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lished and maintained. It is obvious, however, that the thing to be sought is the greatest aggregate of freedom. This may well be consistent with some degree of restraint upon individuals. Every organization implies this. Every combination involves the subordination of the separate powers of its members to a common purpose, for the sake of attaining greater power. The savage rights his own wrongs by the strong hand. As he becomes civilized, he resigns his freedom to do this, for the sake of obtaining redress more cheaply and effectually through the combined action of his tribe or nation; and it then becomes necessary to establish general regulations, according to which the whole force of the community is brought to bear upon the aggressor. Every man who enters into a commercial partnership subordinates his individual will, in regard to the mode of conducting its business, to that of the majority of his associates. The rule sometimes restricts one, sometimes another; but it manifestly secures a greater aggregate of free action to the partners, than if the majority were liable at any time to be thwarted by the arbitrary volition of a single one. What is a State but a great partnership for such purposes, subordinate to the general purpose of promoting association among themselves, as its people choose to define ? What principle of rational freedom forbids restrictions that are selfimposed? forbids a people voluntarily agreeing upon a mode in which future agreements may be made, through legislative agents freely chosen, that shall be binding upon all? What else are laws than the popular will, ascertained and recorded in the mode which the people have themselves agreed upon and designated?

It is quite apparent, we think, that the hostility which prevails so much among European Economists, not simply against particular governmental regulations relating to trade, but to regulation in the abstract, arises from their inability to make the answer to the foregoing questions which the American makes. It is the consciousness that the powers of the State are wielded, not by the many but by the few, that is at the root of the aversion. We have no occasion for such a feeling. We may regard a regulation as unwise and injurious, but it is the agreement of the people who are to suffer by it if it is so, who have, therefore, every motive for enlightening themselves in respect to its operations, and who have the power to repeal

it when they choose. Education is not the monopoly of a class or a party. The laws of Nature tend to its diffusion, and our institutions co-operate with them. We have no reason, therefore, to fear that if we are right the people will not find it out; and great reason to distrust our judgment, if the people do not concur in it.

The progress of society in population and wealth naturally tends to diminish the proportion of its members who are occupied in the duties of government; or, what comes to the same thing, the labour that it is necessary to devote. A people, thinly scattered over a large territory, requires a large portion of the time of its males to be spent under arms. Its feebleness invites aggression, and aggression provokes reprisals as well as defence. A vast deal of military service is therefore imposed in the first stages of society upon its members. "War," said Napoleon, "is the science of barbarians." Every man is a soldier, and alternates between the camp and the farm. He is an enormously expensive soldier, as all experience with militia troops has shown; and the intermitting service which makes a poor soldier, spoils the man who might have been a good agriculturist or mechanic. Robberies, and other similar causes of internal insecurity, abound in inverse proportion to the density of population. To guard against their commission, and to detect and punish the offenders, requires a greater share of the labour which a sparse community has at command, than when it has become dense. Labour is most unproductive at that stage of social, progress when the burden of defence is greatest; and governments are relatively most strong, employ proportionately most men as soldiers, constables, judges, &c., when their constituents are least numerous, when their accumulated capital is smallest, and the labour devoted to its increase is least effective. Taxes paid in money or personal service are then more onerous, than when, at an advanced stage of progress, the absolute amount collected is vastly greater. The occasions for governmental interference, and the need of governmental agencies, diminish as the power of private association grows with the increase of numbers, and the curtailing of the distances which separate men from each other. It is the same with the purely industrial operations of the State. It is only thirty-five years since the construction of the Erie Canal was deemed an enterprise of such magnitude

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as to strain the powers of the State of New York. The idea of its being made by a private corporation would then have been regarded as visionary to the last degree. Since that time a single corporation has constructed a railroad within the State, of more than double the cost of the Erie Canal. Nobody doubts the wisdom of the construction of the canal by the State at that time; while no one would now regard it as a sufficient reason for the State's undertaking an industrial enterprise, that its cost would be ten times as great.

. There are palpable objections to States assuming any industrial employment, when individuals can be found with adequate means. The vigilance of individual supervision, and the keenness of private interest, secure an economy, which is never obtained where the loss caused by neglect is not borne in its entire weight by the guilty party, but is divided among a multitude. This is so well known as to dispense with the necessity of enlarging upon it. If the State could secure the same profit as one of its citizens, or an association of them, it is difficult to perceive any reason why the community should forego an advantage, in which all its members would share. But unless it can render a specified service at the same or a less cost than individuals, it is plain that it imposes a tax upon those with whom it deals, which is unjust because it is partial, or must make up the loss by a tax on the whole for their exemption, which is equally unjust.

When it is said that no objection can be perceived to operations by government for pecuniary profit, except the general inability of government to work with the same economy as individuals, it is on the supposition of the free consent of the people, who can determine the questions of expediency relating to a particular case, or inhibit the government by permanent restrictions from undertaking such classes of industrial enterprises, as they deem it wise to reserve for private action. If government, in pursuance of what we deem its most general purpose, facilitates and encourages association among individuals, it thereby extends the power of private competition with the State, and diminishes the temptations for it to attempt any operation for pecuniary profit. When the people of the State of New York revised the Constitution in 1846, they deprived the government of the power to retire from the only business relations which

the State sustains towards the public, by providing that "the Legislature shall not sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any of the canals of the State, but they shall remain the property of the State, and under its management for ever"; and that "the Legislature shall never sell or dispose of the salt springs belonging to this State." They, at the same time, made the enlargement of the Erie Canal, and the completion of certain others, obligatory. The security which they took against future industrial enterprises on the part of the State, consists in provisions prohibiting the credit of the State being loaned to, or in aid of any individual, association or corporation; and prohibiting the State's contracting debts to exceed $1,000,000, except to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or defend the State in war, "unless such debt shall be authorized by a law for some single work or object, to be specified therein; and such law shall provide for the collection of a direct annual tax, sufficient to pay the interest of the debt as it falls due, and redeem the principal within eighteen years"; which law is inoperative until it shall have been submitted to the people, and ratified by a majority of those voting upon it. These provisions have been substantially copied by several States which have revised their fundamental law since the year 1846.

The same constitution deprived the government of a power, which it had formerly possessed, of impeding private association. In order that numerous persons should be willing to unite and contribute their capital to be employed for a common purpose, it is necessary that they should be at liberty to contract with each other, and those with whom they may have dealings, upon such conditions as they deem proper. If a thousand persons combine to build a railway or a factory, they must entrust the management of their property to a few agents. The stake which each has in the skill and fidelity of those agents is proportionate to the amount he contributes. It would be the most natural arrangement in the world, that the partners should agree that their power, in regard to the selection of those agents, should be proportioned to their several risks, and that they should divide the profits resulting from their operations, or contribute to the loss in the same proportions. To such an arrangement, as between themselves, the law has presented

no obstacle. Suppose, however, that one of them has embarked in the undertaking, not only the whole of his own property, but capital which he has borrowed for the purpose from a third person, who chooses not to invest his means for the sake of a contingent profit, but is willing to entrust them to the probity and judgment of his friend for a stipulated interest. Others may contribute but a small portion of their capital, preferring to buy State stocks with the remainder, or to employ it under their personal supervision in agriculture or commerce. Upon the arrangement above stated being proposed, the exceptional individual might well say to his associates, "Gentlemen, I embark in this business with the hope and expectation of profit-so do you all. You have, nevertheless, very properly made a provision in the case of loss, which is undoubtedly equitable. I think it fair, however, to inform you that the provision, so far as I am concerned, will prove entirely nugatory in case we sustain a loss of capital. You have the whole of my property already, and more, too. I shall have no means of contributing to make up a loss. If I should obtain the means by my future earnings, I should feel bound to repay the borrowed capital entrusted to me, the owner of which gains no profit by our success, as you will, and, therefore, in justice, should suffer less by our failure. I propose to promise only what I can perform. When the capital I contribute is gone, I intend to be under no liability to make it good." If the others accede to his views, still the law makes no objection to the contract between themselves. They were prevented, however, by the common law of partnership, from making the same arrangement with the public. The law held each partner liable for the entire debts which the copartnership might contract. After the entire capital had been exhausted, any creditor might resort to the individual property of any one of the partners for satisfaction, leaving him to obtain from the others what he could. Another difficulty in regard to partnership was, that a member desirous of withdrawing his capital, or selling it to another person, who might be willing to take his place and continue the business, could not do so without the consent of all the partners; and if he obtained it, he still remained liable to creditors for all debts previously contracted.

The only mode of association in which the difficulties above enu

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