years ago, that "any attempt on the part of Russia to cope with the great naval powers, would be a most improvident waste of the national resources." So, too, De Custine has observed: "the English call a vessel of the royal navy a man-of-war. Never thus will the Russians be able to denominate their ships of parade, their men of court or wooden courtiers."

Both Russia and England have fallen into an error as to the mode in which the battle between tyranny and civilization must be fought. The former has wasted an enormous outlay upon ships of war which she has been obliged to convert into awkward harbour-booms and land batteries; and the latter has employed a fleet of steamers of the largest size, to capture a few cargoes of salt, some belonging to the poor Finns, and some to the Swedes and Danes. Had Great Britain, from the moment that war became imminent, concentrated all her energies and resources upon the measures necessary for conquests on the northern shores of Russia, and the capture of Sebastopol, these results would have been obtained with far less sacrifice of our heroic soldiers, while they would have tended to quench the lust of conquest, and belief in their destiny to overcome the world, which animate the Russian people, without severing the only tie that connects the empire to which they belong with the peace and interests of Europe. That tie is commerce, yet it is especially on the men who have framed it that we are told the burden of war should fall. Why should one class, which has done more than all others to promote peace, be called upon to make unparalleled sacrifices in war? "The political system of Russia," says De Custine, "could not stand twenty years' free communication with the rest of Europe." And who have been the missionaries who have labored to diffuse civilization through the farthest provinces of the Russian empire? Who but the merchants of the world, most of all of Great Britain, and not least of all of Russia herself; and yet it is on them that the chief cost of a Russian war upon the liberties of Europe is to be inflicted! Who but her merchants have won for England her maritime power, her high place among nations, and the might with which she can do battle in a just cause? And have they only established a claim to be the chief sufferers in every struggle?

Let no provocation tempt us to snap the ties that connect us with the peaceful subjects even of hostile and despotic states; let us seek in political science instead of in the usages of former wars our views of national policy and international law, and we shall become a greater, a more secure, and a more honoured people than by the ruin of the Russian empire.

III.-The Relative Expediency of defraying the expense of War by Loans or by Increased Taxation, considered with reference to the present financial system of the United Kingdom.-By Richard Hussey Walsh, LL.B., Professor of Political Economy in the University of Dublin.

[Read 16th April, 1855.]

HAVE WE A RIGHT TO TAX SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS?-When discussing the relative expediency of defraying extraordinary public expenditure by loans or by immediate taxation, it is sometimes sought to dispose of the question in limine by denying the right of an existing community to shift their pecuniary liabilities on those who come after them. But in this it is overlooked that in the political struggles which give rise to national debts, future as well as present interests are generally involved, and often to a greater extent. For instance, if the war now in progress had not been undertaken, and Russia allowed to go on in the ambitious career she is said to have marked out, a considerable time must have elapsed before she could have sufficiently extended and consolidated her power as to be in a position to endanger our territorial possessions or interfere with our commerce. The next and succeeding generations would be far more exposed to such injurious results than the present, and accordingly the expense of the war must be deemed to be incurred rather for their protection than our

own.

Should it, therefore, be found necessary to make them bear a part of it, they can have no just reason to complain.

UNDER OUR OWN FINANCIAL SYSTEM IS IT ADVISABLE TO DEFRAY A

LARGE AMOUNT OF EXTRA EXPENDITURE BY IMMEDIATE TAXATION EX

CLUSIVELY?—It is one thing to maintain that future generations may justly be burthened with a national debt, and quite another to assert that it is advisable to meet extra public expenditure by borrowing rather than by increased taxation. Prudence dictates that present liabilities should be satisfied by immediate sacrifices on the part of the people, and the resources of the future left free and unincumbered to bear whatever demands on them may arise. To carry out this principle in financial administration would be in itself extremely desirable; but occasionally it may be impossible to pursue such a course, and even were it otherwise, there might be countervailing disadvantages which merit our serious attention. do not intend entering upon all the questions arising in connexion with this subject; but I shall confine myself chiefly to one which stands particularly in need of development, because, although the circumstances on which its importance depends possess little novelty,

I