To A. T. A. TORBERT, FIRST REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS, Colonel First Regiment New Jersey Volunteers: SIR-On Sunday morning, March 9th, I was ordered by General KEARNY to take two, companies and proceed to Farr's Cross-roads, by the Old Braddock road, and there wait for reinforcements from Fairfax Station. I arrived at the Cross-roads about noon. My command consisted of companies B and E. At the Cross-roads we discerned the enemy's cavalry on a hill near the Court House; but, having positive orders to remain at the Cross-roads, I did not feel at liberty to pursue them. However, I sent out a small detachment, under command of Lieutenant TANTUM, in order to get as near the enemy as possible, under cover of the pines, so as to watch their movements. By so doing we found that the enemy was moving back and forth from the Court House to the old Braddock road, a distance of about one mile. At four o'clock the Fourth New Jersey, under Colonel SIMPSON, came up, when we marched to the Court House-the two companies under my command were deployed as skirmishers. When near the Court House, by order of General KEARNY, we marched on at double-quick, and I may also add that the enemy did the same, only in an opposite direction. I then received orders from General KEARNY to march back to the Crossroads and join my regiment, and there bivouacked for the night. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed), DAVID HATFIELD, Major First Regiment New Jersey Volunteers. FIRST REGIMENT NEW JERSEY VOLUNTEERS, To A. T. A. TORBERT, Colonel First Regiment New Jersey Volunteers: SIR-I have the honor to report that I was ordered by Lieutenant-Colonel McALLISTER, on Monday morning, 10th instant, at half-past eight A. M., while stationed at Farr's Cross-roads, to take my command and proceed cautiously up the Braddock road towards Centreville, and after passing our pickets, to send out an advance guard; which I did, sending Lieutenant WILLIAM H. TANTUM on with fourteen men. I was also furnished with four cavalrymen, to act as a patrol, and to report to him at intervals, as we proceeded. I received the first communication from Lieutenant TANTUM when at Cedar Run, which I forwarded to Lieutenant-Colonel MCALLISTER, saying that he had possession of five contrabands, and had caught up with the four scouts sent in advance. Lieutenant TANTUM halted with his guard until I brought up my reserve; he then advanced about a mile, when I received word that appearances were favorable, to come on with all possible dispatch, as he would be in Centreville in an hour. The message I immediately sent to Lieutenant-Colonel MCALLISTER, and proceeded on. Lieutenant TANTUM arrived at Centreville about half-past eleven A. M., where he immediately posted four sentries in different places in the village-one at each of three forts. I arrived there at fifteen minutes after twelve o'clock, noon, and took possession of General JOHNSTON's headquarters, and there awaited the arrival of the First Regiment, which came in about four o'clock P. M. The New York Forty-fourth Regiment arrived at about half-past three o'clock P. M. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, (Signed), S. VAN SICKELL, Captain Company B, First Regiment New Jersey Volunteers. THE neglect of MCCLELLAN to take advantage of this success (detailed in the preceding chapter) by immediately following up the retiring and, to all appearance, surprised enemy completely satisfied General KEARNY of his (MCCLELLAN'S) incompetency. From thenceforward his opinion of him was fixed. "The stupid fact is (he writes March 17th, 1862), that, not content with letting me and others push on after the panic-stricken enemy, fighting him a big battle, and ending the war for his panic promised us sure successMCCLELLAN, so powerful with figures, but so weak with men, has brought us all back. It is so like our good old nursery story "The King of France, with twice ten thousand men, Marched up the hill, and then marched down again.' The result will be, that, in Southern character, they will more than recuperate, - more than think us afraid of a real stand-up fight, meet us at the prepared points, possibly play ugly tricks at the capital, and nonplus or force us to fight with the worst of chances against us; and all this, because when MCCLELLAN, out of confidence since his failure at Ball's Bluff, despairing of a direct attack on Manassas, invented, with the aid of engineers (men who are ignorant of soldiers), the plan of turning the enemy by a sea-route, instead of availing himself of the good luck of the enemy's retreat, thinks that he must still adhere to his sea-plan, like the over-stuffed glutton who thinks he must cram because he has in hand an 'embarras des richesses.'" March 31st he writes, sketching a campaign* for the enemy, which was not attempted till POPE's time: "The war of 1806 broke out; and the Prussians, proud of their former fame, took the field against NAPOLEON. MASSENBACH, then a colonel, was Quartermaster-General to Prince HоHENLOHE's army, and, as the storm-clouds of battle drew on towards oach other, foretold, with wonderful clearness, accuracy and precision, the ruin which the measures in progress were certain to bring upon the army and the country! Looking back to these terrible times, trying the avowed and registered predictions delivered "Our present affair is a terrific blunder. Instead of following up, overtaking and whipping the enemy as they retired panic-st icken, he is attempting an affair of rivers. I do not know his full means of action; but I do know that, if opposed with enterprise, the Southern army, recuperated under the plea of our evading a real fight, will seize Centreville and Manassas, just in rear of forces left on the Rappahannock, cut them off, restore the uninjured railroad, steam via Harper's Ferry to Baltimore and Washington, and be back in time to meet us before Richmond;* because the batteries on the York and James rivers, if as formidable as the captured resources of Norfolk should have made them in guns, will oblige us (if we have no iron-armored gunboats) to land our heavy pieces and take them piecemeal (besides expending thus gratuitously much bloodf), all which takes time. I can only account for this absurd movement from General MCCLELLAN and his advisers not having sufficient simplicity of character. It would have been so beautiful to have pushed after the enemy, and, in doing so, isolate Fredericksburg, carry it easily, occupy that road, and thus turn those river batteries, all the while near enough to Washington in case of any attempt on it. They will tell you that it was a want of subsistence, etc. This only proves how unpractical MCCLELLAN and his advisers are. And it is precisely from a mismanagement of these simple details in our own camps on the Potomac that I have the more and more learned to distrust him entirely. However, JOHNSTON is a very slow man, and our resources are enormous, so we must win, and MCCLELLAN will, no doubt, pass down in history as a great general. What annoys me the most is, that he has stupidly blundered in carrying out his own plans. We should, at least, have kept the enemy impressed with the idea of our direct advance, and withdrawn division after division in the stealthiness of night, and under the curtain of strong corps." This was an early day for such criticism. They meant what GRANT afterwards painfully executed. Some 200,000 men lay 'round Washington then. The rebel force was barely 40,000. day after day by MASSENBACH, in the Prussian council of war, by the subsequent events, we are, in profane languages, bound to confess that no man ever spoke before in a more perfect spirit of prophecy. All that he foretold came to pass to the letter." In the same way VON BULOW.-Gen. MITCHELL'S "Biographies of Eminent Soldiers," 319. "MASSENA," he (SOUVAROFF) says, in a memorandum on the subject, "has no object in waiting for us when he can beat us in detail. He will first throw himself upon KORSAKOFF, who is nearest to him, and then upon CONDÉ, and that will probably be enough for him." How just was the prophecy.-Gen. MITCHELL'S "Biographies of Eminent Soldiers," 157. "The celebrated SOUVAROFF was accused of cruelty, because he always at once stormed fortresses instead of investing them and starving out the inhabitants and the garrisons. The old hero showed, by arithmetical calculations, that his bloodiest assaults never occasioned so much loss of human life as did, on both sides, any long seige, digging and approaches, and the starving out of those shut up in a fortress. This for MCCLELLAN."-GUROWSKI's Diary, Vol. I, page 164; February, 1862. 254 BIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP KEARNY. The direct advance would have been necessarily overwhelming ; no manœuvers could have resisted it. Looking back, and with the knowledge we now possess, we know that, undertaken then, the direct advance must have been speedily successful, economizing rivers of blood and thousands of lives. Says POLLARD in his Lost Cause, page 262: "On March 1st, 1862, the number of Federal troops in and about Washington had increased to 193,142 fit for duty, with a grand aggregate of 221,987. Let us see what was in front of it on the Confederate line of defense. General JOHNSTON had in the camps of Centreville and Manassas less than 30.000 men; STONEWALL JACKSON had been detached with eleven skeleton regiments to amuse the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley. Such was the force that stood in MCCLELLAN's path, and deterred him from a blow that, at that time, might have been fatal to the Southern Confederacy." We have said that MCCLELLAN seemed but ill satisfied with the sudden and skillful movement of KEARNY upon Manassas. Perhaps it was in consequence of this; but, whatever the reason, in a few days after he tendered him a command (to which, as numbered fourteen on the list of brigadiers, he was long entitled) of a division, vacated by the promotion of General SuxNER to a corps. General KEARNY was more than glad to accept, only desiring that, inasmuch as his FIRST JERSEY BRIGADE had been perfected by such toil, expense and zeal, he should be at liberty to carry it with him, exchanging it for one of SUMNER'S, which lay close by FRANKLIN, and the consent of whose brigadier was obtained. General MCCLELLAN did not discourage the project, but General FRANKLIN at once rejected it, upon which General KEARNY, feeling his JERSEY BLUES to be a trust especially confided to him, and realizing their adoration of him, most generously declined the proposition, and, ranking many division generals, remained with his brigade. This conduct was rewarded, as might readily be expected. As soon as it was known, in spite of orders to avoid all demonstrations, the enthusiasm of his brave boys could not be restrained. His appearance was the signal for irrepressible cheering. His men would have followed him, or gone at his bidding anywhere, against any odds; "nor did a Jersey soldier ever forget it." Another writer thus expresses the same idea, but in such elegant language that it will bear insertion, even at the risk of repetition: "Just about the time the overland advance was thus abandoned for 'an affair of rivers,' General KEARNY was offered the command of a division. He was more thau glad to accept the honor, on one condition: that the 'Jersey Blues' should be embraced in his command. MCCLELLAN was not unwilling, but FRANKLIN rejected the proposition, and KEARNY determined to remain brigadier and command his own brave boys. The effect of this decision on his brigade can be imagined. It gave him boundless control over their sympathies and their conduct. He could not ride down the line on parade without arousing cheers from every company. They would have followed him (as his Dragoons did follow him up to the gate of Mexico, and as his men did always everywhere until he fell at their head) into the charge at Balaklava, Though Into the jaws of death, Cannon to right of them, Volleyed and thundered." " With all this, the step caused General KEARNY much regret. His subordination to men of much less military experience than his own perpetually annoyed him. He had strong reliance upon his own powers, a reliance which was by no means conceited, and which was afterward strongly justified. Feeling himself equal to almost any task, he could not help longing to take the place of some one of those whom, in his confidential correspondence, he styled his "inferior superiors." It was some alleviation to his disappointment, and the state of harassed feeling which his inferior position occasioned, to find himself valued as he was by NEW JERSEY and its LEGISLATURE. How much its patriotic Executive regarded him he was not then aware, and his correspondence betrayed an unjust opinion upon that subject. But the Press, the People and the Legislature of NEW JERSEY, all exhibited their admiration and attachment for him in such a manner as could not be otherwise than gratifying. On the 20th of March, 1862, the LEGISLATURE passed a RESOLUTION, declaring— |