no position between it and Borodino where he could have engaged the enemy with any prospect of success. Bonaparte, therefore, advanced to Moscow unmolested; but, on his entrance into that city on the 14th of September, he found its governor and inhabitants animated by the true Russian spirit: in some of the emperor Alexander's proclamations, the determination to destroy Moscow, if the enemy were likely to gain possession of it, had been announced: as a preparatory step, every thing was carried away that possibly could be removed, and persons were appointed to set fire to the city in different quarters; and, that the fire might not be extinguished, all the fire-engines had been removed or destroyed.

But before the goveruor of Mos. cow had recourse to this dreadful measure, he was resolved, as far as in him lay, to oppose the entrance of the French: a great part of the effective population was armed, and as soon as the advanced guard of the enemy appeared they attacked them in the streets and from the houses, impeding their progress and causing great destruction. When it was no longer practicable to prevent the entrance of the enemy, the city was set on fire: as it was built principally of wood, the fire spread rapidly in all directions; and before the French could stop the progress of the flames, only about a tenth part of it remained unconsumed.

It is impossible to describe, or even imagine, the disappointment, mortification and wrath of Bonaparte when he beheld Moscow in flames: he had promised his soldiers rest from their fatigues, refreshment, provisions in abundance, and comfortable winter quarters in it. These were now all vanished:

amidst the ruins of Moscow his army would in vain seek for shelter from the inclemencies of the approaching winter, or for a supply of provisions. His indignation soon broke out, as it generally does, in conduct at once tyrannical, cruel, and mean: he seized on the men who had set fire to the city, tried, condemned, and executed them. That these men were unjustly put to death there can be little doubt: they acted in conformity to the orders of the governor; of that man whom they were bound and authorized to obey, so long as he kept possession of the city; and the French do not pretend that it was set on fire after they obtained possession of it.

Perhaps there is not to be found in the annals of mankind any event so awfully grand and impressive as the conflagration of Moscow: it was a heroic deed, but of such a quality and nature as could only have been achieved by the heroism of a semi-barbarous race. Nations accustomed to the comforts, the ease and the refinements of civilized life would not have submitted to such a sacrifice; much less would they have been the willing instruments and objects of it. That it was an act perfectly justifiable cannot be doubted: if it is the first duty of a government to provide for the well-being of its subjects, that duty must lead it to protect them from foreign invasion and conquest: wretchedness undoubtedly followed the burning of Moscow; but that was trifling in degree, local in extent, and temporary in duration, compared with the dreadful consequences which must have resulted from the unchecked success of the French. To say that the inhabitants of Moscow were unwilling to second the intentions of the Russian

govern

government, is to libel them, and to betray at the same time the most profound ignorance of the national character: besides, it can hardly be supposed that the city could have been so completely destroyed, unless the inhabitants had at least consented, if not administered, to its destruction; for they must have known, from the previous measures adopted by the governor, that it was his intention to set it on fire, if the French advanced to it.

But though the right of the Russians to destroy Moscow appears to us indisputable, and founded on the most sacred principles of patriotism, yet the policy of the measure admits of some rational difference of opinion. Those who contend that, on the score of policy, Moscow ought not to have been set on fire, argued in this manner: if Bonaparte had found it entire, he might have been induced to prolong his stay in it, and thus his retreat would either have been absolutely impracticable, or, if practicable, being conducted in the very middle of winter, must have proved much more disastrous than it actually did. But it is hardly to be supposed that Bonaparte, even if he had found Moscow entire, would have attempted to winter in it: he probably never had such a mad purpose in view, though he announced it to his soldiers, to encourage them before the battle of Borodino: but he hoped, by gaining possession of Moscow, to intimidate the emperor Alexander, and thus to bring about a peace. The destruction of the city blasted these hopes; but at the same time it may be supposed that it induced him to stay in it longer than if it had not been destroyed: in the latter case, as in the former, he must have been

convinced, that, as there was no chance of moving the emperor Alexander, and no possibility of remaining with his army, surrounded by a Russian winter and Russian forces, it would be proper to prepare for his retreat; but if the city had not been destroyed, his army would have been refreshed, and provisions secured in a much shorter time than could possibly be the case in the midst of the ruins of Moscow. On the whole, therefore, the destruction of Moscow appears to us to have been a politic, as it was a perfectly justifiable, measure.

Of the situation of the French army in Moscow, where they expected to enjoy repose and plenty, some idea may be formed from the following considerations: for the mere purpose of shelter, probably enough of the city had escaped destruction; but the army must have been collected so closely together as not to have been capable of defence or resistance: but the difficulty of subsistence was insurmountable. Moscow itself is situated in a province not remarkable for its fertility; its supplies are drawn principally from the provinces of Tula and Kalouga: here Kutusoff had taken up his position. Bonaparte asserted, in one of his bulletins, that every house in Moscow was provided with necessaries of every description for eight months; but this assertion, like those he made respecting the climate of Russia, was totally unfounded, and calculated and intended to deceive the people of France. The inhabitants of Moscow were not accustomed to lay in their stock of provisions till about the middle of October, just before the snow begins to fall: then, but not before, their winter supplies are collected: at all other seasons of the year the 2C4

general

general stock of provisions was calculated only for a short period of consumption. Bonaparte, in the same bulletin, asserted, that large supplies of wine and brandy were found in the cellars: these could not be large, since these liquors are entirely confined to the highest classes in Russia.

The same causes which prevented him from finding any large stock of provisions in Moscow, threatened to render his retreat difficult and disastrous in the highest degree: about the end of October, immediately after the laying in of the supplies for the winter, there is a cessation of all intercourse between Moscow and the smaller towns, villages and estates; and this cessation continues during the whole winter. But Moscow was not only in a great measure destitute of provisions when Bonaparte entered it, but its local situation rendered it extremely unhealthy, especially to an army not accustomed to the climate, and already worn down by fatigue. There are three rivers which surround and flow through the city; and the fogs and exhalations from them, just before the fall of snow commences, are extremely injurious to the health even of the inhabitants who are seasoned to the climate.

As Bonaparte had been disappointed in his hopes of inducing the peasantry to join him, so was he also disappointed in the expectation which he had formed respecting the old Russian nobility who constantly resided at Moscow: they chiefly consisted of those, whose ancestors had objected to the removal of the seat of government to Petersburgh: their descendants nourished the same prejudice, and kept aloof, in a sullen and discontented mood, from the new noblesse of the em

peror in the new capital, the rapid growth of which they regarded with a jealous eye: but though they disliked the proceedings of the court, they were yet truly Russian in heart and sentiment: indeed they had about them even more nationality than the other classes of the Russian nobility, and consequently hated the French, and utterly disregarded the promises of Bonaparte.

From all this, it is apparent that the situation of the French army in Moscow was most critical, even if they had not been surrounded by numerous armies. Winter was fast approaching; the troops were already exhausted with fatigue; in Moscow they could not remain till spring opened the communication with the southern provinces; and if they retreated, how were they to obtain provisions, or endure a march of 500 or 600 miles, amidst the severe winter, the deep snows, and the almost hidden and impassable roads of Russia? The Russian generals, in the mean time, were not idle: their object was, to force Bonaparte from Moscow, by cutting off his supplies there; and when they had compelled him to retreat, to harass him continually: for this purpose, a great number of Cossacks, besides those which had been already employed, were collected: now was the season and the opportunity of their utility and triumph. Kutusoff, as has been already mentioned, took up a position to the south of Moscow, defending the fertile provinces from the foraging parties of the enemy. On the other side of the city Winzingerode was posted with a large body of troops, in order to exclude the French from the Petersburgh road and the northern provinces. Wittgenstein defended the line of the Dwina, where he carried on an unremitted and generally

generally a successful contest with Oudinot; but as soon as he learnt that the French were in Moscow, having been reinforced by 18,000 men from Finland, he began a movement upon that city, in the line which it would be necessary for Bonaparte to follow in his retreat. As it was of the utmost consequence to keep open this line, St. Cyr endeavoured to defend the important post of Polotsk against Wittgenstein; but he was completely routed, and driven beyond the Dwina: after this success, the Russian general continued his march on Witepsk, and thus cut off the communication between the main French army and the west of Europe.

Bonaparte had hitherto by his intrigues prevented peace from being concluded between Russia and Turkey; but now, as it was of the utmost consequence for the former power to bring up all her forces, she agreed to give Turkey such favourable terms, that peace was agreed upon. In consequence of this event, the army which had been employed on the Turkish frontiers immediately began its march through the south of Poland; and as it advanced it united with the corps which had been stationed in Volhynia, forming altogether nearly 80,000 men, Their first object, after they were rendered so power ful by this union, was to attack the Austrian auxiliary army, under the prince of Schwartzenberg: the Austrian government, though obliged by the treaty which it concluded with Bonaparte to furnish 30,000 men, had not employed them in very active warfare; their sole object was to keep up the communication between the main French army and this part of Poland: this they effected till they were attacked by the Volhynian army, when they

were compelled to cross the Niemen and separate themselves entirely from the main body. As soon as the Volhynian army had driven the Austrians across this river, it formed a junction with the force under Wittgenstein, on the high road leading to Moscow.

Bonaparte was now sensible of the dreadful error he had committed: unless he actually expected to dictate terms of peace at Moscow, it was the extreme of madness to have proceeded thither at the beginning of a Russian winter: and if he did expect either to dictate terms of peace, or to have his own offers accepted, he must have been ignorant of the determined hatred which all ranks in Russia bore towards him. The apology he offers, in his bulletins, for his military career in Russia, is a paltry one: according to him, the Russian winter this year commenced earlier than usual; as if the circumstance of the frost setting in a very few days sooner or later could have saved or destroyed his army! What must be the military prudence of that man, who calculates, for the safety of his army, and the success of his measures, on so uncertain a thing as climate! The fact is, Bonaparte in all his former campaigns had been indebted for his success to the boldness of his advances into the very heart of the enemy's country: that this boldness did not assume the character, deserve the name, and produce the consequences, of rashness, was less owing to his own foresight and circumspection than to the pusillanimity, treachery, and want of talents, of his opponents: without adverting to the different circumstances in which he was placed in Russia, from a difference of climate, and national character, he followed his

usual

usual plan, thus proving that he was defective in one great feature of a man of abilities, the adaptation of general principles and plans to particular circumstances.

Perceiving that, though he was in the heart of the Russian empire, and amidst the ruins of its ancient capital, no terms of peace were proposed, and that the Russians were gathering round him on all sides, he sent Lauriston to Kutusoff, to propose an accommodation, or at least an armistice: Kutusoff received the French negotiator in the midst of his generals, and replied to him with the utmost frankness: he told him that he was not authorised to receive any proposals either for peace or an armistice; that he would not send to Alexander, nor even receive the letter which Bonaparte had sent by Lauriston; and that with respect to an armistice, in particular, the Russian army had no occasion for it, and they were in possession of too many ad vantages to throw them away by accepting it. Lauriston, perceiving that Kutusoff was absolutely determined to listen to no terms of accommodation, began to complain of the barbarous manner in which the war was conducted: to this Kutusoff replied in language which ought to be addressed to all invaders: the French had introduced the barbarities of which they complained; they had commenced hostilities without reason; had invaded Russia, which by nature was placed beyond the power of injuring them, and it might have been thought beyond the reach of their ambition; they had inflicted as much misery on its inhabitants as they could; and now, when vengeance and re

taliation were at hand, they wished for peace: peace could not be talked of till the French were beyond the Vistula: Bonaparte had nothing to do but get out of Moscow how he could, since he came thither without being invited: the Russians, he might depend upon it, would do their duty; and their duty to their sovereign, their country, their murdered or banished and wandering wives and children, demanded that they should make their invaders suffer as much misery as possible: Bonaparte had proclaimed the campaign terminated at Moscow, but with the Russians it was only commencing.

About the same time Murat complained to general Miloradovitch of the excesses committed by the Cossacks: it is evident, though the conference was begun on his part, that Murat, if he had found encouragement, would have changed the subject to peace; but he met with no encouragement: the Russian general told him that the Cossacks acted according to orders, when they fired on the French foraging parties; and when Murat complained that the flags of truce were also fired upon, the Russian replied, "We want not to hear of parleys; we want to fight, not to negotiate; take your measures accordingly."-Perceiving that there was no chance of peace, and that the Russians were fully sensible of the reduced strength and miserable state of the French army, and had formed their plans in such a manner as to take the utmost advantage of their own good fortune, Bonaparte, after having been upwards of a month in Moscow, prepared for his retreat.

CHAP