Orleans, as had been suggested by the supposed interest or caprice of the Spanish government, or of its representatives in America. The eyes of the inhabitants adjacent to the waters which emptied into that river, were turned down it, as the only channel through which the surplus produce of their luxuriant soil could be conveyed to the markets of the world. Believing that the future wealth and prosperity of their country depended on the use of that river, they gave some evidence of a disposition to drop from the confederacy, if this valuable acquisition could not otherwise be made. This temper could not fail to be viewed with interest by the neighbouring powers, who had been encouraged by it, and by the im becility of the government, to enter into intrigues of an alarming nature. Previous to his departure from Mount Vernon, the President had received intelligence, too authentic to be disregarded, of private machinations by real or pretended agents both of Spain and Great Britain, which were extremely hostile to the peace, and to the integrity of the union.

Spain had intimated that the navigation of the Mississippi could never be conceded, while the inhabitants of the western country remained connected with the Atlantic states, but might be freely granted to them, if they should form an independent empire.

On the other hand, a gentleman from Canada, whose ostensible business was to repossess himself of some lands on the Ohio which had been formerly granted to him, frequently discussed the vital importance of the navigation of the Mississippi, and privately assured several individuals of great influence, that if they were disposed to assert their rights, he was authorized by Lord Dorchester, the governor of Canada, to say, that they might rely confidently on his assistance. With the aid it was in his power to give, they might seize New Orleans, fortify the Balise at the mouth of the Mississippi, and maintain themselves in that place against the utmost efforts of Spain.

The probability of failing in any attempt to hold the mouth of the Mississippi by force, and the resentments against Great Britain which prevailed generally throughout the western country, diminished the danger to be apprehended from any machinations of that power; but against those of Spain, the same security did not exist.

In contemplating the situation of the United States in their relations not purely domestic, the object demanding most immediate consideration was the hostility of several tribes of Indians. The military strength of the nations who inhabited the country between the lakes, the Mississippi, and the Ohio, was computed at five thousand men, of whom about fifteen hundred were at open war with the United States. Treaties had been

concluded with the residue; but the attachment of young savages to war, and the provocation given by the undistinguishing vengeance which had been taken by the whites in their expeditions into the Indian country, furnished reasons for apprehending that these treaties would soon be broken.

In the south, the Creeks, who could bring into the field six thousand fighting men, were at war with Georgia. In the mind of their leader, the son of a white man, some irritation had been produced by the confiscation of the lands of his father, who had resided in that state; and several other refugees whose property had also been confiscated, contributed still further to exasperate the nation. But the immediate point in contest between them was a tract of land on the Oconee, which the state of Georgia claimed under a purchase, the validity of which was denied by the Indians.

The regular force of the United States was less than six hundred

men.

Not only the policy of accommodating differences by negotiation which the government was in no condition to terminate by the sword; but a real respect for the rights of the natives, and a regard for the claims of justice and humanity, disposed the President to endeavour, in the first instance, to remove every cause of quarrel by a treaty; and his message to congress on this subject evidenced his preference of pacific

measures.

Possessing many valuable articles of commerce for which the best market was often found on the coast of the Mediterranean, struggling to export them in their own bottoms, and unable to afford a single gun for their protection, the Americans could not view with unconcern the dispositions which were manifested towards them by the Barbary powers. A treaty had been formed with the emperor of Morocco; but from Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, peace had not been purchased; and those regencies consider all as enemies to whom they have not sold their friendship. The unprotected vessels of America presented a tempting object to their rapacity; and their hostility was the more terrible, because by their public law, prisoners become slaves.

The United States were at peace with all the powers of Europe; but controversies of a delicate nature existed with some of them, the adjustment of which required a degree of moderation and firmness, which there was reason to fear, might not, in every instance, be exhibited.

The early apprehensions with which Spain had contemplated the future strength of the United States, and the consequent disposition of the house of Bourbon to restrict them to narrow limits, have been already

noticed. After the conclusion of the war, the attempt to form a treaty with that power had been repeated; but no advance towards an agreement on the points of difference between the two governments had been made. A long and intricate negotiation between the secretary of foreign affairs, and Don Guardoqui, the minister of his Catholic majesty, had terminated with the old government; and the result was an inflexible adherence on the part of Mr. Guardoqui to the exclusion of the citizens of the United States from navigating the Mississippi below their southern boundary. On this point there was much reason to fear that the cabinet of Madrid would remain immoveable. The violence with which the discontents of the western people were expressed, furnished Spain with additional motives for perpetuating the evil of which they complained. Aware of the embarrassments which this display of restlessness must occasion, and sensible of the increased difficulty and delay with which a removal of its primary cause must be attended, the executive perceived in this critical state of things, abundant cause for the exercise of its watchfulness, and of its prudence. With Spain, there was also a contest respecting boundaries. The treaty of peace had extended the limits of the United States to the thirty-first degree of north latitude, but the pretensions of the Catholic King were carried north of that line, to an undefined extent. He claimed as far as he had conquered from Britain, but the precise limits of his conquest were not ascertained.

The circumstances attending the points of difference with Great Britain, were still more serious; because, in their progress, a temper unfavourable to accommodation had been uniformly displayed.

The resentments produced by the various calamities war had occasioned, were not terminated with their cause. The idea that Great Britain was the natural enemy of America had become habitual. Believing it impossible for that nation to have relinquished its views of conquest, many found it difficult to bury their animosities, and to act upon the sentiment contained in the declaration of independence, " to hold them as the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends." In addition to the complaints respecting the violation of the treaty of peace, events were continually supplying this temper with fresh aliment. The disinclination which the cabinet of London had discovered to a commercial treaty with the United States was not attributed exclusively to the cause which had been assigned for it. It was in part ascribed to that jealousy with which Britain was supposed to view the growing trade of America.

The general restrictions on commerce by which every maritime power sought to promote its own navigation, and that part of the European system in particular, by which each aimed at a monopoly of the

trade of its colonies, were felt with peculiar keenness when enforced by England. The people of America were perhaps the more sensible to the British regulations on this subject, because, having composed a part of that empire, they had grown up in the habit of a free intercourse with all its ports; and, without accurately appreciating the cause to which a change of this usage was to be ascribed, they attributed it to a jealousy of their prosperity, and to an inclination to diminish the value of their independence. In this suspicious temper, almost every unfavourable event which occurred was traced up to British hostility.

That an attempt to form a commercial treaty with Portugal had failed, was attributed to the influence of the cabinet of London; and to the machinations of the same power were also ascribed the danger from the corsairs of Barbary, and the bloody incursions of the Indians. The resentment excited by these causes was felt by a large proportion of the American people; and the expression of it was common and public. That correspondent dispositions existed in England is by no means improbable, and the necessary effect of this temper was to increase the difficulty of adjusting the differences between the two nations.

With France, the most perfect harmony subsisted. Those attachments which originated in the signal services received from his most Christian Majesty during the war of the revolution, had sustained no diminution. Yet, from causes which it was found difficult to counteract, the commercial intercourse between the two nations was not so extensive as had been expected. It was the interest, and of consequence the policy of France, to avail herself of the misunderstandings between the United States and Great Britain, in order to obtain such regulations as might gradually divert the increasing trade of the American continent from those channels in which it had been accustomed to flow; and a disposition was felt throughout the United States to co-operate with her, in enabling her merchants, by legislative encouragements, to rival those of Britain in the American market.

A great revolution had commenced in that country, the first stage of which was completed by limiting the powers of the monarch, and by the establishment of a popular assembly. In no part of the globe was this revolution hailed with more joy than in America. The influence it would have on the affairs of the world was not then distinctly foreseen: and the philanthropist, without becoming a political partisan, rejoiced in the event. On this subject, therefore, but one sentiment existed.

The relations of the United States with the other powers of Europe, did not require particular attention. Their dispositions were rather friendly than otherwise; and an inclination was generally manifested to

participate in the advantages, which the erection of an independent empire on the western shores of the Atlantic, held forth to the commercial world.

By the ministers of foreign powers in America, it would readily be supposed, that the first steps taken by the new government would, not only be indicative of its present system, but would probably affect its foreign relations permanently, and that the influence of the President would be felt in the legislature. Scarcely was the exercise of his executive functions commenced, when the President received an application from the Count de Moustiers, the minister of France, requesting a private conference. On being told that the department of foreign affairs was the channel through which all official business should pass, the Count replied that the interview he requested was, not for the purpose of actual business, but rather as preparatory to its future transaction.

The next day, at one in the afternoon, was named for the interview. The Count commenced the conversation with declarations of his personal regard for America, the manifestations of which, he said, had been early and uniform. His nation too was well disposed to be upon terms of amity with the United States: but at his public reception, there were occurrences which he thought indicative of coolness in the secretary of foreign affairs, who had, he feared, while in Europe, imbibed prejudices not only against Spain, but against France also. If this conjecture should be right, the present head of that department could not be an agreeable organ of intercourse with the President. He then took a view of the modern usages of European courts, which, he said, favoured the practice he recommended of permitting foreign ministers to make their communications directly to the chief of the executive. "He then presented a letter," says the President in his private journal," which he termed confidential, and to be considered as addressed to me in my private character, which was too strongly marked with an intention, as well as a wish, to have no person between the Minister and President, in the transaction of business between the two nations."

In reply to these observations, the President gave the most explicit assurances that, judging from his own feelings, and from the public sentiment, there existed in America a reciprocal disposition to be on the best terms with France. That whatever former difficulties might have occurred, he was persuaded the secretary of foreign affairs had offered no intentional disrespect, either to the minister, or to his nation. Without undertaking to know the private opinions of Mr. Jay, he would declare that he had never heard that officer express, directly or indirectly, any sentiment unfavourable to either