pline of which, or both, they conscientiously, disinterestedly, and unequivocally dissent ?"

In the same debate Mr. Wilks, himself, I believe, a Dissenter, and the Member for Boston, said

which they are called upon to pay, but, that emption from any charge upon his property as Protestant Dissenters they are called on to for the support and maintenance of the support a church, from the doctrines and disciChurch, shall cease to have the privileges appertaining to a member of that Church; that is to say, that he shall not be able to compel the clergyman to perform over him any religious rite. For, surely, it cannot be thought reasonable that a Dissenter shall at one and the same time say that he conscientiously objects to contribute to the maintenance of a Church because he dissents from her doctrine and her discipline, which are an abomination to him, and ne

"The principle for which the Dissenters contended was, that every man has a right to worship God according to his own conscience, and that he cannot, consistently with justice, contribute a doit to the support of a form of worship which his conscience condemns; and if any Dissenters did not act on that principle, they deserved the re-vertheless insist that the Church shall be spect neither of the Established Church, nor of those to whom they professed to belong."-[3 Hansard, xxxij. 1031.]

And in 1837 Lord Brougham, after presenting many petitions in the House of Lords, observed

"It was on the ground that they considered the rate injurious to the interests of religion, as well as oppressive to them individually, and hard upon them conscientiously, that the great bulk of the prayers of the petitions were founded."[3 Hansard, xxxvij. 557.]

Now, Sir, the Bill which I ask permission of the House to introduce, will remove entirely the objections of the conscientious, though it will not remove those of the political Dissenter. And next, I confess, to my pleasure at relieving the really tender conscience of the honest Dissenter, would be my satisfaction at defeating the machinations of the dishonest Dissenter, who made his conscience a pretext for political agitation, who desired the wound to be kept open, lest his subject for declamation should be taken away.

Sir, I propose that every Dissenter, on professing himself to be such, shall be exempted from the payment of church rate. It is said, "Ah! but how can you define Dissent?"

compelled, whenever he may think fit, to perform her rites in his behalf. Surely this is not a claim for liberty for yourself, but for tyranny over others. I further propose a mode whereby persons who have withdrawn from the Church

sha be allowed to return to it. It has happened that persons who, in a moment of pique or from want of due consideration, have left the Church, have wished to return to her again. To these I would open wide the door; and I propose that, regard being had to the proper ecclesiastical authorities, and that under their sanction, a Dissenter, on signifying his wish to withdraw his statement, should be restored to the Church, and, of course, to all his former obligations. I also propose that a Dissenter claiming such exemption should cease to have any right to vote in vestry, or on any question relating to a church rate, or to the management of the property or affairs of the Church.

Then, Sir, with respect to the law and the administration of it over Churchmen. I do not propose any alteration in the former, because, after much consideration, I think the law itself has been made plain by many judicial decisions, and is in itself reasonable and wise.

Sir, I have no intention of doing any- By the existing law it is competent to thing of the kind-my faculties are wholly the Churchwardens, without summoning a unequal to the task-the difficulties of it vestry to provide the bare necessities of are to me insuperable-but there is no such divine worship, such as the bread and wine difficulty in my proposition. A person may for the holy communion, and the washing surely say, "I am a Dissenter." I pro- of the minister's surplice. But for every pose that he shall make that simple state- expense which passes beyond this bounment in writing. No conscientious Dis- dary, and partakes in the least of an exsenter can say that any intolerable griev-traordinary or an ornamental character, ance is imposed upon him by requiring the previous consent of the vestry must be this declaration. I propose that this state- obtained; and it is therefore competent to ment shall be kept by the churchwarden, the parishioners, if they please, to refuse and that a copy of it shall be evidence, in any court of law, of the exemption. I propose that a person who makes this statement, and who thereby obtains an ex

the vote and prevent the expense being incurred. Subsequently to the consent of the vestry for any material addition or alteration, the certification of the bishop or ordi

There cannot be better authority than that of Mr. Baines, of Leeds :

would.

"Q. 3357. Should you, as a Dissenter, but yet interested in the maintenance of the edifices of the Church as public property, be disposed to give up those edifices entirely to the members of the Established Church ?—I do not think I should feel justified in expressing an opinion upon a question of so much importance as that."

But being pressed he says

"If you ask for my mere individual opinion and feeling, it would be certainly to give them up to the Establishment, and not to disturb the Establishment at all in the possession of them; that is my individual feeling, but I cannot speak for others. I know no feeling to the contrary of that, however, I may say."

nary, expressed by what is called the Faculty Such, Mr. Speaker, is the outline of my of his Court, must be procured; and, again, scheme of the Bill which I ask the House the parishioners may object to and be heard to read a first time. That the principle of against the issue of this instrument-and it, namely, the exemption of persons from this brings me to the reform of the admin- paying church rates who give up their istration of this law. The present state claims of Church privileges, ought to sais very objectionable, owing to the expense, tisfy Dissenters, cannot, I think, be doubtthe delay, and the number of appeals, but ed, and there is evidence in the Report these are accidental evils and not essen- which confirms this natural exdectation. tially incident to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which, greatly altered and improved, for reasons which I think ought to “Q. 3356. (Chairman.) Will you state whesatisfy the House, I propose to retain. It ther you think, that if church rates were abolishhas been proposed to substitute the au- ed, churches would still be maintained in the agrithority of the magistrates at quarter-ses-tural parishes?—I am fully confident that they sions for that of the Consistorial Court; but it requires a moderate acquaintance with the subject to see the unfitness of this tribunal. Objections to a church rate are not simply or principally to the amount; if they were, something might be said in favour of quarter-sessions; but objections are frequently made to the character of the subject-matter for which the rate is made. Whether the spiritual wants of the parishioners required the addition or the alteration--whether it tended to their edification, and in these days especially, when ornaments are often supposed to be symbolical of doctrine, surely these are questions proper for the adjudication of the Consistorial Court. I propose, therefore, that proceedings in a matter of church rate should be heard summarily and vivá voce, and that there shall be only one appeal on a matter of law to the court of the province. With these improvements and alterations I think justice would be more cheaply, expeditiously, and properly done in the Consistory than in any other tribunal, unless, indeed, the House was prepared to say that, with no amount of reform, under no circumstance, and for no objects, however strictly ecclesiastical, should the Consistorial Court exist, but that the bishop should, without any legal intervention of the kind, deal with questions of this description. Otherwise, there is no assignable reason why the Consistory should not be made perfectly efficient, and when made so, it seems to me much better to retain the authority of this the proper forum over cases of church rate, than to transfer them to a wholly incompetent jurisdiction. How could magistrates at quarter-sessions decide whether an ornamental addition or alteration for which the rate was perhaps on principle objected to, was of a proper ecclesiastical character or

not?

Then there is the evidence of Mr. Offor to the same effect:

ed among those who you say, and I suppose quite "Q. 228. (Mr. A. Hope.) Have you remarktruly, by the increase of knowledge raised a conscientious objection to paying church rates, any conscientious objection on their part to partake of what they would get in return for that church

rate, namely, a refusal to be married in the church, or to use its burying ground?—Yes, very much indeed.

“Q. 229. (Sir D. Dundas.) In your parish ?— In my own parish, and in others.

I

"Q. 234. (Mr. A. Hope.) All of your friends, suppose, who are unwilling to pay church rates, are willing to give the quid pro quo; they think it reasonable and just, that if they are to be emancipated from church rates, the church also should be emancipated from religious services for Dissenters those of marrying, baptising, burying, and so forth ?-Certainly."

Mr. Burgess, the Rector of Chelsea, appears to entertain the same opinion.

But if the Dissenter has no right to complain of, but every reason to accept my measure, the Churchman will perhaps complain that I offer-such is the common phrase-a premium on dissent. I hope not. I hope that the Church of England has a firmer hold upon her people; if she has not, it is high time that she acquired it. It is possible that some nominal Churchman may leave her; but is the loss of such any real

detriment to her? And is there no pre-yield to most men, in my attachment to mium on dissent now? Does this existing her I yield to none. state of things offer no argument in favour of the Dissenter?

SIR WILLIAM CLAY said, that in rising to move, as an Amendment to the Sir, I can truly say, that while in my Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman ability to serve the Church of England, Ithe Motion with respect to church rates,

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were well worth recalling for a moment. In 1837 the Braintree vestry postponed the consideration of a church rate for twelve months; in other words, refused it. The churchwardens levied one on their own authority, and it was resisted. The case first went to the Consistory Court. There it was confirmed. It went, "on motion for prohibition" (for reversing the decision of the Consistory Court), to the Queen's Bench. The prohibition was granted. The churchwardens appealed to

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the prohibition. But, in delivering the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, Chief Justice Tindall had thrown out a doubt as to what might have been their opinion had the churchwardens, instead of acting quite alone, had with them a minority of the vestry. The Court," he said, “would not give an opinion on that point, but reserved to themselves the right of having an opinion." Ill-omened words-fruitful as the dragon's teeth of strife. They were spoken in February, 1841. In that very year the war which rages still, began again. This time, of course, the churchwardens took care to have a minority of the vestry with them. Again the rate was resisted

of which he had, on the first assembling of subject matter, and arising between the the present Parliament given notice-he same parties. Did the House recollect was happy to find that on one important the circumstances of the case? They point he had the support of the hon. and learned Gentleman. He seemed fully to agree with him (Sir W. Clay) as to the present discreditable state of the law; it would, indeed, be strange if, after the investigation by the Committee of 1851, there could be two opinions on the subject. The actual state of the law respecting church rates was so inconceivably bad, that the real difficulty in treating of it was to convey an adequate idea of its absurdity. From the very inception of a rate to its final payment, all was uncertainty, hope- the Exchequer Chamber. It confirmed less perplexity in every step-doubts which no authority can remove as to the result. Did they want to make a good law by finding out the extremest instance of a bad one? Take the law on church rates, they would have a perfect illustration of everything they ought to avoid. It is doubtful what is a good church rate; doubtful by whom it should be made; doubtful whether the making a rate can be compelled; yet more doubtful by what process, when made, payment of it can be enforced; most doubtful of all, whether by any process it be worth enforcing. When a suit for church rates is begun, nothing is certain, except the utter uncertainty of the decision. Nothing can with confidence be pre-again it went to the Consistory Court. dicated as to the termination of the suit, except that if the parties to it are SO minded, there is no reason why it should have any termination at all. The thing would be supremely ludicrous, but for the mischief it does to great interests, and the sufferings with which it is attended. Was he using exaggerated language? The description falls short of the fact. Truth goes beyond what fiction would dare invent. Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, and the celebrated report of Martinus Scriblerus of the case of the piebald horses, are dull and prosaic by the side of the history of the Braintree case. Dickens and Swift are tame compared with the "Term reports." The "Braintree case!" Did any hon. Gentleman think he was referring to an obsolete illustration? Having heard of it so long, did he imagine it was concluded? By no means. It is in its full vitality. It stands for hearing at this moment before the House of Lords. Having commenced in 1837, it is yet to be decided in 1853. He had spoken of the Braintrce case as one; technically there are two, but substantially one only, the suits relating to the same

1

There it was pronounced invalid. The case was removed, by appeal, to the Court of Arches, the judgment of the Consistory Court was reversed, and the rate pronounced good. It was again removed to the Court of Queen's Bench, the rate was pronounced good as before; the decision was appealed against, and the case once more carried to the Exchequer Chamber. The Judges in that court (by four to three, however, only), confirmed the decision of the Queen's Bench. Appeal was made to the House of Lords, before which the case, as he had said, now stands for hearing. Should their Lordships' decision confirm the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber and the Queen's Bench, the effect, he apprehended, would be, that the jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Court would be reversed; but, from the judgments of these Courts, appeal may be made to the Privy Council. Thus, after sixteen years of law proceeding, and the expenditure of thousands, Braintree has yet, perhaps, some few years to wait, before it be certainly known whether the church rate of 1837 was good or bad. But he might be told, there was no neces